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Article Excerpt
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Project Emily, whose fiftieth anniversary is being celebrated, was the deployment of U.S. Thor intermediate range ballistic missiles in eastern England. This deployment, as the whole development of the Thor missiles, was conducted under the utmost schedule pressure during the Cold War, motivated by fears that the Soviet Union would develop similar missiles faster than the United States could develop its intercontinental ballistic missiles. The risks accepted by the United States and England using an acquisition process known as "concurrency" are described in this paper, as are the consequences for the fielding and operation of completely new, unprecedented weapons requiring high reliability. This history provides the unique perspective of the American engineers, one of whom is a coauthor, describing the deployment and activation of the Thor missile squadrons in England.
Project Emily's Basis in the Cold War (1)
This history is driven by the sense of urgency born in the early Cold War, when the United States and its allies faced a closed Soviet Union whose motivations and actions were unknown. The U.S. began sending intrusive aircraft overflights over the heartland of the Soviet Union to understand what that secretive country was doing. A 1951 intelligence estimate by the Central Intelligence Agency displayed typical concern when it announced 'We believe that the ultimate Soviet Objective is a Communist world dominated by the U.S.S.R ... and that an armed conflict between the [U.S. and its allies] is eventually inevitable." (2) Estimations of the Soviet Union's intentions rapidly became even more gloomy and dire.
The increasingly pessimistic view of world events reflected what little evidence of Soviet actions the Soviets chose to release. The Soviet Union detonated its first atomic fission device, which aerial reconnaissance detected on September 3, 1949, years ahead of intelligence estimates. When the Soviet Union moved up to a thermonuclear fusion device on August 12, 1953, they had advanced from fission to fusion faster than the United States and its allies had. That seemed to indicate that the Soviet Union was not only catching up rapidly, but that their rate of advance was faster and accelerating. In the very near future, the Soviet Union would surpass the capabilities of the U.S. and its allies, and once in that strategically superior position, as the 1951 estimate had said, strategic nuclear conflict might become a reality. (3)
The United States military, and especially President Dwight D. Eisenhower, were committed to preventing another surprise attack like Pearl Harbor, which in a nuclear war would be catastrophic. Fearing the worst, the United States and its closest allies committed to a major increase in strategic nuclear forces. In addition to new bombers, the United States began to pursue land- and sea-based ballistic missiles. When thermonuclear devices became small enough to make a large ballistic missile of feasible size, the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) began development. The U.S. considered the ICBM an area where surely they had a lead over the Soviet Union, which was estimated to be capable of producing such a weapon by 1959.
However, U.S. development of large missiles did not advance as quickly as expected, and by 1955, it was clear that the U.S. might not be able to field ICBMs until the late 1950s. That meant there was a chance that the Soviet Union might beat the U.S. to this capability. Some early capability was necessary. Specifically, shorter-range missiles were necessary to support the Cold War needs of U.S. allies, such as the United Kingdom. (4)
By 1955, Donald A. Quarles had become the U.S. Secretary of the Air Force. His strong support for ICBMs stemmed from his having previously served as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Development, the office responsible for implementing the missile programs. Quarles had been most influential in the course of the U.S. ICBM programs prior to moving to the Air Force in mid-1955. Before taking over the reins of the Air Force, he had also been deeply involved in another, nearer-term missile project: the Thor Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM). (5)
The Thor traced its roots to the meeting of the Office of Defense Mobilization's Scientific Advisory Committee (ODM/SAC) in January 1955. Since 1954, their emphasis had been preventing surprise attack by a combined emphasis on gathering intelligence on Soviet actions and intentions, forming a strategic nuclear force second to no other nation, and a continental defense capability that would exact a high price from any airborne attack. (6) ODM/SAC had spawned the U-2 spyplane, the Corona spy satellite, and other revolutionary capabilities in the early days of the Cold War.
