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Article Excerpt
1. Introduction
In Anarchy, State, and Utopia, (1) Robert Nozick defends his entitlement theory against patterned and end-state theories of justice. He claims that unlike patterned and end-state theories of justice, the entitlement theory is consistent with people's liberty. In other words, he argues that the entitlement theory is consistent with people's liberty because it is a historical unpatterned theory of justice. This argument has been attacked on many different grounds. For instance, it has been argued that some patterned and end-state theories of justice are not inconsistent with people's liberty. (2) Others have claimed that the entitlement theory itself is a patterned or end-state theory of justice and that, therefore, it has the defect that Nozick attributes to all patterned and end-state theories of justice. (3)
The aim of this paper is to cast doubt on Nozick's argument on a different basis. Let us assume that these objections against Nozick fail, that is, that all patterned and end-state theories of justice are contrary to liberty, and that the entitlement theory is a historical unpatterned theory of justice. On this assumption, we discuss Nozick's argument that the entitlement theory is consistent with liberty because the entitlement theory is a historical unpatterned theory of justice. We hold that this argument could be understood in two different ways. First, it could mean that the fact that a theory is historical unpatterned is a necessary and sufficient condition for that theory to be consistent with liberty. Second, it could mean that the fact that a theory is historical unpatterned is only a necessary condition for that theory to be consistent with liberty. (4)
We conclude two things. First, if the right way to interpret Nozick's argument is the first one, then there is something wrong with this argument: although it is true that being historical unpatterned is a necessary condition for a theory to be consistent with liberty, it is false that all historical unpatterned theories are consistent with liberty. (5) in order to show that it is false, we propose a historical unpatterned theory of justice that is inconsistent with liberty: the "bizarre" theory of justice. In turn, the second interpretation of Nozick's argument is based on a more charitable reading of his text that would make him right. However, if we interpret Nozick's argument in this way, then his distinction between historical unpatterned and patterned (or end-state) theories is irrelevant: the relevant distinction is that between theories that are consistent with Nozick's conception of liberty and theories that are not. (6)
We will proceed in the following sequence. In section 2, we present Nozick's argument for the entitlement theory and against patterned and end-state theories of justice. In section 3, we deal with the first interpretation of Nozick's argument, which we call the "sufficiency-necessity claim." Section 4 discusses the second interpretation of Nozick's argument, which we call the "necessity claim." Finally, section 5 sketches a conclusion.
2. Nozick's Argument For the Entitlement Theory and Against Patterned End-State Theories of Justice
2.a. The entitlement theory
The entitlement theory is composed of three principles: 7
(1) The principle of justice in acquisition: A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice in acquisition is entitled to that holding.
This principle concerns the acquisition of unheld things. In order to design that principle, Nozick imagines a state of nature that resembles the state of nature proposed by John Locke: each individual has an absolute property right over his body and talents. He may use them as he sees fit, provided that he does not deploy them aggressively against others. In this state of nature, whether an individual may appropriate an unheld resource depends on how this appropriation would affect others: an individual may appropriate an unheld thing if, and only if, that appropriation does not worsen the situation of others. (8)
(2) The principle of justice in transfer: A person who acquires a holding from someone else entitled to the holding, in accordance with the principle of justice in transfer, is entitled to the holding.
This principle concerns the transfer of holdings from one person to another. Nozick claims that provided that the person who transfers the good is its owner, all voluntary transfers are just. Thus, buying and selling, gifts, prizes, inheritance, and so on are all legitimate ways of transferring holdings. In contrast, involuntary transfers are unjust: robbery, theft, fraud and so on are not legitimate ways of transferring holdings. There is, however, an exception to this last rule: the following principle concerns a kind of involuntary transfer that is legitimate.
(3) The rectification of injustice in holdings: No one is entitled to a holding except by applications of 1 and 2.
This principle concerns the rectification of past injustices. For instance, if an individual steals something from another, the distribution that results from that action is unjust and that injustice must be rectified. (9)
Summary: According to the entitlement theory, people have absolute self-ownership and property rights over their external resources (those that were acquired in accordance with the principle of justice in acquisition, the principle of justice in transfer, or the principle of rectification of past injustices).
2.b. Nozick on distributive justice
In the chapter called "Distributive Justice," Nozick provides what he takes to be an argument for the entitlement theory and against other theories of distributive justice: he claims that unlike other theories of justice, the entitlement theory is consistent with people's liberty. (10) To support his argument, he makes two distinctions. First, he distinguishes between "historical" and "end-state" theories of justice. His second distinction is between "patterned" and "unpatterned" theories of justice. (11)
Consider the first distinction. End-state theories of justice hold that the justice of a certain distribution depends on how things are distributed, that is, on who ends up with what. (12) In other words, to assess the justice of a distribution, we need to look at the features of that distribution and assess its justice by using some structural principle of just distribution. In contrast, historical theories of justice hold that the justice of a particular distribution depends on how it came about.
Consider now the second distinction. Patterned theories of justice are those that claim that the justice of a distribution depends on whether a certain pattern of distribution is followed. In Nozick's terms, a patterned distribution varies along with "some natural dimension, weighted sum of natural dimensions, or lexicographic ordering of natural dimensions." (13) Nozick doesn't say much on what he means by "natural dimension." (14) He may be referring to "empirical" or "metaphysical" facts. Thus, "distribute in accordance with what God says" is a patterned principle of distribution because it refers to a metaphysical fact, to wit, God's commands; in turn, "distribute according to I.Q." is a patterned principle of distribution because it refers to an empirical fact, to wit, the I.Q. of each individual. In contrast, unpatterned...
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