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Uwe Steinhoff, On the Ethics of War and Terrorism.

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Uwe Steinhoff, On the Ethics of War and Terrorism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 160 pp.

Uwe Steinhoff says the following about the purpose of his book: "[I]t is a lack of intellectual integrity, in the form of breathtaking double standards and hypocrisy in the assessment of war and terrorism (and in the assessment of different perpetrators), which constitutes the main target of this book" (2). As Steinhoff characterizes these "double standards," they imply that state-perpetrated violence is less morally objectionable than the violent acts of "subnational or underground organizations."

In view of Steinhoff's statement of purpose, one might naturally expect him to mount a sustained attack against the double standards to which he refers. In fact, however, this is not how he proceeds. Steinhoff's book has five chapters, the middle three of which explore aspects of just-war theory that have no evident link to the double standards to which he objects. Steinhoff does focus in chapter 1 on what he views as a source of double standards in just-war theory's legitimate authority criterion, but he then suspends discussion of these standards until the book's final chapter.

Steinhoff's book is therefore somewhat disjointed. On the one hand, it contains a critique of various components of just-war theory. This aspect of Steinhoff's discussion centers on a question he raises at the end of chapter 2--"Whom may one kill in war?"--which is "probably the most important question of war" (31). On the other hand, Steinhoff's discussion focuses on the aforementioned double standards; and this aspect of his discussion might be characterized as centering on the question "Who may kill in war?" This question clearly differs significantly from the one explicitly raised by Steinhoff.

I can find very little to disagree with in Steinhoff's criticisms of just-war theory, and what it implies about either who may kill, or who may be killed, in war. In the course of developing this critique, however, Steinhoff presents a number of his own views that I will argue ate either objectionably unclear or based on faulty reasoning. I will also suggest that Steinhoff's examination of terrorism and double standards in chapter 5, while perhaps quite sensible, is largely irrelevant to the conclusions he draws at the very end of his book.

1. An especially difficult task confronting anyone attempting to answer Steinhoff's question, "Whom may one kill in war?" is that of producing a principled basis for drawing conclusions about the permissibility of killing innocent noncombatants. (1) Just-war theorists commonly rely on the doctrine of double effect for this purpose, while Steinhoff rejects double effect in favor of two alternative principles. He leads up to his discussion of double effect and his proposed alternatives with an examination of several criteria, which, according to just-war theory, determine the justifiability of entering a war. Steinhoff's comments on the right intention criterion warrant attention, since they are relevant to his critique of the doctrine of double effect. (2)

According to the right intention criterion, entering a war is justified only if done so...

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