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Article Excerpt
Brian Barry is one of the most vociferous critics of multiculturalism. In this paper, I argue that Barry, given the commitments that underlie his own theory of justice as impartiality, should be far more receptive to claims for cultural accommodation. In fact, Barry's justice as impartiality provides normative support of justification for many claims for cultural rights. (1) Cultural rights may be necessary to balance against the ways that policies adopted by democratic majorities rail to treat members of minority cultural groups impartially. Recognizing this point, in turn, provides significant insight into how contractualist liberals ought to consider claims for cultural rights.
Let us begin with Barry's objections to multiculturalism. In Culture and Equality, Barry comments on what he sees as a dangerous trend in political theory: the ever-expanding focus on culture and cultural difference. (2) The dangers of this trend, according to Barry, are twofold. First, whether any individual author would approve of such actions or not, the writings of multiculturalists like Charles Taylor or Will Kymlicka are in fact cited in support of policies that can only result in the violent oppression of the vulnerable. Barry's trepidation in these areas is understandable. Throughout history, differentiated citizenship (to borrow a term from Iris Marion Young (3)), whether by race, social status, gender, property ownership, or religion, has largely been accompanied by the unjust treatment of those who were considered "different." Second, Barry is concerned that this trend could lead to a division of the state into ethnic nationalisms, and therefore a collapse of the liberal "welfare state," stemming in large part from ah associated collapse of a conception of uniform or universal citizenship. At the very least, multiculturalism distracts us from truly important issues of economic justice and equality of opportunity. These issues are central to Barry's liberal egalitarianism. For these reasons, Barry professes incredulity or disbelief over the paths taken by liberal multiculturalists like "Will Kymlicka and his itinerant band of like-minded theorists." (4)
Is Barry right that increased attention on issues of multiculturalism has obviated concerns about economic justice and equality of opportunity? There isn't time to redeem or invalidate this concern in the space of this paper. My point here is that there is a strong prima facie case for recognizing certain cultural rights claims based on the premises of Barry's theory of justice as impartiality. Naturally, different schemes of legal recognition aimed at greater cultural accommodation will have different costs to other valuable policy goals (such as economic justice). Anecdotally, at least, there may be reason to worry that increased recognition and accommodation of cultural difference will erode the sort of social solidarity that is thought to sustain the social welfare state. The United States, by many measures, is one of the most culturally diverse of modern industrialized societies. It is also among the least progressive economically. Critics can point to the fact that as the U.S. and other countries increasingly recognize cultural difference, they increasingly cut social welfare programs. Social democratic parties in Europe are, arguably, losing popularity, and are certainly under increased pressure to "reform" or "liberalize." There is a sense, both in and out of the academy, that issues of economic justice or equality of opportunity now take a back seat to issues of identity and difference, such that liberals like Barry and critical theorists like Thomas McCarthy increasingly urge the left to return to economic concerns. (5) None of this, of course, establishes ah inverse relationship between a "politics of recognition" and a "politics of redistribution." (6) Certainly, it doesn't prove that states can't pursue progressive economic policies in combination with greater cultural accommodation. Time and study will determine the legitimacy of Barry's concern, and the "damage" done to economic justice by Kymlicka and others.
Like Kymlicka, and many other proponents of cultural rights, Barry believes that any liberal should value toleration and support equality of opportunity. He denies, however, that cultural membership is in any significant way relevant to these ideals. Barry's primary point of divergence with multiculturalists is that he believes that the "traditional" liberal state, by treating members of all cultures uniformly, is treating them equally. As James Tully notes, while Barry never makes the mistake of equating equality with "sameness of treatment," in every case he seems to take sameness of treatment as the standing norm against which any claim for recognition must be made good by compelling reasons. (7) Therefore, rather than seeing cultural rights as ah attempt to work out what a liberal commitment to equality of opportunity, of equal respect, or impartiality, would mean in conditions of cultural diversity, Barry sees them as special or particular exemptions from the norm, which itself is culturally neutral.
Barry does believe that it is important for states to have good reasons for laws that disproportionately burden members of a particular cultural group. If a law serves a legitimate state interest, however, these burdens ate no reason to calla law unjust. After all, every law burdens someone. Laws prohibiting theft burden pickpockets. Speed limits burden those who wish to drive faster. That a law burdens someone does not necessarily mean that it is unjust. One might say, then, that Barry does not see the burdens created by cultural inequality as unjust. For this reason, Barry concludes that considerations of cultural inequality ought to be trumped by just about any sort of consideration (though, admittedly, not for no reason at all). A policy is either justified or it is not; that such a policy burdens, of benefits, the members of one culture more than members of another culture is beside the point.
Barry endorses what is commonly referred to as the benign neglect approach to cultural difference. According to theories of benign neglect, the state should protect the freedom of people to express particular cultural attachments from various forms of discrimination and prejudice. It is not the place of public agencies, however, to attach legal identities or disabilities to cultural membership or ethnic identity. Thus, the separation of state and ethnicity is said to preclude any legal or governmental recognition of ethnic of cultural groups, or any use of ethnic criteria in the distribution of rights, resources, and duties (with the possible short term exception of cases of affirmative action to remedy years of discrimination, once again with the long-term goal of creating a "colorblind" society). (8)
One might wonder what is wrong with such an arrangement, which, by simply ignoring cultural matters altogether, seems to regard all cultures equally. After all, isn't a liberal society supposed to value diversity, and treat all citizens or peoples equally, regardless of cultural heritage of ethnicity? The problem is that it is not possible for a society to ignore cultural matters altogether. As Kymlicka notes, societies must answer the following sorts of questions: Which languages should be recognized in the parliament, bureaucracies, and courts? What are the limits of individual conscience? Should internal boundaries (legislative districts, provinces, states) be drawn so that cultural minorities forma majority within a local region? Should government powers be devolved from the central level to more local or regional levels controlled by particular minorities, particularly on culturally sensitive issues of immigration, communication, and education? Should political offices be distributed in accordance with a principle of national or ethnic proportionality? Should the traditional homelands of indigenous peoples be reserved for their benefit, and so protected from encroachment by settlers and resource developers? (9)
Since any society must provide answers to such questions, and differing answers will have a profound effect on the quality of life of various groups within a society, it is not possible for a society to ignore cultural matters altogether through the sort of separation of state and ethnicity suggested by principles of "benign neglect." The question, then, is not: should societies treat members of minority cultural groups differently? But instead, how would a just society answer such culturally sensitive questions? My claim, again, is that Barry's justice as impartiality provides the makings for a political liberal argument for cultural accommodation, and gives us insight into how political liberals ought to consider claims for cultural rights. Indeed, my analysis places demands on a whole section of contractualist political philosophy. It has implications for any theory of justice that, like Barry's justice as impartiality, is based on an account of what citizens could reasonably reject of accept.
Contractualist theories of justice, like Barry's justice as impartiality, must be receptive to certain claims for cultural rights. Such claims would include exemptions to generally applicable laws, such as giving Sikhs exemptions to motorcycle helmet laws for the wearing of traditional headdress, exemptions to non-Christians to operate businesses on Sunday, as well as exemptions to laws prohibiting the use of peyote or other illegal substances. (10) For groups with geographical integrity, such as the Navajo Nation or the Quebecois, federalist legal structures, which provide minority groups with...
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