Consequently, the ODM/SAC urged development of a tactical ballistic missile by the Air Force. Dr. James R. Killian, Jr., the President's Scientific Advisor and a highly influential individual in these formative days, expressed concern that the Soviets might develop an IRBM before the U.S... That was unacceptable in the early Cold War days, so considerable support was behind the development of IRBMs. Killian's Technological Capabilities Panel (of the ODM/SAC) sent a report to President Eisenhower on February 14, 1955, recommending the development of IRBMs for land- and sea-basing. (7)
Bernard A. Schriever, promoted to major general in December 1955, was the head of Air Research and Development Command's Western Development Division responsible for ICBM and reconnaissance satellite development. Schriever initially hesitated because the nation's limited production facilities and qualified engineers had to be devoted to the highest priority systems--the ICBMs. Any IRBM that did not grow naturally out of the ICBMs might divert critical resources from ' the ICBM developments. (8)
Schriever's concerns about diverting resources were solidly based. Development of the ICBM had such high priority and incredible schedule pressure that an approach to acquisition, known as "concurrency" was being used. Had a "traditional" development approach been used, the first task would have been a prototype missile with associated research and development tasks completed during a development phase. Upon successful completion of the test program, a production phase would have begun. That process would have taken five to seven years, but a capability was needed within three years. (9)
Schriever's "concurrency" idea was to have all the components of the weapon system (the missiles, equipment, crews and launch sites) complete development at the same time. The management approach was to split out activities that could be made parallel, and then run them concurrently in such a way that their outputs were ready at about the same time. The approach quickly identified those activities that had to be serial, and whose duration could not be made shorter--the "critical path." Concurrent development even lasted into the operational phase, with the first operational units providing feedback to the continued research and development of the missile. (10)
The system's goals were set most aggressively, with a first research and development launch by the end of 1956 on a "maximum calculated risk basis." Continuing with that aggressive schedule, a full-range test flight would occur in July 1957, followed by the first combat-configured missile launch in July 1958. On that schedule, assuming no major development problems, a first operational launch by a military launch crew would occur in July 1959. (11)
Concurrency was neither low cost nor low risk nor efficient. It did get the job done as quickly as possible, which was the reason for its adoption. Making the ICBM development schedule so highly parallel that it absorbed a large percentage of the available engineering resources of the aeronautical capabilities of the U.S. meant any new missile development, by the Air Force or any other service, seemed to threaten the availability of resources.
Schriever's concerns about supporting multiple, competing missile systems surpassed the missiles themselves. Competing with Thor activities in England and elsewhere was another development that used Thors in a different role. The Thor missile was to become the space launch workhorse, which its descendants remain today. At the time, three satellite programs were slated to use Thor boosters and upper stages (aside from those supporting the new civilian space agency, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration). These programs were openly designated as Midas, Samos and Discoverer. (12) Midas was an early warning satellite whose task was to be detection of any missile launches in the Soviet Union. Samos was a series of reconnaissance satellite concepts, most of which would never reach fruition. Discoverer was ostensibly a component research and development program supporting Midas, Samos and other military programs. Discoverer was actually the cover name for the first operational photoreconnaissance satellite, named Corona. Corona was the satellite alternative to the U-2 spy plane, whose operational lifetime over the Soviet Union was rapidly getting shorter. While the Thor program enjoyed a Defense Priority Allocation Systems rating of"DX," the highest national priority rating, not all of that priority derived from its relationship to Project Emily. Corona was easily first-among-equals when it came to the resources necessary to make it work. The problem was that Corona experienced its own set of development issues just like the Thor--the kind of problems due to intense schedule pressure, learning-by-doing and unprecedented engineering challenges. Corona, and to a slightly lesser extent, Midas and Samos, demanded attention on its Thor boosters that had to compete with Project Emily. Discoverer I was launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base (A.F.B.), California, on February 28, 1959, and after fourteen attempts, the first satellite image was finally returned to Earth on August 18, 1960. (13)
