|
Article Excerpt
The seventy-six days between election day, November 4, 2008, and inauguration day, January 20, 2009, once again demonstrated the significance of the transition period to an ensuing presidency. For the Obama presidency, the transition was especially important given the uncertain environment in which he entered office: the first president-elect since Richard M. Nixon to take office in wartime, as well as the first incoming president since Franklin D. Roosevelt to face the gravest of economic difficulties. Economic conditions were particularly notable in the cloud they ominously cast on his presidency: banking and auto industries on the verge of collapse, a stock market in its most significant retreat since the 1930s, skyrocketing federal deficits, and an economy in the midst of what is likely to be the deepest recession in the post-World War II era.
At the same time, Obama's political position was reasonably favorable. He garnered a healthy majority of the popular (52.9%) and electoral vote (365). The popular vote was a more propitious result than the pluralities of John F. Kennedy in 1960 (49.7%), Nixon in 1968 (43.4%), Bill Clinton in 1992 (43%), and, of course, the popular vote loss of George W. Bush in 2000 (47.9%). It was above the bare majority that Jimmy Carter won in 1976 (50.1%) and only slightly behind George H. W. Bush in 1988 (53.4%). The electoral vote was also significant: above Kennedy (303), Nixon (301), Carter (297), and G. W. Bush (271), and only slightly less than Clinton (370). Yet Obama's victory was hardly of record-making proportions. He was well below the margins of FDR in 1932, Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1952, and Ronald Reagan in 1980. (1) However, like all of the last three, his accession to office followed that of an unpopular incumbent. His campaign themes of "hope" and "change" resonated with an uncertain public. But would the difficult context of his transition and early presidency yield an effective policy response?
A Successful--and Ambitious--Pre-Election Effort
Since Jimmy Carter's transition in 1976, presidential candidates have made significant efforts before election day in planning for a possible presidency. For Carter, work began shortly after it was clear that he would be the Democratic Party's nominee following the Pennsylvania primary in April. For Reagan, tentative steps were taken late in 1979 and a formal effort began in the spring of 1980, once Reagan's nomination was secured. For G. H. W. Bush, discussions began in late 1987, and, like his two predecessors, serious work commenced once his nomination was clear. For Clinton, planning began right after the July 1992 Democratic National Convention. G. W. Bush chose to start much earlier: the spring of 1999, the earliest effort to date.
Obama and his associates, especially former Senator Tom Daschle (D-SD) and former Clinton chief of staff John Podesta, followed the 1992 pattern and waited until the summer of 2008 to begin the major part of their work. Some reports even indicated that they were well under way by that point. As Paul Light (2009) notes, "The Obama team ... started writing briefing memos long before Obama announced his planning effort last July. Indeed, the outline of the transition's soon-to-be-published book of transition essays was set last April." More generally, according to another account, "Obama got an early jump on his transition planning last spring, turning discreetly to Washington veterans and survivors of the Clinton years for advice on how best to launch his administration" should he win (Simendinger 2008, 71; also see Sweet 2008). According to Podesta, Obama "understood that in order to be successful he had to be ready. And he had to be ready fast" (Tumulty 2008, 27).
Podesta was tapped to direct the operation, and by all accounts, he proved to be an effective choice. (2) He was knowledgeable about White House and personnel matters, had directed the outgoing Clinton transition in 2000, and understood Congress and the ways of Washington. His status as a Clinton White House and Democratic Party insider brought him familiarity with many who might serve in a new administration. As head of the Center for American Progress think tank, he could draw on a wealth of policy-related studies and an organized cadre of policy-informed associates.
Podesta and his group followed one game plan from their more successful predecessors: They largely operated out of the limelight. Some press reports and pundits did catch wind of their efforts over the summer, which led to some ill-advised and historically naive criticism that the Obama camp was "measuring the White House drapes" too early. However, it was a brief dustup, and further media attention was largely absent until shortly before election day.
