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Article Excerpt
ON MAY 7, 2008, DMITRI MEDVEDEV TOOK OFFICE AS PRESIDENT OF THE Russian Federation. By that time, it was already known that former President Vladimir Putin would be appointed prime minister. The new system of power that emerged in Russia was immediately called "tandemocracy" and it was very unusual. Medvedev as head of state had full formal authority in the country, while Putin as the head of government enjoys the status of an informal leader of the nation who is still immensely popular..
On August 8, 2008, on the 96th day of his presidency, Medvedev sent troops into the territory of Georgia to rebuff a Georgian attack against the separatist enclave of South Ossetia. During the five-day war that ensued, the Georgian army was defeated, while two rebel territories in Georgia that had thrown off Tbilisi's control (South Ossetia and Abkhazia) were taken by Russian troops. Symbolically, these developments were the culmination of the policy that had been taking shape throughout the eight years of Vladimir Putin's presidency.
In the autumn of 2008, when the global financial crisis hit the Russian economy, the Putin era ended. It was marked by the growth of the Russian state's influence in all spheres of life--politics, the economy, and ideology--through a highly favorable situation in the energy market, and through absolute support from the population. The latter was due to an increase in the standard of living and an end to the complex of national humiliation, brought about by defeat in the Cold War.
In late 2008, a new period began in Russian foreign policy, which can be assessed only with time. Putin is not going, yet a different epoch is coming. Just as Putin's time was a natural continuation of President Boris Yeltsin's time, although it looked quite the opposite, the epoch of Medvedev will be a complex derivative of Putin's era. To understand subsequent developments, one should try to assess what happened during the eight years of Vladimir Putin.
Russia's foreign policy under President Putin is difficult to assess. Eight years is not a long period of time in historical terms, yet Russia has, in a way, lived through several different stages during this time. Its relations with the West were a roller coaster.
What lies behind it? A lack of strategy, which turns politics into hectic moves in response to circumstances? Or pragmatism, which is often emphasized by Russian leaders? Or disappointment at the arrogance of the West, which was ready to view Russia only as a weak partner and disregarded everything Russia proposed? Or an inability to stick to the planned policy fine? Or deliberate maneuvering in a bid to make maximum gains? Each of these questions can be answered in the affirmative; yet this will not make things any clearer.
Russian propaganda likes to draw a thick line between the presidencies of Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin. In reality, the time since the Soviet Union's breakup has been one period of transition. Attempts to formulate a new national identity instead of the lost Soviet superpower status have seen several stages.
By the end of Putin's presidential term, this search resulted in the creation of a new understanding of Russia's greatness--largely due to the oil and gas abundance. President Putin's speech at the Munich security conference on February 10, 2007, revealed a new perception by the Kremlin of Russia's role and place in the world. Developments during 2007 give grounds to believe that the country's elite considers the process of Russia's resuming its status on the international scene complete. Moscow no longer needed to prove its right to establish rules of the game in the world; it was beginning to implement this right the way it saw fit. At the same time, Moscow intends to revise the rules that were established in the times when the country was weak and unable to influence this process.
Meanwhile, one can easily compare Putin's Munich speech (Putin, 2007a) and his speech in the German Bundestag in Berlin in September 2001 (Putin, 2001). The Berlin presentation was widely viewed then as a historical breakthrough in relations between Russia and the West. However, if we put aside the style and emotions of the two speeches, their content is actually identical. The only difference is that in the autumn of 2001 Putin proposed that Europeans and Americans discuss and address security problems jointly with Russia, while in the winter of 2007 he bitterly reproached them for not wishing to even listen to what Moscow said.
While looking for a new identity, the nation is going through historical stages that other countries have long passed but which Russia did not for some reason. "Russia is very old Europe," Dmitri Trenin writes. "It could be reminiscent of Germany in the 1920s, with its vibrancy and intense feeling of unfair treatment by others; France in the 1940s, when it was trying to heal its traumas; or Italy in the 1960s, as far as the nexus of power, money, and crime is concerned" (Trenin, 2007: 98). Actually, Russia is much older Europe; it is just developing capitalism and building a national state (in place of a multinational empire that was built in Russia for almost 400 years).
