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...Freedheim 1994; Evans 1995, 1996; Wang 1999). common concern of much of this literature is local empowerment through state decentralization (Hadenius and Uggla 1996; Heller 1999; Lange 2003). By increasing local participation in government, this view suggests that decentralization is able to exploit the knowledge and resources of both state and societal actors in order to optimize policy implementation and make possible a more democratic form of development. Yet, while not denying its potential benefits, others find that decentralization often fails and sometimes empowers a select few, resulting in rent-seeking and extreme power inequalities (Migdal 1988; Putnam 1993; Migdal, Kohli, and Shue 1994; Mamdani 1996). Consequently, an understanding of the processes underlying the different outcomes of decentralization is needed to guide future efforts to empower local communities and promote broad-based development.
This paper suggests that network structures affect whether decentralization will take the developmental or despotic form since they are the fundamental determinants of information and resource flows among state and societal actors. Adapting insight from economic sociology, it suggests that certain network structures--structural holes limit the possibility of positive-sum relations between state and society by endowing intermediaries with control of information and resource flows. Alternatively, dense networks that bypass intermediaries make possible a less encumbered flow of information and resources and thereby positive-sum relations.
After briefly presenting a theoretical framework and describing a nested methodological approach, the paper provides a comparative-historical analysis of two former British colonies in Africa: Mauritius and Sierra Leone. The analysis focuses on how different forms of colonial rule created different network structures between state and society and investigates the impact these networks had on the success of decentralizing reforms that took place after World War II. Comparison of the two cases provides evidence that structural holes promoted decentralized despotism in Sierra Leone and that structural synergies made decentralized development possible in Mauritius.
Network Structures and Development
Recent works on state-society synergy suggest that positive-sum relations among state and societal actors are made possible by three basic factors. First, as the state-centered sociological literature recognizes, effective states are necessary because they provide direction and resources to societal actors. This literature usually stresses the corporate coherence of the state and its ability to act collectively on a very large scale (Rueschemeyer and Evans 1985). The second emphasis is on civil society. Here, scholars suggest that dense and horizontal ties within society are needed to harness the participation and knowledge of societal actors. In addition, such relations promote norms of reciprocity and trust and therefore facilitate collaborative relationships among diverse actors (Putnam 1993). Finally, the actual structure of relations between state and societal actors affects state-society synergy (Evans 1995). Obviously, state and societal actors must engage one another in collaborative relationships in order to pursue common goals. In particular, network relations must exist for the transfer of information and resources among actors, both of which are necessary for large-scale coordinated action. While most scholars recognize that all three factors are necessary for state-society synergy, few investigate the latter, leaving a general lacuna in the literature on whether differences in network structures affect the possibility of synergistic relations. This paper therefore focuses on the configuration of ties linking state and society, attempting to increase insight into their effects on state-society synergy.
Structural Holes and Decentralized Despotism
A central focus of network analysis is the spread of information and resources through social relations. Granovetter (1974), for example, suggests that bridging network ties--those that link two otherwise separate network clusters--are the most efficient means of spreading information among groups; a finding that suggests that bridging ties might be very beneficial for broad-based mobilization and, therefore, state-society synergy. Yet, intermediary network positions also shape the discretionary power of individuals (Cook et al. 1983; Marsden 1983; Gould 1989). In fact, if the intermediary is able to benefit from the control of information and resources and takes the role of a gatekeeper, (1) bridging network structures might actually limit the potential of positive-sum relations between the nonconnected actors and promote negative-sum relations in which the intermediary benefits from rent-seeking activities at the expense of the non-connected actors. Because of the value of the information and resource flows between state and society, gatekeeping intermediaries have both the incentives and the capacity to extract large rents, suggesting that they have very detrimental effects on positive-sum relations.
