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Article Excerpt
The early assessment of Dwight D. Eisenhower and his presidency by the popular media and academic scholars was predominately negative. They saw his political philosophy as conservative and dated, his political leadership and skills as weak, and his grasp of issues and policies as minimal. His foreign policy was timid and isolationist. His domestic policy was virtually nonexistent. In addition, he was accused of delegating decision making to his staff and cabinet. Moreover, he was lazy and a bumbler with the English language (Barber 1972, 162; Brinkley 1990, 113; De Santis 1976, 191; Greenstein 1994, 6-7; Reichard 1978, 266-71). President Harry Truman, who began taking notes for a book on American presidents soon after he left office, categorized Eisenhower as one of our worst presidents. In Truman's estimation, "He didn't do a thing as President ... [and] never made any effort to put forward the leadership to which he was entitled, and he didn't have any program" (1988, 7).
Academics reinforced these early assessments in their ranking of the presidents from "greats" to "failures." The famous Arthur Schlesinger, Sr., poll of 75 prominent historians, political scientists, and journalists in 1962 ranked Eisenhower twenty-second out of 31 presidents. Subsequent assessments by historians and political scientists ranked Eisenhower nineteenth to twentieth among presidents (Reichard 1978, 273; Rosenman and Rosenman 1976, 553-54). James David Barber, in his classification of presidents, rated Eisenhower a "passive-negative" president--that is, "someone who does little in politics and enjoys it less" and a political leader who "lack[s] the experience and flexibility to perform effectively" (1972, 13, 156).
However, time has been good to Eisenhower's reputation. Changing values brought on by the alleged military and domestic excesses of the 1960s and 1970s, and the opening of various Eisenhower archives, have resulted in an outburst of revisionist literature. Commentators now hail Eisenhower's leadership skills, his "hidden-hand" executive maneuvers, his foreign policy successes, and his domestic achievements. The most highly touted of these newly discovered successes were his foreign policy efforts in dealing with the Middle East, China, Vietnam, and the Soviet Union (Alexander 1975; Cook 1981; De Santis 1976; Divine 1981; Hahn 2006; Reichard 1978; Rushkoff 1981). Eisenhower's much-derided political and executive skills have also been subject to positive revision (Conley and Yon 2007, 293; De Santis 1976, 206-7; Greenstein 1994; Maranto 1993; Reichard 1978, 275; Sloan 1991, 153, 160). Some revisionists now credit Eisenhower with desegregating public facilities in previously rigidly segregated Washington, D.C., thus burnishing his civil rights record (Brownell 1991; Mayer 1991).
Eisenhower's early rankings as a mediocre president at best have also been reversed. For example, a 1982 poll of historians placed Eisenhower ninth in the presidential rankings. Successive polls and analyses have ranked Eisenhower between ninth and eleventh as president (Endersby and Towle 2003, 392; Murray and Blessing 1994, 16; Ridings and McIver 1997, xi). Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. (1997, 189), whose father initiated the ranking system, found in a replication of his father's poll that respondents rated Eisenhower tenth, just below James K. Polk and just above John Adams. Sanchez (1996, 61, 99, 102), in an analysis of positive and negative comments on American presidents in 36 introductory political science texts, found that of the modern presidents, Eisenhower ranked second to Franklin D. Roosevelt and just ahead of John E Kennedy in the total percentage of all positive comments.
Purpose of the Article
This article is concerned with Eisenhower's domestic policies, namely his initiatives in furthering active labor market policy (i.e., full employment)--an important staple in the welfare state--in the United States. The revisionist literature holds that Eisenhower, despite his private misgivings, did not dismantle the welfare state created by the New Deal (Barber 1972, 161; De Santis 1976, 190; Garson 1977, 312-13; Greenstein 1994, 50; Reichard 1978, 272), but either offered moderate alternatives, consolidated New Deal gains, or expanded welfare state programs such as social security, unemployment insurance, medical aid for welfare clients, and farm subsidies (Alexander 1975, 39-40; Greenstein 1994, 49-51; Holmans 1961, 198; Sloan 1991, 144; Stebenne 2006, 121-22).
