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Article Excerpt
Recent work on the psychological distinctions between shame and guilt has important implications for mental health counselors. In particular, the work of Lewis (1971) and Tanguey (1990, 1995; Tangney & Dearing, 2002) identifies psychological differences between shame and guilt and how they are phenomenologically expressed that provides helpful insight to those working with clients experiencing these emotions. This paper draws upon this work to establish criteria for distinguishing shame and guilt and to offer guidelines for their treatment.
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Distinctions between shame and guilt are often overlooked by those in clinical work (Tangney & Dearing, 2002). Particularly in Western culture, they are often assumed to be interchangeable or synonymous terms (Gilbert, Pehl, & Allan, 1994). Erik Erikson (1950), one of the first to distinguish psychologically between shame and guilt, noted that "shame is an emotion insufficiently studied, because in our civilization it is so easily absorbed by guilt" (13. 252; cf. Lansky, 1995).
This failure to adequately distinguish shame from guilt ignores a growing body of research on important psychological differences between these two emotions (Tangney & Dearing, 2002). Especially noticeable is the absence of studies that explore the implications of these differences for counseling. Research exploring the psychological differences between shame and guilt notes that failure to distinguish between the two emotions contributes to the neglect of shame as a significant clinical problem (Capps, 1993; Konstam, Chernoff, & Deveney, 2001; Tangney & Dearing); furthermore, shame is often mistaken for guilt, leading to ineffective treatment for those suffering from shame (Lewis, 1971; Nathanson, 1992; Tangney, 1996; Tangney & Dearing; Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & Barlow, 1996). These problems are likely to increase, given the conclusion of several notable authors that shame, not guilt, is now the prominent emotion troubling Western culture (Scheff, 1995; Tanguey et al., 1996; cf. Capps, 1993; Cheng & Page, 1995; Fowler, 1996; Kaufman, 2004).
Although shame and guilt show considerable overlap, often appearing together in clients (Tangney & Dearing, 2002), there is a heuristic as well as practical clinical value in reflecting on the differences. This paper reviews recent research on the psychological and phenomenological characteristics of shame as distinguished from guilt. It summarizes important distinctions between the two emotions and how they are experienced. It then outlines the implications of the differences for counseling.
Mental health counselors will especially be interested in the research on differences between shame and guilt because it helps highlight the developmental and growth aspects of these emotions, not simply the life difficulties that may accompany them. Attending to the developmental differences is especially important in formulating treatment goals and strategies.
DISTINGUISHING SHAME AND GUILT PSYCHOLOGICALLY
Erik Erikson (1950) made one of the first psychological distinctions between shame and guilt. His lifespan model outlined the growth of the self, both body and psyche, as it occurs in the context of expanding social interactions. He laid out critical tasks of emotional development occurring throughout the lifespan that promote healthy psychosocial growth. In Erikson's model, growth occurred through balancing the tension produced by certain polarities. However, this is not an even balance of polarities; although both polarities are necessary, health required an "overbalance" of the positive quality. The resolution of each crisis produced an ego strength that was integrated into one's emerging identity and helped one face the tasks of the next developmental stage. Erikson's list of critical tasks included articulation of the development of shame and guilt.
For Erikson (1950), shame preceded guilt developmentally. As with all the critical tasks, without a proper balance of the polarities one did not proceed well to the next task. This meant that without a proper measure of shame, neither guilt nor initiative developed appropriately. However, if there was too much shame, initiative and guilt were overshadowed by compulsive activity. Since shame was connected to the development of autonomy and the ego quality of will, an overbalance of shame and doubt (vs. autonomy with the optimal amount of shame and doubt) resulted in compulsive activity as the ego overcompensated in its attempts to master and manage the expressions of will. By contrast, guilt was associated with initiative and the emerging ego quality of purpose. An overbalance of guilt, instead of an optimal level of guilt with an overbalance of initiative, inhibited productivity and left the person lacking in purposeful drive toward future goals.
Since Erikson (1950), there has been considerable work, both theoretical and empirical, on the psychological distinctions between shame and guilt. Over the past three decades, Helen Block Lewis's distinction (1971) between shame and guilt has emerged as one of the dominant conceptualizations, in large part because it has received strong empirical support from a range of both quantitative and qualitative studies (Gilbert, Pehl, & Allan, 1994;...
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