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Article Excerpt
Introduction
Since punctuated equilibrium theory was formally introduced to public policy studies in 1993, a rich scholarly literature has generally concluded that a fairly typical and classic pattern in public policy-making has included occasional strong exogenous shocks to various and usually stable policy niches, which has resulted in sharp, sudden, and material punctuated policy change based on positive feedback (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Breunig & Koski, 2006; Givel, 2006b; Jones, Sulkin, & Larsen, 2003; True, Jones, & Baumgartner, 1999; Wood, 2006a, 2006b; Worsham, 1998, 2006). A primary reason that this stable policy status quo occurs is because of constant and entrenched policy monopolies in policy subsystems (such as U.S. state tobacco policy).
However, negative feedback in the form of a substantial attempt to dramatically change policy but resulting in no significant policy change may also occur (Cashore & Howlett, 2007; Givel, 2006b). Some newer research in areas such as U.S. state tobacco policy and U.S. forest policy in the Pacific Northwest has confirmed that despite an attempt to sharply punctuate a particular policy system with positive feedback, the policy change was largely nonpunctuated in the form of negative feedback (Cashore & Howlett, 2007; Givel, 2006a, 2006b; Jones & Baumgartner, 2005; Wood, 2006b; Worsham, 1998). Moreover, in the U.S. state tobacco policymaking and I].S. forest policy in the Pacific Northwest studies, the basis to examine policy change was not based on tone or language of media coverage during the policy enactment and formulation process (Cashore & Howlett, 2007; Givel, 2006b). Rather, the foundation to examine policy change was how policy formulation, enactment, and implementation resulting in concrete public policy change were reflected in operationalized policy outputs of what government actually does or does not do.
What are the general implications of these newer findings of attempts at punctuated change resulting in largely nonpunctuated policy change with a negative feedback loop in relation to future directions in punctuated equilibrium research, analysis, and theory? As Baumgartner stated in 2006: "A Punctuated equilibrium (PE) perspective on the study of public policy reminds us to pay attention equally to the forces in politics that create stability as well as those that occasionally conspire to allow dramatic changes in public policy direction" (Baumgartner, 2006).
As Robert Ropetto also argued in 2006 in the book Punctuated Equilibrium and the Dynamics of U.S. Environmental Policy,
The data presented in Frank Baumgartner's chapter and elsewhere in this book show the dynamics of environmental policy behave as the punctuated equilibrium model predicts. Stability and incremental adjustment are the norm. Abrupt policy innovation and reversals do occur, but rarely. This pattern appears across many environmental and resource policy areas. (Repetto, 2006)
This view that punctuated equilibrium predicts policy behavior has been echoed in recent years for such diverse policy areas as state budget trends, federal budget trends, federal but not state tobacco control, nuclear power, and urban affairs (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Breunig & Koski, 2006; Jones, Baumgartner, & True, 1998).
However, can an attempt to punctuate the equilibrium of a policy monopoly not only generally result in negative feedback as some recent research has begun to indicate but also result in a myriad of nuanced and differing negative feedback policy patterns reflecting a variety of nonpunctuated policy changes? In this paper, I argue that beyond stable and long-term policy patterns followed by short-term and dramatic patterns of policy change associated with punctuated equilibrium and then new long-term and stable policy patterns, a nuanced examination of public policy output patterns over time can indicate a myriad of other different nonpunctuated forms. These policy output forms may include: linear and constant, linear and nonexponentially increasing or decreasing, exponentially increasing or decreasing, oscillating with constant or increasing or decreasing amplitude, or a combination or none of these types (Baumgartner &Jones, 1993; Box, 1994; Kantz & Schreiber, 2004; May, 1976; Williams, 1997). While many punctuated equilibrium studies have assessed punctuated policy change based on the language, "tone," and degree of media coverage in the political decision-making process, I also argue that punctuated equilibrium theory and analysis must occur with a focus on actual policy outputs based on what government does or does not do (Baumgartner, 2006; Baumgartner & Jones, 1993). This is necessary in order to analyze actual, ongoing, and real impacts by the policy-making process on society.
I also suggest that analyses over time of these various and nuanced patterns of policy outputs based on negative or positive feedback can also be analyzed, gauged, and compared in greater depth in tandem with the degree and extent to whether an attempt to punctuate the equilibrium of a policy niche in the policy-making system resulted in material, symbolic, or partially material and partially symbolic public policies. As Edelman wrote in 1960: "The most intensive dissemination of symbols commonly attends the enactment of legislation which is most meaningless in its effects upon resource allocation" (Edelman, 1960). A subsequent refinement of this classic definition of symbolic policy in 2003 by Box-Steffansmier, Kimball, Meinke, and Tate noted: "Symbolic representation, then, can be defined as activities that seek to convey the image that the legislator is hard at work for the interests of the constituency; regardless of the substantive significance of those activities" (Box-Steffensmier et al., 2003). Thus, policies not only can be symbolic or material but can be to one degree or another partially symbolic and partially material.
From 1990 to 2006, a substantial and often acrimonious mobilization of health advocates occurred in all states by litigators, regulatory agencies, health groups, and sympathetic politicians to enact effective tobacco control regulations and higher tobacco taxes (Edelman, 1960; Givel, 2006b; Studlar, 2002). This era of antitobacco advocacy has been characterized as depicting and denormalizing the tobacco industry as a "social menace" (Studlar, 2002). This mobilization was vigorously opposed by the tobacco industry (Edelman, 1960; Givel, 2006b; Studlar, 2002). In this paper, I examine ongoing...
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