Counterbalancing Schriever's resource concerns was the U.S. Army's medium range ballistic missile development. (14) Already underway, the Army missile was already getting resources not counted "against" those devoted to ICBM development. The Army missile might be extended to grow into the IRBM niche. (15) At the time, inter-service competition was as fierce as the competition with the Soviets. Consequently, the Air Staff decided in May 1955 that an IRBM was in the Air Force's best interests. (16)
On November 8, 1955, Defense Secretary Charles Wilson directed the Air Force to proceed with an IRBM to be called Thor, and the Army to extend its missile (with Navy help) on what was designated the Jupiter IRBM. (17)
A month later, on December 27, 1955, the Douglas Aircraft Company received the development contract for Weapon System 315A (Thor). (18) The Thor's performance demands were only slightly less than those of the ICBMs, which were proving considerably difficult. Thor's range of 1,500 miles was considerably less than that of the ICBM, otherwise the IRBM was quite similar. (19) Both the ICBM and IRBM had to be ready to launch instantaneously with high reliability, and then to hit their targets accurately. (20) For the Thor, this translated to a requirement to launch fifteen minutes after the start of a countdown. (21) The short time to erect, checkout and fuel a missile was driven by the simplicity of the launch facility--the sites could not withstand any direct attack, nuclear or otherwise. (22) Therefore, they had to be fired quickly. In addition, twenty-five percent of all the Thors had to be ready within that same fifteen minutes. (23)
With nearly the same driving requirements, how could the IRBM be delivered faster than the ICBM? Both were using "concurrency." If IRBMs were to fill a period of time until the ICBMs were operational, then it was clear that some of the Thor subsystems had to benefit from ICBM work, but the program was still very challenging. (24)
Ten months after the contract award, on October 26, 1956, Douglas Aircraft Company delivered the first SM-75 Thor, number 101, to Patrick Air Force Base in Florida. (25) Three months later, on January 25. 1957, Thor 101 was erected and launched from the Air Force Missile Test Center at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, Florida. The first launch missed its goal by one month due to a relay failure during a tie-down flight readiness firing in December. (26) One aspect of the risks of concurrency showed up in the first launch, when the missile exploded after the liquid oxygen (LOX) tank ruptured due to a contaminated LOX fill and check valve failed to open. Missile 101 fell back through the launch ring at Pad 17B and exploded on the deflector plate below, with enough damage to delay the second launch until April 1957. (27)
The pressure-fed LOX system used gaseous oxygen (GOX) as the pressurant in the initial stages of development. Alternatives such as gaseous nitrogen were considered unacceptable because of concerns about ingestion of nitrogen into the LOX, contaminating the fuel. However, GOX proved to be susceptible to contamination in its own right, leading to several problems and one severe accident. No specific testing programs had been conducted to confirm or refute the concerns about nitrogen, because the schedule did not allow for testing of alternatives.
The program's high risk revealed itself when the first four launches ended in failure. While the second missile, on April 19, 1957, did much better, the third, Number 103, suffered a ruptured fuel tank on the pad five minutes before launch. That incident, on May 21, 1957, caused another refurbishment of Pad 17B, but Pad 17A had in the interim been completed. Thus, the fourth Thor launched from the new launch site on August 30, 1957. While the missile actually flew, it broke in half ninety-three seconds into the flight. (28)
The fifth flight on September 20, 1957, was the first completely successful launch, which was an understatement. (29) Success after five attempts was remarkable and a testament to the ability to overcome the complexity imposed by a short schedule. The first full range test took place with Thor number 109 on October 24, 1957. (30)
The early rocket program and its urgency allowed situations that later safety restrictions and hard-won lessons learned would never tolerate. For instance, the early Thor missiles had small fins on the aft end, and there was some concern that the launch loads were causing these fins to come off shortly after liftoff. To determine whether that was the case, on the third launch, two Douglas Aircraft engineers, Jay Simmons and Al Ressor, sat in a foxhole 200 yards downrange of the second successful Thor missile launch. That meant that the missile would launch right over the top of them, but their job on that launch was to determine if the fins stayed on--which they did. (31)
Secretary of Defense Neff H. McElroy, who took over from Wilson on October 9, 1957, ordered the Thor and Jupiter IRBMs into production. He planned to begin deployment in England, mandating December 31, 1958, for combat readiness. (32) Security made launch site locations secret until the missiles were actually in place.