Most notably, there were no reports of tension between the transition group and the Obama campaign staff. Key staff member such as David Axelrod, David Plouffe, and others had developed a reputation for internal order during the campaign, as well as strong interpersonal harmony and a rather cautious, "tight-lipped" relation with the media. So, too, on the transition side: Podesta "runs a tight ship," and he has calmed "rancor," "by ensuring that people aren't free-lancing in the newspapers by anonymous quotes" (Crowley 2008, 27). That discipline carried over once transition planning was under way. No leaks to the media suggested any friction between the two groups. Nor would any likely have sat well with the candidate, who during the campaign had earned the nickname "No drama, Obama," as well as a reputation for low tolerance of interpersonal competition, back-biting, and self-serving press leaks.
A Robust Effort
The lack of conflict is all the more remarkable given the rather robust pre-election effort that Podesta and his team were undertaking. In the Reagan, G. H. W. Bush, and G. W. Bush efforts--which are generally regarded as among the more successful of recent transitions--the pre-election period was largely devoted to preparing for the post-election transition. Work was largely confined to planning the transition's budget, staff organization, personnel needs, ethics requirements, and other legal issues. The three respective heads of the pre-election phase--Pendleton James for Reagan, Chase Untermeyer for G. H. W. Bush, and Clay Johnson for G. W. Bush--did not bring attention to future policy to the task, but rather were focused on transition organization and process. Each also played key roles in the post-election phase, largely in the area of personnel, and all three then served as White House director of personnel. Before election day, discussion of potential appointments was limited. Among the very few exceptions were James A. Baker's selection as secretary of state in 1988 and Andrew Card, Jr., as chief of staff for G. W. Bush in 2000. Neither appointment was made public.
Over the fall of 2008, the Podesta operation was more ambitious in scope. It was closer to the more expansive operations run for Carter in 1976 and for Clinton in 1992. But there was one crucial difference: It did not generate the friction and infighting with the campaign war rooms that negatively affected those earlier transitions, both before and after election day. Both Carter and Clinton experienced considerable delay in getting their post-election efforts up and running as a result.
While a full account of what transpired remains elusive, reports indicate a range of activity along a number of fronts. Potential nominees for key positions began to be considered, albeit discretely. According to one account,
Obama is conducting the vetting process much the way he managed his campaign: methodically, thoroughly and on a prodigious scale. He did not wait until he won the election to vet his favored picks. Soon after he clinched the Democratic nomination, lawyers quietly prepared dossiers of about 150 contenders for senior positions--often without the candidates themselves knowing--said a senior Obama transition adviser who spoke on the condition of anonymity. (Rucker 2008)
This effort was aided by an unprecedented agreement with the White House to permit Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) background checks on potential nominees.
The pre-election group also took a look at their predecessors' early successes and mistakes. According to one account, Obama's "transition advisers studied how past presidents used their first months" (Connolly and Smith 2008). Preliminary planning for the Obama administration's first 100 days was also undertaken. Here, Podesta's ready access to his own think tank proved important: "much of its staff has been swept into planning for Obama's first 100 days in office," including a 26-page report detailing the day-to-day activities of an early Obama presidency (Connolly and Smith 2008). No pre-election effort in the past has had a director who could so easily and directly tap into such a policy and planning resource.
The need to move from a more expansive list of campaign promises to a leaner presidential agenda especially was explored. In particular, the pressing call for an economic recovery program and its relation to other agenda items was raised, both as to substance and timing. These debates, one account noted shortly after election day, have "flavored the discussion among Mr. Obama's transition advisers for months, even before his election. The tension between these strategies has been a recurring theme in the memorandums prepared for him on various issues, advisers said" (Baker 2008a; emphasis added).
Review of President Bush's executive orders, as well as other rules and regulations, was also undertaken: "the Obama transition team has identified executive orders he can sign in the first hours and days of his presidency to demonstrate action, even as the more ambitious promises take more time. Among other things, he can reverse a variety of Bush policies, like restrictions on abortion counseling and stem-cell research" (Baker 2008a). According to another account, "A team of four dozen advisers, working for months in virtual solitude, set out to identify regulatory and policy changes Obama could implement soon after his inauguration." Comprising mainly lawyers, this pre-election team reportedly compiled a list of about 200 regulatory actions and executive orders that could be rescinded, positioning "the incoming president to move fast on high-priority items without waiting for Congress" (Connolly and Smith 2008).