The "catch-up" process is occurring very quickly; hence the rapid change of scenery on the political stage. An analysis of Russia's conduct is complicated by the growing dynamics in the world. Since the Russian Federation became an independent state, the world has seen changes, the scope and outlines of which could not be foreseen. More important, global and European development is still far from being in balance. As Timofei Bordachev put it, "attempts to artificially halt the radical turn on the continent and achieve some sort of status quo have either yielded no result or their outcome is unclear" (Bordachev 2007: 64).
The Russian elite sees the surrounding world as unstable and very fragile. The instability brings many threats, which naturally frighten the Russian establishment. But it also offers possibilities. Like any reviving country, Russia is in a state of excitement. It sees that developments have been going not the way the Cold War winners planned it in the 1990s. So now, willing to take a risk, Russia can lay down the markers for its positions in a world order that will, sooner or later, take shape. During the latest period of Putin's presidency, playing an all-or-nothing game has become Russia's style. It remains to be seen whether this approach will survive the economic crisis that clearly demonstrated how dependant and vulnerable Russia is.
The complexity of the situation in Russia causes some analysts and policymakers to stop all attempts to make heads or tail of it, and to declare this country "lost" for the civilized world. In a way, classifying Russia among threats will let the West heave a sigh of relief--a Cold War is unpleasant, yet everyone knows how to behave and one does not need to rack one's brains to invent forms for engagement. On the other hand, real threats of destabilization, coming from the Third World, will not disappear, while growing nations in Asia will continue to strengthen their competitive positions, taking advantage of the increased tensions inside European civilization. No doubt, Russia belongs to this civilization, considering its culture, history, and mentality, although it is now at a different historical stage, compared to the European Union nations.
In this paper, I do not seek to provide a comprehensive explanation of Russia's foreign policy. That is simply impossible, since foreign policy is formed under the impact of too many different factors. They form a blend of inertial perceptions and vestiges of the former ideology, commercial interests of large financial and industrial groups and influential private individuals, spur-of-the-moment impulsive reactions to events, complexes caused by tumultuous developments of the last 20 years, and ambitions of a nation in its salad days. Other important factors included the general situation in the world, mistakes and setbacks in policies carried out by the major Western countries, which weakened the influence of the United States and the European Union, and the peculiarities of the thinking and conduct of the second Russian president, Vladimir Putin. He was not only the sole subject of power but also the source of its legitimacy.
Yet let us try to understand the basic motives behind Russia's conduct, which stem from the psychology of the present elite and its perception of the surrounding world. Amid the absence (for the time being) of a state ideology and a constantly changing world, it is instincts and feelings that determine the nature of one's actions.
SPIRAL TURNS
The view that Vladimir Putin is an antipode to his predecessor, Boris Yeltsin, is actively propagated by Kremlin spinmasters and shared by the majority of the population. Yet, when it comes to foreign policy, the contrast between the epochs of the first and second presidents of the Russian Federation is less obvious than it seems at first glance.
What has undoubtedly changed is the overall situation in the world and Russia's capabilities. But the algorithm of Russia's relations with the West (which remains the dominant vector in Russia's foreign policy and foreign trade, despite Moscow's attempts to diversify its political and economic ties) has changed little over the nearly 20 years of Russia's independence.
An analysis of relationships between Moscow and major Western capitals revealed an interesting up-and-down pattern, where the cycle of strained and improved relations repeats itself every four years. The years 1994, 1998, 2002, and 2006 were marked by momentous events that fixed Russia's status in the world. Each peak was almost immediately followed by a sharp decline.
This cycle suggests that the next turning point will take place in 2010, which does not contradict the political logic. Dmitri Medvedev, who came to power in the spring of 2008, will need about two years to become firmly established in his office and formulate an understanding of his own.
The four-year cycles began in 1994, when Russia entered the international political arena after it had resolved the...
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