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Article Excerpt
Introduction
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA HAS EXPERIENCED 133 STATE-LEVEL CONFLICTS SINCE THE END of World War II (Rothe and Mullins, 2008). These include civil wars, non-international armed conflicts, and a small number of international wars. The contextual background and etiological factors that have facilitated these conflicts are perhaps more complex than in any other region of the world. Further, many of these conflicts are prolonged, some lasting decades. Compared to the rest of the world, the region has had a disproportionate number of weakened and failed states. Further, conflicts on the continent have produced a disproportionate incidence of wide-scale atrocities. In large part, this is due to the region's colonial history and the aftereffects of various policies of colonial authorities (e.g., ethnic divisions, preferential treatment according to geography, direct or indirect rule, and means of decampment), global marginalization, and policies of international financial institutions. Only 31% of those upheavals had some sort of mechanism put in place either to end a conflict (e.g., peace agreement stipulations) or to address post-conflict issues (e.g., truth commissions, amnesties, disarmament-demobilization-restoration programs, or tribunals) (Ibid.).
Where post-conflict modalities did occur, multiple mechanisms were often instituted. Unfortunately, most of the existing literature on post-conflict justice is limited to single modalities (Cobban, 2005; Haveman, 2008; Parmentier, 2001; Uvin, 2003; van der Merwe, 2001). Compounding this selectivity, the literature on social controls and social justice often points to a dichotomy between the formal Western legal process, which, as Cobban (2007) observes, has failed to address the needs of society and victims, and that of the more successful forms of social justice (amnesty, in particular). This may be shortsighted, since societies may require multiple responses, including a formal international social-control approach and a state-level form of social justice (e.g., gacaca, 1 truth and reconciliation commissions, or amnesties). Levels of social justice exist that, in a broad sense, should include finding truth about the past and events and calling offenders to account (Huyse, 1996; Kritz, 1995). To end impunity and create a culture of accountability and social justice, both are absolutely crucial (Mathews, 2002; Minow, 1998). Another central element is the issue of effectiveness, as these arguments are often made without evaluating all the modalities a state may use within its analysis. Thus, existing assessments of effectiveness remain partial. If one examines a single modality, the interactive effects between modalities are automatically ignored.
Our goal here is to help fill this void in the literature. We draw from analyses of two widely known conflicts: Sierra Leone's civil war and the Rwandan genocide of 1994. A brief overview of the conflict in Sierra Leone is followed by a discussion of the multiple mechanisms that were put in place post-conflict. We then provide an overview of the Rwandan genocide and the multiple post-conflict mechanisms that were instituted. Finally, we evaluate the various institutionalized modalities for both countries, concluding with some of the major themes that appear to facilitate either the success or failure of these mechanisms.
Sierra Leone
The Conflict
The three decades preceding the onset of violence in Western Africa's Republic of Sierra Leone were marked by widespread governmental corruption and exploitation of minority ethnic groups. The All People's Congress (APC)--the ruling state party--moved to monopolize the county's rich mineral resources (especially the diamond fields), employing violence and thuggery to consolidate power, if not legitimacy, in the eyes of Sierra Leoneans. Throughout the 1980s, the state entered into numerous arrangements with international financial institutions, including several major structural readjustment programs that engendered more economic chaos and instability than they solved. The devaluation of Sierra Leone's currency created higher inflation and led to widespread unemployment. Numerous strikes and other public demonstrations achieved little in the way of real change, but they mobilized portions of the population. As neighboring Liberia descended into civil war, violence spilled over into Sierra Leone, eventually leading to the Sierra Leone Civil War, which began in 1991 and was resolved in 2000.
In this context, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) formed in the late 1980s. Unlike in other African civil wars, the RUF did not have an ethnic basis. Seeking support from anyone who disliked the APC, the RUF drew from the economically and politically disaffected, as well as upon veterans from the Liberian war. In 1991 the RUF initiated the violent Sierra Leone Civil War, which was resolved in January 2002.
The government of Joseph Momoh, a military leader installed as president from 1985 to 1992, was weak and underfunded. The civil war crashed the agricultural markets, bringing economic chaos to Sierra Leone. Even the army was not immune to the economic hardships that plagued the country. Those atop the military hierarchy benefited greatly, but younger officers and enlisted troops faced the same deprivations suffered by Sierra Leoneans as a whole. In 1992, a coup removed Momoh's APC from power, replacing it with the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC), headed by Captain Valentine Strasser. The NPRC stabilized the economy, bringing inflation under control and reestablishing relationships with international financial institutions, with new loans benefiting the economy. Within a few years, however, Sierra Leoneans became disenfranchised by Strasser's NPRC. Involved in diamond smuggling, it could not satisfactorily end the war. The economic solvency of the RUF rebel forces hinged on control of the diamond fields. Revenue from the now infamous "blood diamonds" allowed the rebels to remain better armed than the standing army was. To combat this, the government sought help from the United Kingdom and a South African mercenary outfit, Executive Outcomes (EO). EO troops shifted the balance of power in the conflict, but their involvement drained the nation's treasury.
A palace coup in 1996 handed power to the defense minister, who stepped down after elections later that year. Now the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP), led by President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, controlled the state. Kabbah's SLPP ruled with the support of the Paramount Chief's in Parliament. He created a coalition government and began talks with the RUE The RUF leadership insisted on the withdrawal of foreign fighters from the conflict (EO and the West African intervention force, ECOMOG), demanded a power-sharing government, and called for incorporation of RUF fighters into the national army. Kabbah refused these demands, but established a truth and reconciliation commission and made funds available for the reintegration of rebel forces into society.
In May 1997, Major Johnny Paul Koroma's Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) led a coup that ousted the Kabbah government and quickly invited the RUF into a coalition government. Ten months later, Nigerian troops, acting under the authority of ECOMOG, reinstalled the Kabbah government. The new government wasted no time holding courts martial for soldiers who had supported the AFRC and arresting citizens who had provided social or political support for that regime (Rothe and Mullins, 2008).
In 1999, the parties signed the Lome Peace Accords, though the agreement broke down. The U.N. established a peacekeeping operation in late 1999, with the first troops (approximately 6,000) on the ground in December. Peacekeepers found themselves fighting both RUF and AFRC forces. In February of 2000, the UNSC increased the size of the mission to 11,000, and later to 13,000. In May, the RUF took some 500 people prisoner, leading the U.K. to deploy a force to help evacuate the last Europeans from the country and capture RUF leader, Foday Sankoh, during an attack on Freetown (Sierra Leone's capital). The hostages were released, but the action did not undermine the ability of the RUF (or the AFRC) to continue hostilities.
Although the elections stipulated by the Lome Accords were postponed in 2001, international peacekeepers made some headway in disarming rebel factions. Sporadic fighting continued through 2001. In January 2002, the government and the RUF formally declared the war over; elections followed in May, with Kabbah and the SLPP cementing control of the government. In 2004, the United Nations declared that the rebels were fully disarmed and withdrew the last U.N. peacekeepers in late 2005.
Post-Conflict Justice Measures
The Lome Peace Accords contained provisions for a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and a comprehensive Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration program (DDR). Active through 2004, it disarmed more than 72,490 combatants, including 4,751 women and 6,845...
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