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...story is important because it provides key insights into how the Air Force flies, fights, and adapts during combat.
This article reviews the early years of the Vietnam War and how the need for Fast FACs evolved. Prior to the spring of 1967, the USAF tasked O-1 and O-2 FACs to conduct visual reconnaissance missions over the southern area of North Vietnam. In response, the North Vietnamese deployed additional air defenses, driving the slow and vulnerable propeller-driven aircraft back across the border. Operation Commando Sabre was the first test of the Fast FAC concept. Jet aircraft would perform FAC duties, adapting the two-seat version of the F-100 Super Sabre to the visual reconnaissance and strike control mission. This article also highlights the build-up and operations over the Misty FACs three-year history until the unit's dissolution in May 1970. Commando Sabre operations never consisted of more than twenty-two pilots at any given time and rarely involved more than six single-ship missions per day. Yet, they succeeded in finding and destroying targets where other methods had failed. This success came at price, though, as the low altitude Misty FAC missions proved to be among the most dangerous missions flown in the Vietnam War. Nonetheless, the tactics developed by the Misty FACs--including visual reconnaissance, strike control, and search and rescue operations--formed the foundation for FAC and Killer Scout operations employed during Operations Desert Storm and Allied Force, and remain valid today.
Vietnam: The Interdiction Campaign
Prior to August 1964, the U.S. military presence in South Vietnam was limited to an advisory role. However, instability within the South Vietnamese government led President Lyndon Johnson to question Saigon's ability to withstand the increasing threat from North Vietnam. (1) In the wake of the Gulf of Tonkin incident of August 2, 1964, Johnson's position shifted towards more aggressive and offensive measures, leading ultimately to the commencement of the Rolling Thunder air campaign in March 1965.
Johnson's primary goal for Rolling Thunder was to demonstrate the resolve of the United States, believing that a series of graduated air strikes on North Vietnam would compel Hanoi to withdraw support from the Viet Cong in South Vietnam. (2) A secondary goal was to improve morale and help stabilize the South Vietnamese government. Additionally, the air strikes were to limit the flow of reinforcements, weapons, and supplies to the Viet Cong. (3)
While Rolling Thunder was an offensive campaign, target selection was limited by the President to those approved during his Tuesday Rose Garden luncheons. This fell well short of the strategic air campaign proposed by the Air Staff, consisting of over ninety-four strategic targets. These limited air strikes alone, however, did not achieve Johnson's objectives and, by July 1965, he concluded that victory in Vietnam required a protracted campaign with more emphasis on military action in South Vietnam. (4)
As the Johnson administration shifted its emphasis toward ground operations and increased U.S. troop strength, the importance of close air support and the interdiction of supplies from North Vietnam to the Viet Cong in the south was likewise elevated. (5) Under the direction of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) Commander, Gen. William C. Westmoreland, the U.S. Army concentrated on direct military action in South Vietnam against Viet Cong and North Vietnamese regular forces. Restricted to South Vietnam, these ground operations relied heavily on close air support. (6) While the Air Force provided CAS within South Vietnam, it was also responsible for conducting the Rolling Thunder strikes in the North, including interdiction missions.
The North Vietnamese logistics and transportation system was centered in Hanoi. Chinese supplies flowed into Hanoi along roads and the rail system leading north, while Soviet supplies reached Hanoi via ships through Haiphong Harbor. These were then moved along rail and major road routes toward the South and transferred to smaller convoys, that maneuvered along a series of redundant roads and trails. The supplies were further dispersed as they approached the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and carried by truck, bicycle, or packed on foot...
NOTE: All illustrations and photos
have been removed from this article.
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