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Turkish Alevi poetry in the twentieth century: the fusion of political and religious identities.(Critical Essay)

Publication: Alif: Journal of Comparative Poetics
Publication Date: 01-JAN-03
Format: Online - approximately 17037 words
Delivery: Immediate Online Access

Article Excerpt
This article examines Turkish Alevi poetry in the twentieth century focusing on how the Alevi community integrates political issues within a traditionally religious genre. The figure of Kemal Ataturk, the state ideology of Kemalism, and the acts of violence the Alevi community have under the...

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...experienced Republic are recurring themes in this poetry. A contextual interpretation of Alevi poems contradicts our commonsense understanding of the supposedly distinct categories of religion and politics. The Alevi worldview does not operate with notions of "sacred" versus "profane" and indeed challenges our conception of religion and politics as distinct categories. The Alevi case provides us with a fascinating example of how we are caught in our terminological categories when we ignore the worldview of our subjects.

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[R]eligious studies as a cognitive discipline may actually distort or reduce that which it is claiming to investigate. As an example of this we shall consider the possibility that the secular framework upon which the modern discipline of religious studies is founded may actually subordinate religious phenomena and emic explanations of it to a secular meta-discourse. (Richard King, Orientalism and Religion, 42f.)

Entering Alevi spaces, such as association buildings, private living rooms, or cemevis, (1) one is very often confronted by a surprising visual arrangement: the portraits of the two Alevi saints, Ali and Haci Bektas, accompanied by that of Kemal Ataturk, the founding father and first president of the Turkish Republic, whose picture is almost omnipresent in Turkey. (2) Ataturk is commonly understood as a symbol for the state ideology of Kemalism, especially its key republican and secularist principles. Some Alevis, however, not only strongly uphold these republican and secularist principles, but also give them a religious meaning. These Alevis honor Ataturk as a saint, and also embed laicism and certain themes of republican history into their religious narrative.

About twenty percent of Turkish citizens are estimated to be of "Alevi" background. (3) The label "Alevism," referring to the veneration of the first Shiite Imam Ali, became popular at the beginning of the twentieth century, when it was applied to a number of regional socio-religious communities with similar beliefs, rituals, and social structures. (4)

The aim of the present paper is to investigate the fusion of religious and political identities of Alevism by examining Alevi religious poems of the twentieth century. Poetry is the medium in which this fusion is the most apparent. The medium of the poem offers a distinct voice that--through the use of the stylistic devices of metaphors and analogies--allows the formulation of positions not necessarily expressible in prose. I will look at the ways political issues are framed in these poems. Categorized according to topics, the given examples of Alevi poetry will illustrate the embedding of a variety of political themes in religious contexts.

To provide the background of the poems, it will first be necessary to outline some basic information about Alevi beliefs and history, as well as the role and the place of poetical tradition in Alevism. On a theoretical level, the goal here is to offer a sufficient explanation for the incorporation of political symbols and incidents into the religious narrative of Alevism. I will argue that the phenomenon has to be understood in the context of the societal developments of the twentieth century and the Alevi interpretation of these developments. However, I do not consider the historical approach alone as a sufficient explanation. There are particular aspects of the Alevi worldview that have to be taken into account. As I will try to show, the Alevi worldview has no proper equivalents for a paradigmatic way of thinking that explores religion by reference to dichotomous notions like religious/secular, religious/political or sacred/profane--especially if these notions are conceptualized in an essentialist manner. A question such as "How is it possible that Alevis declare their deep devotion to secularism while simultaneously referring to secular political issues and symbols of secularism in religious terms?" is based on a dichotomous concept of religion, which is not properly applicable for Alevism. However, astonishment about the Alevi fusion of religious and political themes should not lead us to reflexively view the Alevi phenomenon as a paradox. Instead, it should be taken as starting point for a critical evaluation of the conceptual presumptions underlying out terminology.

Proto-Alevism and Alevi Belief

The roots of Alevism as a sociologically perceivable phenomenon can be traced back to the Babai movement at the beginning of the thirteenth century. (5) The Babai movement was a socio-religious reform movement that, although superficially islamized, preserved elements of pre-Islamic Turkish belief and rites often labeled "shaman." (6) The rural milieu of the Babai was less influenced by the Koran-based Islam of the madrasa than by minor Islamic traditions, often referred to as "heterodox" (7)--such as Ismailism, Batinism, and various concepts of popular Sufi Islam.