But did Eisenhower's policies extend to support of active labor market policy (ALMP)--that is, the intervention of government in the market economy to prevent or ameliorate unemployment or to ensure high employment? The revisionist literature is sparse in this regard. Greenstein (1994, 118) and Garson (1977, 313) talked briefly about Eisenhower's support of public works programs.
Literature Review
The prevailing version of the developmental history of active labor market policy in the United States, which stresses a two-stage process, largely ignores the Eisenhower era. Jerrett and Barocci (1979) dated postwar active labor market policy to the Employment Act of 1946, but found that the institutional mechanisms for implementation in the 1940s and 1950s were abortive and unsuccessful. They dated the implementation of active labor market policy in the postwar period to the Area Redevelopment Act of 1961, the Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962, and the Accelerated Public Works Program of 1962 (Jerrett and Barocci 1979, 15-16).
Ginsburg (1983), like Jerrett and Barocci (1979), believed that ALMP in postwar America began in 1946 with a weak Employment Act, which stressed creating the conditions for maximum employment rather than federal intervention, as called for in the 1945 Full Employment Bill. Ginsburg believed that "the first training programs explicitly or implicitly for the unemployed were established in the 1960s" (1983, 49), specifically the Manpower Development and Training Act and the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964. In fact, Ginsburg (1983, 50) held that the first major job creation program since the New Deal was really the Emergency Employment Act of 1971.
For Janoski (1990, 199), the Employment Act of 1946 was a retreat on active labor market policy, a policy undertaken in the New Deal. Janoski (1990, 125-51) dated ALMP to job training and job creation activities in the Area Redevelopment Act, the Manpower Development and Training Act, and the Accelerated Public Works Program.
Mucciaroni (1990, 25-28), like Janoski, saw the Employment Act of 1946 as a weak form of labor market policy that continued to embrace the market economy and attacked unemployment during business cycle fluctuations through temporary fiscal policy relief, such as tax cuts. The next effort at ALMP, Mucciaroni (1990, 149) believed, was under President John F. Kennedy with the Manpower Development and Training Act.
Gordon (1967) embraced the passage of the Employment Act of 1946 and the resultant debate around an appropriate unemployment percentage--culminating in the Council of Economic Advisers' acceptance of a target of 4% unemployment as the goal of full employment--between 1947 and 1962 as the first stage. The second stage, encompassing the Area Redevelopment Act and other administrative efforts, was a "fumbling toward ... a multi-dimensional approach to the problem of redefining the target of full employment" (Gordon 1967, 50).
Burtt (1963) saw the Employment Act of 1946 as America's acceptance of government responsibility for attacking unemployment, but held that the Area Redevelopment Act was the "first federal acceptance of responsibility in the area of structural unemployment," and the Manpower Development and Training Act the first training policy (Burtt 1963, 417).
The Department of Labor also agreed that postwar active labor market policy began with the Employment Act of 1946, but the "first comprehensive effort [by the federal government] to deal directly with the employment and training needs of workers and the economy's needs for trained manpower" (1968, 20) came through the Manpower Development and Training Act.
Pierson (1964, 14-15), like other commentators, declared that American postwar active labor market policy began with the Employment Act of 1946. The act's only impact, however, was the collection of unemployment data. The second stage occurred under President Kennedy's watch with the Area Redevelopment Act and the Manpower Development and Training Act.
Clague and Kramer held that the Employment Act of 1946 was an attempt by the federal government to forestall "the possibility of a massive unemployment problem" (1976, 5-7) after the end of World War II. They also saw the Employment Act of 1946 as "clearly an alternative to a renewed WPA program" of the New Deal. Aligned with the Employment Act was the collection of unemployment data, started under the Works Progress Administration, as a key component or as a "foundation for the nation's full employment policy." The monthly publication of data was a method of keeping unemployment a public rather than a private issue. And despite President Eisenhower's reputedly strong aversion to federal initiatives to attain full employment, unemployment remained a vital public rather than a private issue. For example, it became a contentious issue in the 1960 presidential election, especially with regard to whether unemployment data should be issued before or after the election. To Clague and Kramer (1976, 12-15), labor market policy probably began with the economic growth strategies of the Area Redevelopment Act of 1961 and the retraining strategies of the Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962.