One interesting--and unprecedented--pre-election effort was a series of letters sent to federal employees at seven agencies outlining Obama's differences from the practices of the Bush presidency with respect to the bureaucracy. The letters described an "intention to scale back on contracts to private firms doing government work, to remove censorship from scientific research, and to champion tougher industry regulation to protect workers and the environment." The letters, most written on October 20, according to the report, "reveal a candidate adeptly tailoring his message to a federal audience and tapping into many workers' dismay at funding cuts and workforce downsizing in the Bush years" (Leonnig 2008).
Early Appointment of a Chief of Staff
One important development was the early selection of a White House chief of staff. Scholarly analyses of transitions have especially noted the importance of the position and the early selection of someone to fill it: the chief of staff-designate generally plays a central role in organizing the White House staff and in selecting people to fill key positions. According to one account, Obama was thinking about Representative Rahm Emanuel (D-IL) as his chief of staff as early as August. As David Axelrod later recalled, "It was months before the election when Barack said to me, 'You know, Rahm would make a great chief of staff.'" Emanuel had "spent six years in the White House, knows this place inside and out, spent four or five years in Congress, and became a leader in a short period of time. He really understands the legislative process, he's a friend who the President has known for a long time from Chicago, and whose loyalty is beyond question, and who thinks like a Chicagoan" (Lizza 2009, 28).
News of his possible appointment leaked to the press several days before election day. To no surprise, two days after the election, the announcement was made. By contrast, in the 1992 transition, it was not until December 12 that Clinton got around to naming his chief of staff. The delay proved costly in putting in place the rest of the Clinton White House, and it set back his early presidency.
The early selection of Emanuel was a direct product of Podesta's study of other presidential transitions shortly after he was appointed. "The one basic take-away that a lot of people commented on, including the president [Bill Clinton], is that Clinton really concentrated on building his Cabinet early on, to the neglect of building his White House structure," Podesta observed. "The early pick of Rahm [Emanuel] reflects the lesson of that experience, which is that you need to begin to build a structure for the White House" (Romano 2008).
Early efforts were also made to name another major White House official, the National Security Council (NSC) advisor. According to one account, transition members contacted General James L. Jones--the former commandant of the Marine Corps and NATO commander--early on, asking him to meet with candidate Obama on the campaign trail:
General Jones, who had spoken with Mr. Obama only twice before, rode by car one day from Washington to Richmond, Va., for the meeting. No promises were made that morning, but it touched off a series of telephone calls about possible jobs and issues like the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. "We did a walk around the world a couple of times," General Jones said in an interview. Shortly after the election, he was asked to come to Chicago, where he met again with Mr. Obama and talked about becoming secretary of state or national security advisor, people close to the transition said. (Baker and Cooper 2008)
Post-Election: Hitting the Ground Running
Preparations made before election day enabled the transition to be up and running quickly. The day after the election, the transition team was announced. Podesta was kept on, with Obama's Senate chief of staff, Peter Rouse, and longtime confidante, Valerie Jarrett, serving as co-directors. Christopher Lu--a former member of Obama's Senate staff and that of Representative Henry Waxman (D-CA) and eventually White House secretary to the cabinet--was named as executive director. It was a shrewd and swift melding of the pre-election team with the campaign war room and the Obama inner circle; it was good preventative medicine against the delays and the tensions that had beset Carter and Clinton. It was also the only time in recent transitions where the head of the pre-election operation retained control of the post-election effort. The only hitch was that the transition's Web site--http://www.change.gov--was up but still "under construction"; a few days were needed to sort out the technical glitches. On November 5, the day after the election, the General Services Administration turned over the keys to a 120,000 square foot building in Washington, D.C., which would serve as transition headquarters. As per custom, however, Obama and his inner circle largely operated out of his home base in Chicago. He and his family would move...
|