In 1240, the Babai led an uprising against the Rumseldjuk Empire motivated by socio-economic tensions and legitimized by messianic claims. From the Babai movement onwards there are traceable historical paths that lead us to modern Alevism. These paths can be discerned not only through their historical actors, but also on the level of ideas. The Bedreddin movement of the early fifteenth century, and the Anatolian Kazilbas milieus that came into being from the late fifteenth century onwards are the most prominent examples of this tradition. All of these groups displayed distinct religious features, which can be summarily categorized as "revolutionary Mahdism." The belief in charismatic leaders as Mahdis explains the religious and political vigor of these groups: (8) once the end of days is believed to be close, the believer is urged to take an activist stance and engage for the case of the Mahdi (Dressler, Die alevitische Religion 45f.).

The history of the Bektasi order can also be integrated into this historical path. (9) The origins of Bektashism are linked to the Babai-movement, too, and the fundamental characteristics of the beliefs as well as the rites of Alevis and Bektasis are very similar. There is evidence that as early as the sixteenth century one branch of the Bektasiye and some Kizilbas-Alevi communities established institutional connections. These connections are still valid, which is one of the reasons why, in modern Turkish parlance, Alevis and Bektasis are often not distinguished. It is thus quite common to speak of the Alevi-Bektasi or of Alevilik-Bektasilik ("Alevism-Bektashism"). (10) In view of these connections and similarities between the two, in this study I will also discuss some Bektasi poems. The formal difference between Alevis and Bektasis emerges in the respective borders of the communities. While descent determines whether one is Alevi, the Bektasiye is a Sufi order, and therefore anyone who fulfills certain conditions can be initiated as a Bektasi. Before the Sufi orders were banned and the lodges closed down by law in 1925, the lodges of the Bektasis tended to be closer to the urban centers than were the rural and peripheral Alevi communities. The Bektasis were therefore more familiar with literate urban culture. Nevertheless, the religious worldview of Bektasis and Alevis is basically the same, even if the Bektasis would generally express that worldview in more sophisticated terms.

The sixteenth century was decisive for the institutionalization and identity formation of both Ottoman Sunnism and Kizilbas-Alevism. The Kizilbas ("Redheads") were adherents of the Safevi order. In 1501, Ismail, the Pir of the order at that time, founded the Safavid Empire in Iran. Motivated by their spiritual bounds to Shah Ismail, whom they venerated as the Mahdi and with whom they wanted to territorially connect, Anatolian Kizilbas undertook several anti-Ottoman uprisings at the beginning of the sixteenth century. (11) The Ottomans succeeded in suppressing all of these uprisings, and toughened their centralization and assimilation politics. The primary motive for the Ottomans' anti-Kizilbas measures was the latter's unwillingness to accept Ottoman political authority. The Kizilbas appeared at best as politically unreliable and at worst as subversive allies of the Ottomans' eastern rival, the Persian Shah. (12) The Ottoman state legitimized its anti-Kizilbas measures through religious arguments: Kizilbas were accused of heresy and even of unbelief. (13)

The Kizilbas responded by separating themselves from non-Kizilbas and seeking shelter from Ottoman authority in remote areas of Anatolia (Dressler, Die alevitische Religion 99-103). In this societal seclusion, the diverse Kizilbas tribesmen, so far mainly united by their allegiance to the Shah, developed ethnic boundaries: commitment to the Safevi Pir was replaced by birth in a Kizilbas community. It is my suggestion that this transformation marks the point from which we should speak of proto-Alevism. These proto-Alevis, to whom the Ottomans kept referring to as Kizilbas, were considered politically unreliable heretics, and were thus never integrated into Ottoman society. (14) It was not until the early twentieth century, during the rule of the Young Turks, that we find individual members of proto-Alevi tribes in anything but the lowest positions in Ottoman institutions (Kieser 283).

Since the religious worldview of proto-Alevism was an important aspect in the development of an Alevi identity, it should be looked at more closely. (15) In the religious worldview of Alevism, the distinction between batin and zahir and the belief in the immanence of God are basic principles (Dressler, Die alevitische Religion 105-23). The term batiniye (Arab.: batiniyya) refers to the adjective batini (Arab.: batini), literally meaning "inwardly" (Hodgson). Historically, the term batiniyya is a designation for the religious worldview of the Ismailiyya, or Sevener Shia, a worldview that was later integrated into and transformed in Islamic mystical discourses. There are indications of Ismaili influence on the aforementioned Babai movement. (16) The batiniyya worldview is based on a distinction between the batin, the "interior," "hidden" and the zahir, the "exterior," "visible." According to the Alevi understanding of batiniye, what is important is the inner meaning of religion. This holds true for the interpretation of everything related to the spiritual path. Through reference to the batin, Alevis play down both the literal meaning of the Koran and the practical religious duties (especially the ritual prayer, the pilgrimage to Mecca, the fasting) devised by orthodox Islam. For Alevis, all these practices are only zahir, and are not of importance for those who long for the "Truth" (Hakk) that is God.