For Weir (1992, 9-10), the Employment Act of 1946 was a moderate and ameliorative version of the 1945 Full Employment Bill. The 1946 act did acknowledge "that the federal government should bear some responsibility for the health of the economy, but it embodied an uncertain commitment to government action and provided few tools to facilitate action" (Weir 1992, 27). Weir, one of the few to acknowledge any efforts by Eisenhower, minimal as they were, identified the creation in 1954 of the Office of Manpower Administration within the Department of Labor as a vehicle "to plan for labor needs created by the cold war" (1992, 65). The Office of Manpower Administration attempted to expand its area by seeking to coordinate interagency attempts at manpower training, with the stress on private sector initiatives rather than government spending. Congressional initiatives during this period to address high unemployment, a result of a fading industrial sector, by government programs of "public works, extension of unemployment insurance, credit to industries locating in such areas, and retraining programs and subsistence allowances for unemployed workers" drew President Eisenhower's vetoes (Weir 1992, 66). Active labor market policy was not revived until passage of the Area Redevelopment Act and the Manpower Development Training Act and the Department of Labor's attempt in 1962 to craft a universal labor market policy.
While the explicit literature on ALMP is fairly consistent with regard to the Eisenhower administration's lack of contributions to ALMP, there is reference to Eisenhower's ALMP activities in the literature addressing his economic stewardship in general (Sloan 1991) and his antirecession activities in particular (Holmans 1961; Sloan 1991). For example, Sloan (1991) looked at the president as the manager of the economy and the various government entities--the Department of the Treasury, Council of Economic Advisers, Office of Management and Budget, and Federal Reserve Board--as they attempted to ensure economic stability and prosperity. Sloan discussed the role of the Council of Economic Advisers as the lead agency in fighting the 1953-54 recession in Eisenhower's first term through public works programs and housing and highway policies (1991, 134). He also addressed Eisenhower's efforts at combating the 1957-58 recession by speeding up existing public works expenditures (Sloan 1991, 144).
Holmans (1961) looked at the monetary and fiscal tools used to pursue economic stability in both the prewar and postwar years. When Holmans looked at high employment policies, he looked at them through the prism of monetary and fiscal policies, which include multiple sets of actors--Congress, the president, and various regulatory bodies. Holmans (1961, 123) concluded that the various federal agencies responsible for housing investment were instrumental in fighting the 1948-49 recession under Truman. Holmans also addressed the recession of 1953-54 and Eisenhower's attack on it through fiscal and monetary policy, with great stress initially on monetary policy. Holmans (1961, 224-25, 244) held that Eisenhower's attempts at ALMP included subsidies for shipbuilding and increased processing of housing subsidies during the 1953-54 recession. He maintained, however, that, as in 1948-49, home building "played a prominent part in the recovery" (Holmans 1961, 244). Eisenhower was dilatory in response to the 1957-58 recession, but when he acted, he employed similar strategies as in the previous recession--that is, speeding up public works projects in the pipeline (Holmans 1961, 281).
Both Sloan (1991) and Holmans (1961) called into question the thoroughness of the ALMP literature. They fell short, however, in that they were outside the conceptual model of ALMP--Holmans because his work was published before the institutionalization of the two-stage process, and Sloan because his focus was larger than ALMP. Sloan looked at the president as the overall manager of the economy, encompassing both domestic and international roles. Both addressed ALMP solely within the context of recessions rather than as an ongoing policy-making process.
Thus, with the exceptions noted here, the literature indicates that American active labor market policy evidenced a two-stage process. It had its postwar "impetus" with the Employment Act of 1946, exhibited minimal or no activities during the Eisenhower administration, and really had its growth, stunted as it may have been, during the early 1960s with the Area Redevelopment Act of 1961, the Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962, and subsequent legislation.
Study
To measure Eisenhower's and his administration's (1953-61) contributions to the growth of American ALMP, we have analyzed Eisenhower's proposals, plans, executive actions, and legislative initiatives....
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