Similarly, Burt (1992) describes a particular form of network structure--a structural hole--that concentrates information, resources, and power in the hands of intermediaries. As shown in Figure 1, a structural hole exists in a network of social relations when two actors (A and C) are connected by a third (B). As such, actor B is positioned at a structural hole between actors A and C. Most basically, an intermediary position in network relations provides individual actors with an advantaged capacity to exploit information and resource flows for personal benefit. Burt refers to this structurally endowed capacity to act independently as structural autonomy (see Figure 1).
[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]
In addition to structural autonomy, structural holes endow intermediary actors with high levels of structural power. While structural autonomy enhances the ability of intermediaries to pursue their interests through personal action, structural power enables intermediaries to pursue personal interests through the actions of others: It gives an intermediary the power to force others to act in ways benefiting the intermediary. As shown and described in Figure 2, structural holes cause non-connected actors to depend on intermediaries for information, resources, and services; and intermediaries are therefore able to extract rent. This rent-seeking, in turn, creates incentives for intermediaries to prevent the non-connected actors from interacting with one another and to limit the spread of information and resources and monopolize services as much as possible. As a result, structural holes limit both the frequency and positive-sum character of personal exchanges and concentrate power in the hands of certain individuals.
[FIGURE 2 OMITTED]
Besides disrupting individual interaction in small networks, structural holes can also separate large groups of individuals. As depicted in Figure 3a, intermediaries can control several structural holes and thereby have even greater structural autonomy and power, which can be used to limit exchanges between the two network clusters and thereby the possibility of coordinated action for mutual benefit. Alternatively, when new channels of exchange are opened, the ability of actors to control information, resources, and services is reduced (see Figure 3b).
[FIGURE 3 OMITTED]
Structural Synergies and Decentralized Development
In freeing the flow of information and resources, the closing of structural holes also expands the possibility of broad-based coordination among diverse actors. Such coordination, in turn, allows synergies among different coordination structures. As argued in this section, these structural synergies ultimately underlie many of the developmental benefits provided by state-society relations.
As recognized by the resource mobilization literature, network exchanges among groups of individuals are much more beneficial to broad-based coordination and mobilization than exchanges among isolated individuals (Morris 1981; Jenkins 1983; Gould 1991; Hedstrom, Sandell, and Stern 2000). Such superior capacities result from more efficient and extensive information exchanges as well as greater individual access to collective goods and organizations. Similar to the latter, much of the work on state-society synergy suggests that both state and societal actors are able to benefit from relationships with one another through the exploitation of the comparative advantages of their different coordination structures. That is, individuals are able to benefit from their dense network ties through greater access to and participation within multiple coordination structures, which, in turn, allow individuals to combine the coordination structures in synergistic ways. (2) Recognizing Esman and Uphoff's (1984) trilogy of coordination structures, three ideal types of structural synergies exist: bureaucratic-market, market-associational, and associational-bureaucratic (see Figure 4).
[FIGURE 4 OMITTED]
Dense networks among state and economic actors increase the coordination capacity of each by exploiting the state's central control, resources, and permanence to guide economic production and the market's ability to discipline production and engage a large number of individuals. A growing body of work recognizes that economic development depends on the combination of the bureaucratic and market structures (Amsden 1989; Wade 1990; Evans 1995; Leftwich 2000). Onis (1991) writes:
The key to rapid industrialization is a strong and autonomous state, providing directional thrust to the operation of market mechanisms. The market is guided by a conception of long-term national rationality of investment formulated by government officials. It is the 'synergy' between state and market which provides the basis for outstanding development experience. (Onis 1991:110)
Next, positive-sum relations between bureaucratic states and local associations utilize the centralization, resources, and permanence of the state and the adaptability, collective control, and low maintenance costs of local groups. Several analyses of state-society synergy recognize that network relations between state and local associations expand local-level development by enabling the state to engage a large number of local actors for policy implementation (Tendler 1993; Tendler and Freedheim 1994; Hadenius and Uggla 1996; Heller 2001; Lange 2003). For example, in a study of 16 developing countries, Uphoff and Esman (1984) suggest...
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