In the Alevi conception of God we find a mixture of religious traditions. At the philosophical edge of the spectrum we come across Ibn al-'Arabi's wahdat al-wugud ("Unity of Existence") and hurufi-teachings. Alevis interpret the wahdat al-wugud, paraphrasing the Alevi dede Mehmet Yaman, as "the unity of God, nature and man." (17) There is no definite distinction between God and his creatures, for God is not transcendent. On the contrary, he manifests himself--and here we come across the Alevi and Bektasi adoption of the hurufi-teachings (18)--in the human being and not in the Koran. The following aphorism, ascribed to the thirteenth century saint Haci Bektas, and widely spread amongst Alevis, is often used by them to explain their understanding of religion: "The greatest book to read is the human being." (19) The divine is also believed to be present in certain stones, springs, trees, and at the tombs of Alevi saints. (20) The veneration of holy places and objects is a widespread popular Turkish practice, and no distinct Alevi feature. Similarly, there are non-Alevi Muslims, be they Sunni or Shii, who adhere to the mystical teachings of the wahdat al-wugud. As in other monotheistic religions, there always has been a tension in Islam between those who conceive God as immanent and those who conceive him as transcendent (Peters 91). Also, the batini worldview is not an exclusively Alevi feature, but has permeated other mystical groups, too. What is characteristically Alevi, however, is their distinctive combination of these practices and beliefs, and the way they are embedded in Alid mythology.

Alevism in the Turkish Republic

It is due to their unhappy relationship with the Ottomans that the Alevis had sympathy for the abolition of the sultanate in 1922 and the caliphate in 1924, the two central institutions symbolizing and legitimizing Ottoman political and religious power. Modern Alevi interpretations of the Turkish War of Independence (1919-1921) stress the Alevi support for Mustafa Kemal, the later Ataturk. (21) Mustafa Kemal organized an Anatolian resistance movement against the European allies, who had occupied vast parts of Anatolia following the Ottoman collapse after World War I. According to the same Alevi accounts, Alevis also supported Kemal Ataturk in the period of comprehensive societal reforms undertaken under his presidency in the newly founded republic. The modern Alevi narrative conceives of Ataturk's reform program--which transformed a theocratic empire into a republican secularist nation-state--as liberation from Ottoman oppression and from religious discrimination. Whereas the historical extent of Alevi support for the War of Independence and for the secularist Kemalist reform program is still a subject of scholarly dispute, (22) there can be no doubt that the Republic in fact improved the situation for the Alevis. Even though the Alevis are still not recognized as a distinct community, they are no longer considered heretics by the state. (23)

In the course of the history of the republic, Alevism underwent far-reaching transformations (Kehl-Bodrogi, "Die 'Wiederfindung';" Vorhoff, Zwischen Glaube; Dressler, Die alevitische Religion 171-76). Economic and societal changes resulting from industrialization initialized a rural exodus in the 1950s and 60s. Large numbers of Anatolian villagers, Alevis and Sunnis, migrated to the urban centers. Hence, the historic physical segregation between Alevis and Sunnis came to an end. At this time, most Turkish citizens came to some arrangement with the nationalist and secularist state ideology of Kemalism, some of them enthusiastically, and most of them pragmatically. Many Alevis went even so far as to sever ties with the religious beliefs and rites of their ancestors. In fact it is very difficult today to find young Alevis who have received even basic information about Alevism from their parents. Alevi traditions depend on oral transmission, and the interruption of this transmission from the 1940s until the late 1980s caused a serious erosion of religious knowledge in the Alevi population. Substituting Turkish-nationalist, Kurdish-nationalist, (24) or socialist identities for their religious and tribal identities, most Alevis underwent a far-reaching process of secularization.

The situation changed after the military coup of 1980. The new military regime responded to the clashes of the late 1970s between the rival groups of the ultra-nationalist right and the left by destroying the left and boosting Islamic institutions as a bulwark against them. Islamic education in public schools and Islamic institutions in general received financial and ideological support never seen before. Religious symbols entered the public sphere and religious language became part of public discourse to an unprecedented degree. (25) For many Alevis, this situation precipitated a severe identity crisis. The political left, with which many of the younger generation had identified themselves, was destroyed. The idea of socialism was losing its pervasiveness, a trend accelerated by the erosion of socialist regimes toward the end of the 1980s. But unlike their former political counterparts, the entirely Sunni ultra-nationalist movement, Alevis no longer had a religion, to which to turn, since the institutions of traditional Alevism were almost entirely eroded. A longing for rediscovery of Alevism emerged, and in the...

NOTE: All illustrations and photos have been removed from this article.



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