And that is where the story of Project Emily began in earnest. The challenge was taking a new weapon system with its missiles, equipment, facilities and crews, and deploying everything operationally in England. That part of the story begins with the selection of the sites.
Project Emily: Construction and Deployment
Project Emily deployed sixty Thor missiles in four squadrons at twenty existing facilities in eastern England (largely in Yorkshire and East Anglia). Short timelines drove the use of existing sites, but further constraints existed. In addition to security concerns, the sites had to be spread apart far enough that they could not be eliminated by a single Soviet nuclear weapon. Sites had to have accommodations and other support infrastructure to avoid building these in addition to the missile sites. Usable runways were also important for delivery of the tons of missiles and equipment. (33) RAF Lakenheath was the primary landing site for the transshipment of missiles, equipment and personnel. (34) Initially, the missiles arrived aboard Douglas C-124 Globemaster IIs, but these were replaced in January 1959 by the much larger Douglas C-133 Cargomaster aircraft. The Cargomasters had enough space to ship the missiles mounted on their transporters, greatly simplifying the loading and unloading of the missiles. (35) All deployment sites had long associations with the Royal Air Force (R.A.F.), especially as World War II heavy bomber bases when Britain was the "aircraft carrier" prior to the Normandy landings. (36)
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R.A.F. Feltwell, an airfield since 1917, was the first squadron under construction. (37) With the first missiles going to Feltwell's 77 (SM) squadron, the unit's initial mission also included working out the training and procedures for the rest of the squadrons. (38)
Douglas Aircraft studies estimated 500 civilians would be needed for the construction, checkout and activation of the four squadrons. That raised the question of quarters. Of the four squadrons only Lakenheath had any U.S. Air Force-controlled housing to quarter civilian bachelors. England was still recovering from the devastation of World War II, so living on the economy would not be a complete solution. In fact, living on the economy in most of the deployment locations would handle only a minority of those required. Hotels from Cambridge to Norwich had to be used. In addition, leases on some mansions had to be taken, and these included Lynford Hall, Northcourt Guest House and Brandon Parks Great House. (39) This was neither a satisfactory solution for the occupants or for the local populations, but the solution was needed only temporarily.
Finally, with realistic alternatives exhausted, trailers had to be used. However, English trailers were conceptually different from American ones, and were not intended for full-time living quarters, because they lacked facilities for year-round habitation. Consequently, Douglas Aircraft had British firms build trailers specifically suited to American tastes and needs. (40)
The available quarters for contractors precluded any further influx of Douglas personnel. All the housing for fifty miles around the activation sites was full. Consequently, 250 Air Force, and a good many R.A.F. personnel, became Douglas employees. Under the acquisition rules at the time, this was not completely legal, but it was absolutely necessary to accomplish the program. Project Emily was, in the sense of the times and the fear engendered in the Cold War, something that had to be accomplished whatever the obstacles. Any problems that might arise out of who worked for whom would simply have to be sorted out later, as the mission had to be accomplished. As a testament to those who participated, no objections arose because the "can do" attitude was pervasive. (41)
In February, 1958 a joint government agreement called for the U.S. Third Air Force to assist in the construction of the Thor sites and deliver the missiles. (42) This was presented to Parliament as a white paper "Supply of Ballistic Missiles by the United States to the United Kingdom" covering the topics of the supply system, operational command and control, and control of the warheads. (43) The British would build the launch bases based on U.S. blueprints. This alone was a difficult task, as the blueprints called for tolerances on the launch pad of one-eighth of an inch (3 ram) in line and level. Furthermore, the living quarters for the construction crews and the 1,000 R.A.F. maintenance and launch crews at each complex had to be rapidly set up. To illustrate the rate at which things were getting done, after initial sketches...
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