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...religion Islam is incompatible with modem thinking and scientific rationality. The second posits the opposite view (i.e., a compatibility thesis). A third view posits that there are some elements that can be incorporated, adapted, and adopted by the Islamic world but simultaneously rejects other elements of modernity or deem them as alien. These three views have advocates both within and outside of the "Muslim" world. Their rationale to adopt a particular view may differ; Muslim advocates of the incompatibility thesis would advance their view in the name of cultural "authenticity," while Western counterparts would advance their view in the name of, for example, ethnocentricity or secularism.
Recently, Francis Fukuyama claimed that, in his view, Islam and modernity are incompatible. He argued, "there does seem to be something about Islam, or at least the fundamentalist versions of Islam that have been dominant in recent years, that makes Muslim societies particularly resistant to modernity" (Fukuyama October 11, 2001). For Fukuyama, it is institutions such as liberal democracy and capitalism that characterize modernity. The prevalence of these two institutional systems in a given society qualifies that society as "modern" or, according to Fukuyama, as having "reached the end of history" (Fukuyama October 11, 2001). Fukuyama remains at the macro level of analysis. Accordingly, his claim will be tested at the appropriate level. Due to limitations of space, I will restrict the analysis to democracy.
Fukuyama uses Islam as a "yardstick" that offers an easy cultural essentialist explanation for the absence of democracy from most Muslim countries. In this he converges with other culturalists blaming Islam for whatever goes wrong in a Muslim country. This cultural essentialism, when empirically tested, does not seem to offer much explanation. Is there a better model that can explain the undemocratic nature of political systems in most Muslim countries, especially in the Middle East? In order to find out, we must test Fukuyama's theory in a Muslim context.
The analysis will be carried out at the macro level and will focus on democracy as one dimension of modernity. It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine other manifestations. Even democracy will be examined at the abstract level, for instance, measuring support for democracy as an ideal form government as opposed to other forms of government. The data available from the World Values Survey (WVS) and European Values Survey EVS allow for comparative analysis covering 80 percent of the world population. At the macro level, two statistical techniques are implemented. First, a correlation analysis is used to establish the strength of the relationship between the dependent variables (support for democracy, years of uninterrupted democracy) and the independent variable (religiosity with a focus on Islam). Then, regression analysis is implemented to evaluate the impact of religiosity (Fukuyama's single explanatory variable is religion), Human Development, and Political Opportunity Structures (POS) upon support for democracy. The latter is meant to measure the over-stretched state structure in the Muslim Middle East.
I argue that support for democratic ideals is universal, although the institutional state of democracy may not reach the ideal, or falls far short of it, in some societies (particularly Muslim societies). Many prominent scholars (Fukuyama 2001; Huntington 1996) have attributed this state of affairs to cultural factors. It is the aim of this paper to evaluate these claims. The data set, which consists of representative samples of each population, covers Islamic countries as varied as Arab-Islamic societies such as Jordan, Egypt, and Morocco and None-Arab Islamic societies such as Iran, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Turkey. Additionally, it covers countries of Latin America, North America, South East Asia, South Asia, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Africa, and Australia. These societies represent different cultural traditions, religions, languages, and ethnicities.
Cultural Essentialism
Reflecting on the debate that followed the tragic terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, Fukuyama remains convinced there is "nothing else towards which we could expect to evolve but liberal democracy and capitalism" (Fukuyama October 11, 2001). This seems to be a plausible assumption. However, Fukuyama's line of argument was diluted by rival claims and counter claims, especially after September 11, such as the "Clash of Civilizations" thesis in which Huntington argues, "rather than progressing toward a single global system, the world remained mired in a 'clash of civilizations' in which six or seven major cultural groups would co-exist without converging and constitute the new fracture lines of global conflict" (Fukuyama October 11, 2001). It seems that both theories are partly right. We anticipate that the empirical evidence will show universal and overwhelming support for democracy and, at the same time, show the persistence of diverse cultural heritages and traditions in Huntington' s cultural zones. But does this mean that conflicts would be driven by cultural differences? Are some cultures (in particular Islamic) resistant to democracy and its ideals, while other cultures are receptive of these ideals (Christian)?
