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Article Excerpt
During the past half-decade, those Americans following international affairs have been inundated by media accounts of genocide in Darfur, supplemented by full-page advertisements in the major newspapers, sponsored mostly by the Save Darfur Coalition. During the first half of 2008, activists tried to link the Beijing Olympic Games to Darfur by labeling them the "genocide Olympics." They even enlisted some prominent American athletes in a lobbying effort via "Team Darfur."
Just prior to the games in July 2008, the activists scored an apparent victory when the prosecutor for the International Criminal Court (ICC) filed a petition against the sitting Sudanese president, Omar H. A. al-Bashir, charging him with 10 war crimes and crimes against humanity and responsibility for genocide in Darfur. The application was acted upon by a pre-trial chamber of three justices, who issued an arrest warrant for Bashir on March 4, 2009, in The Hague. (1)
Bashir responded by publicly ridiculing the ICC actions and setting off on an extended tour of the three provinces in Darfur, where he was met with wild acclaim by mostly very large audiences. His government ordered 16 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to leave Sudan forthwith, accusing some of their members of political interference in Sudan's domestic affairs, especially in Darfur, and also of providing "tainted evidence" to the ICC abroad. (The chief prosecutor, Professor Luis Moreno Ocampo, had not been in Darfur or Sudan as yet.) In late March 2009, President Bashir defied the arrest warrant by traveling to Eritrea, Egypt, Libya and an Arab League meeting in Qatar--where he was lionized, to the chagrin of Western media and governments.
As of this writing, those outsiders concerned about Darfur can be grouped into three categories. First, there are the overwhelmingly Western activists who insist that "justice for the victims" must prevail in Darfur regardless of political consequences, and that "impunity for war crimes can no longer be tolerated" as a "signal to tyrants the world over." Second, there are the "realists" among political actors and observers, who admit that justice is a most worthwhile principle but "should not take precedence over peace." (3) Third, there are the academic experts on Sudan in Europe and the United States who reject the genocide charges out of hand and are relatively sanguine about human-rights violations in Darfur, pointing to shared responsibility among rebels, government forces and proxies. They also provide a historical context that rebuts charges of genocide by the activist community. One is tempted to add a fourth category solely for the ICC prosecutor, who has engaged in a virtual crusade against Bashir and Khartoum in a lecture tour, using highly incendiary language seemingly at odds with the responsibilities of a senior official on an international court. (3)
To unravel this confusing situation, especially in view of the new Obama administration's commitment to make Darfur and Sudan a "high foreign-policy priority," this article will examine in summary form the multilayered issues. At least six layers can be identified: the situation on the ground in Darfur, at present and in historical context; the internal politics of Darfur; the politics of Khartoum; the politics of Sudan, especially the relationship between the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005 and the Darfur crisis; the role of regional actors; and what might be called "the politics of Washington."
Most Western media accounts of the crisis in Darfur describe deliberate attacks by the Sudan Armed Forces on orders of the "Arab" or "Arab-dominated" government in Khartoum or their "Janjaweed" proxies against innocent and defenseless "African" villagers. They include stories of massive atrocities such as large-scale murder, rape used as a weapon, the burning of villages, and forced dislocation from homes to refugee camps for internally displaced persons. Some insinuate that Khartoum is implementing a policy of Arabization through the "ethnic cleansing" of existing "African" populations in Darfur. The leader of the Sudanese Liberation Movement (SLM), Abd al-Wahid Muhammad Nur, goes further and charges forced Islamization by the "Islamo-Fascist" regime in Khartoum. (4)
Such descriptions are highly misleading; they distort realities on the ground and, sadly, contribute to prolonging the very real conflict and add to the suffering of many people in Darfur. To set the record straight, there follows some historical, demographic and political context for this very real humanitarian crisis.
THE GEOGRAPHICAL SETTING
More than four decades of studying Sudan intensively have persuaded me that understanding this fascinating country requires, at a minimum, full awareness of its size, its human and ecological diversity, and its inadequate infrastructure. The tenth-largest country on earth and the largest in Africa at almost one million square miles (2.5 million square kilometers), Sudan contains fewer all-weather roads than most American counties, much less states, at least prior to the year 2000. When I was first in Darfur in 1972, there were fewer than five kilometers of pavement in a territory the size of France.
Given the extensive rainy season as one moves southward and the debilitating sandstorms (haboob) in the north, transportation over land is haphazard at best, in Darfur as in the entire country. Added to this, the Nile River is not navigable for transport except for short distances and
by small craft in limited stretches; and the narrow-gauge, single-track railroad built by the British military more than a century ago is as antiquated as it is inadequate. The result is a recipe for classical underdevelopment. Indeed, since Sudan acquired its modern identity in the 1820s under Ottoman rule, no government has been able to exercise adequate control beyond a modest perimeter of perhaps 250-300 km from the capital. Hence, distribution of food from producing to consuming areas, provision of educational and health services, tax collection, and even the recruitment of soldiers have been limited and haphazard.
As a result, groups in outlying areas have been left to their own devices. They expect little from Khartoum and have minimal loyalty to the central authority. I have heard constant complaints from residents in the west, south, east and even the north of the country about the lack of services. These conditions have been well-documented in numerous studies and are unchallenged by government officials and politicians. When feelings of marginalization have escalated--for understandable reasons or, perhaps, due to local politicians agitating their populations--conflict has erupted. The more remote the region, the more severe the problem. The two most remote regions have been southern Sudan, especially the Sudd area, and Darfur. (5)
In the absence of effective government, conflict resolution has been based on customary law (sulh), arbitration and negotiations among local chiefs. Many anthropological studies as well as Sudan archives, including from colonial times, document the high success rate of these traditional methods. When negotiations failed, armed conflict might return for awhile, until the next round of sulh, under different auspices perhaps. It is noteworthy in this context that international intervention, with or without the ICC, is unlikely to be accepted and more likely to be resisted, as happened when the British tried to intervene during World War I and the French in neighboring territories, as well as the Libyans, in the 1980s and 1990s.
DEMOGRAPHIC DIVERSITY
This situation would be challenging enough if the country and its people were homogeneous. Unfortunately, Sudan is one of the world's most heterogeneous nations. Serious anthropological research has identified almost 600 different tribal groupings speaking up to 400 different languages and dialects. Most northern Sudanese are Muslims, but they tend to divide into more than a dozen rival sects (tariqah); there are several million Christians as well.
Meanwhile, in the southern...
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