|
Article Excerpt
The argument put forward in this article is that while the radicalization of Islamists is undoubtedly taking place in North Africa, it is not possible to devise a formula that enables us to predict why people become radicalized or who these people are. (2) Of course, it is feasible to identify a number of radicalized and sometimes violent Islamist groupings, but their emergence, membership base and modus operandi do not conform to a particular pattern. In short, the radicalization of Islamists is a highly complex phenomenon. With regard to violent radicalization, one member of a group may become violent while others do not, hence making the individual rather than the group the victim of such a process.
This article centers on what has been labeled the "dilemma" of the Islamists: how to provide security while respecting basic civil liberties and, more important, how this weighing of principles and the subsequent strategies employed affect recruitment by radical organizations. The focus is on general policy implications rather than the effect on specific organizations. Hence, the effect of domestic and international policies--democracy-promotion efforts, the prosecution of (perceived) Islamists and the tolerated level of freedom of expression--on the structure, methods and membership base of radical Islamist groupings will not be studied in detail.
Finally, it is important to underline the scope and depth of the research presented here. While quite a number of the conclusions reached in this article may be valid for a number of Arab and Islamic countries, the findings are based on fieldwork carried out in Morocco from 2002 until 2008, and during research trips to France, Spain, Germany and the United States. With regard to the case selection, the reasoning behind the focus on the radicalization of Islamists in Morocco rather than in the entire Maghreb is the direct implication of Moroccan nationals in terrorist incidents at home (for example, the Casablanca bombings of May 16, 2003), abroad (e.g., the Madrid bombings of March 11, 2004), and as accessories in the terrorist attacks of September 11 (e.g., Mounir el-Motassadeq in Germany). Moreover, Morocco also lends itself very well to this kind of research in comparison to Algeria and Tunisia, as freedom of speech and information is markedly better there, making it a lot less difficult and dangerous to access data.
"GOOD" AND "BAD" ISLAMISTS
For a number of decades there has been a tendency in the West--particularly in the United States--to classify regimes across the globe as either "good" or "bad," that is, "friends" or "foes." (3) In recent years, this policy has been extended to Islamist groupings; there are now so-called good and bad Islamists. In the current post-9/11 political climate and following the commencement of the War on Terror, the United States, in particular, but also the EU, has intensified its dialogue with Islamist groupings in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Democracy-promotion programs have been one of the key vehicles behind such dialogue. This is partly because of the realization that Islamist involvement in democracy promotion programs is paramount for their success, as the Islamists are generally viewed as the main target. But it is also due to the fact that democracy-promotion initiatives are received with huge scepticism not only from the political leadership, but also from large segments of the so-called "Arab street." It is a problem Islamist involvement may help alleviate. (4)
In the case of Morocco, democracy-promotion efforts and similar initiatives are largely directed at the Parti de la Justice et du Developpement (PJD), the country's largest Islamist party. (5) The PJD is also generally seen as the most moderate Islamist party in Morocco, although this status is disputed by some academics due to the party's structure. The PJD came into being in 1998 when its predecessor, the Mouvement Populaire Democratique et Constitutionnel (MPDC), changed its name following the incorporation of the radical Mouvement Unicite et Reforme (MUR) in 1996. Today the MUR, which is the bone of contention, is best described as a rather independent and very powerful wing of the PJD. This is largely due to the fact that, although a great many MUR members eventually moderated their outlook following the merger, a considerable segment remain loyal to the pre-1996 principles, particularly on religious issues and the status of the monarchy. Because the PJD has allowed the MUR to continue to occupy such an influential position within the party, despite its radical credentials, some academics claim that the PJD is a radical construction itself--nothing but a wolf in sheep's clothing. (6)
It is worth noting that the Islamist alternative to the PJD, the Parti de la Renaissance et de la Vertu (PRV), was formed as the result of a split from the PJD in December 2005 by a group of politicians under the leadership of Mohamed Khalidi, though the party was not legalized until January 2006. (7) The dissociation from the MUR may make some observers conclude that it is the more moderate of the two Islamist parties currently on the scene. (8) However, based on the behavior in parliament by the PRV, this article adopts the opposing position. While the PJD has been much less concerned with religious issues, the PRV has brought forward a number of radical proposals, including the introduction of reserved seats for members of the 'ulama in parliament, a proposal which the PJD opposed. (9)
"FRIENDS" AND "FOES"
The division of Morocco's Islamist groupings into friends and foes not only takes place at the international level. With regard to participation in the country's political institutions, the PJD exercises a virtual monopoly. It won no less than 47 seats in the lower-house elections of September 7, 2007, a great many more than the one seat won by the PRV, the only other Islamist party to successfully contest the elections. (10) The PJD's rather strong electoral performance in September 2007 was due to its popularity, but its status as a friendly Islamist party in the eyes of the Moroccan authorities was not without significance. (11) It has long been clear that the PJD has close links with the monarchy. In fact, the party has often been accused, rightly or wrongly, of being a makhzen party, that is, a party set up either directly or indirectly by the monarchy in an effort to counterbalance other...
|