The danger of involvement in a conflict may come about as a result of the absence of democracy in a given society but quite certainly not of cultural differences. (1) The atrocities of September 11 committed by Muslim ultra-extremists promoted the idea of the clash of civilizations and many have taken it for granted; identifying the Islamic cultural zone in contrast with the West symbolized by the United States. Even Fukuyama himself, who advocated a single model of evolution to "modernity," has accepted a version of Muslim exceptionalism in which Islam or some versions of Islam are incompatible with modernity. By exempting Muslim societies, Fukuyama undermines the universality of his own thesis. Because liberal democracy and capitalism have universal appeal, Muslim societies should be attracted to them as any other society in the world. It is understood that if religion, in general, constitutes a hindrance to democracy, it should hold true for all religions with no exceptions. Some religions may be less rest rictive than others depending on whether they have been through a major reform in modern times (e.g., Protestantism).
But can we really reduce the whole issue to religion as the only factor? As the literature suggests, the answer is no (Rueschemeyer et al. 1992; Vanhanen 1997; Dahl 1998; Inglehart 1997). There are more factors to look at such as modernization, industrialization, urbanization, literacy, colonial legacy, international trade, international political economy (weapons and oil), interpersonal trust, wellbeing, secularization, social class, globalization, openness of the market, distribution of economic and intellectual resources, regional and international conflicts, nationalism, state structure, elite orientation, and state legitimacy. All of these factors play some role in determining the shape of the political system a society may have or prefer to have. The concern here is to test the impact of religiosity on support for democracy.
We can anticipate that high levels of support for democracy are to be found in societies where it has functioned properly and successfully for well over a century, for instance, Western Europe and North America. In other underdeveloped societies, democracy may have even higher levels of support because it represents the hope of the people for development, since almost all societies that embraced these democratic institutions are well-to-do societies.
Fukuyama (2001) argues,
modernity has a cultural basis. Liberal democracy and free markets do not work everywhere. They work best in societies with certain values whose origins may not be entirely rational. It is not an accident that modern liberal democracy emerged first in the Christian west, since the universalism of democratic rights can be seen as a secular form of Christian universalism. (Fukuyama October 11, 2001).
Modernity may have cultural bases but what are they? Is it religious cultural heritage that makes democracy attainable in one society and unattainable in another? Fukuyama seems to implicitly acquiesce that the religion of Islam cannot accommodate modernity. Clearly, this cultural essentialism requires examination. Because cultural values are epiphenomena, a more comprehensive test is required. For example, high religiosity is more likely to be found in less developed societies, while more aesthetic values are more likely to be found in rich and developed societies (Inglehart 1990, 1997). Therefore, levels of development largely condition both sets of values. In addition to the impact of socioeconomic modernization, the institutional structures of states contribute to understanding how a given country could have 90 percent of its population supporting the ideals of democracy and yet not be a democracy.
Equating universalism of democratic rights to Christian universalism seems to be an oversimplification. For all democratic states today are more or less secular. Moreover, the introduction of Christianity to Africa did not bring about Liberal democracies. Further, if one equates the universalism of democratic rights to Christian universalism, why did Central and Eastern Europe, Russia and Latin America not develop liberal democracies and capitalist free-market economy simultaneously with Western Europe? Instead they developed systems of an opposite nature: political authoritarianism and economic communism as opposed to democracy and free markets. Fukuyama's cultural yardstick of "Christian universalism" does not account for Japan's (Confucian) democracy and free market. Catholic Christian societies are different from the protestant Christian societies. They have different patterns of development and have experienced similar circumstances to some Islamic, Buddhist, Orthodox Christian, and Confucian societies. The fortunes of democracy in many of these societies explicitly indicate that there is more to the story than religion and cultural tradition.
Fukuyama (1992) posits,
there have been pressures for greater democracy in various Middle Eastern countries like Egypt and Jordan, following the Eastern European revolutions of 1989. But in this part of the world [the Middle East], Islam has stood as a major barrier to democratization. As demonstrated by the Algerian municipal elections of 1990, or by Iran a decade earlier, greater democracy may not lead to greater liberalization because it brings to power Islamic fundamentalists hoping to establish some form of popular theocracy. (P. 347; emphasis added)
Clearly, Fukuyama adopts and promotes a cultural essentialist argument. By emphasizing Islam as the obstacle, he underestimates, if not ignores, the dynamics of political processes within which "political Islam" (2) functions. Also, the same process can explain support for liberal democracy.
As Katerina Dalacoura (1998) forcefully argues,
if liberalism and Islamic Liberalism are bound together in Middle Eastern societies, the implication is that secularism is not an essential requirement for liberalism. The input of Islamic liberalism in political culture would not be authoritarian, although it would undoubtedly be conservative, as in the case of Christian Democratic parties in the European experience. (P. 192)
Using Islam as a yardstick to justify...
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