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Article Excerpt
There is a tension within the United Nations between intergovernmentalism and transnationalism, two forces that encompass different sets of interests and reflect distinct constituencies. As an intergovernmental institution, the UN reflects the overlapping interests of its member states, particularly those on the Security Council. Major initiatives and policies are promoted by accredited delegations, all of whom represent their governments. As a transnational organization, however, the UN also often represents a common good that transcends the sum of individual state interests. Such concerns are promoted by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and by the UN's specialized agencies, affiliated organizations, bureaucracy, and office of the secretarygeneral. In many cases, transnational concerns such as human rights or humanitarian relief conflict with the more traditional intergovernmental ones such as security. When this occurs, the UN is unable to function effectively.
This conflict between intergovernmentalism and transnationalism reflects a similar tension within the international system itself. Intergovernmentalism is certainly the dominant force in world politics, but transnational actors have also achieved increased visibility and influence within the global organization. From this perspective, the UN not only provides a forum for states to resolve their disputes, it also serves as a medium through which state and nonstate actors promote their often competing interests. Thus, the conflict between these forces within the UN can help to illustrate their respective roles in international politics.
In this article I examine this tension and explore what this may mean for the future of global politics. Since this is primarily a conceptual essay, I do not present original data nor examine specific cases in any detail. Rather my purpose is to identify and explain a phenomenon and provide a framework through which one can undertake empirical studies in the future.
In the first section I examine the intergovernmental and transnational foundations of the UN system. I argue that while traditional theories of international organizations can explain the intergovernmental side of the UN, they have trouble accounting for the transnational aspects. In the next section I try to account for this other face of the UN by suggesting that the UN is not only a forum for interstate cooperation, but also an institutional embodiment of an "international community," independent of the states that compose it. The benefits that are enjoyed by this broadly defined community can be viewed as the common good. In the third section I examine the inherent tension between these two forces. I argue that when the interests of the states conflict with those of the broader community, the organization becomes paralyzed. In the last section I discuss the broader implications of the conflict for theories of international relations.
In distinguishing between intergovernmental and transnational functions, I use the following criteria: First, which constituency is being served in a particular operation or program: the member states, local populations, nongovernmental interest groups, the "international community" as a whole, or regional organizations? I define those programs that serve primarily nonstate actors as transnational. Second, who are the primary actors initiating the operation or program: the member states, specialists within the UN agencies, government representatives to functional bodies, NGOs, or the UN Secretariat? Those activities that require the active cooperation and participation of the states are intergovernmental. Those that rely primarily on UN agencies, NGOs, specialized agencies, or the Secretariat are considered transnational. Third, through what process are state interests defined in a particular issue: domestically, through consultation with representatives from other countries, through interaction among special ists or representatives of NGOs, or by initiation of the secretary-general? Interests that develop through diplomatic or domestic political channels are intergovernmental, while those that evolve from within the UN structure are transnational.
The United Nations as an International Organization
From an analytical perspective, the UN is an enigma. It does not fit neatly into the traditional category of an international organization, nor does it embody the characteristics of a budding world government. (1) It was originally conceived primarily as a collective security organization, yet its goals, practices, and institutional structure suggest a far broader and more ambitious social agenda. It is an organization of, by, and for independent sovereign states, yet it is also a semi-independent actor staffed with a semiautonomous civil service. (2) Its constituency is the states, yet it also serves a wide range of nonstate actors, regional organizations, and even individuals regardless of nationality or boundaries.
On the one hand, the UN reflects the basic principles of intergovernmentalism. (3) It was created by member governments and is governed by representative consultative conference organs; it has a permanent secretariat. (4) Delegates representing the interests of their governments largely develop its policies and programs through a process of bargaining and collaboration. And like all intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), the UN is designed to equip the multistate system with an administrative mechanism that can do things for the states that they cannot do well by themselves. Alan James describes this side of the United Nations as follows:
[The United Nations] fundamentally is nothing more than an association of sovereign states ... each member will be trying to use the United Nations to further its own interests ... States have not joined out of respect for the "U.N. idea" (but) for what they can get out of it. (5)
Both neorealist and liberal institutionalist theories can account for this face of the United Nations. For neorealists, the UN reflects the distribution of power and capabilities among its members. Created after World War II by the winning coalition, substantive authority rests with the great powers through the Security Council. During the Cold War, the organization's security policies largely reflected the dynamics of bipolarity and, subsequently, the interests of the only remaining superpower, the United States. In the area of political economy, the UN has reflected the structural conflict between North and South that comes from the skewed distribution of national material power capabilities in the international system. (6) As predicted by most realists, the outcome of this conflict has been generally determined by this same distribution of power. Finally, as realists would expect, the major powers have usually hesitated becoming involved in potentially violent situations where their vital interests were no t threatened; indeed, they have demonstrated a clear unwillingness to trust their security to the global organization. (7) As a result, the organization has not fulfilled the promise of collective security as espoused by the founders. (8)
Institutionalists, in both their strong and weak varieties, can also explain the intergovernmental side of the UN. The world organization brings together governments that support the fundamental goals of peace, security, and prosperity but recognize that in an interdependent world they can accomplish this only through interstate coordination and collaboration. Governments often find that by themselves they cannot achieve their objectives, since doing so depends upon exerting authority over actions within other states' jurisdictions. As a state's own vulnerability to others' actions increases, its willingness to trade some legal freedom for additional influence over others increases. (9)
Thus, the United States sought to...
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