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Article Excerpt
The 8 March 2008 general election in Malaysia has been characterised as a "political tsunami". (2) The ruling Barisan Nasional (National Front, BN) coalition (3) suffered unprecedented losses while the primary peninsular opposition parties--Parti Keadilan Rakyat (People's Justice Party, PKR), Democratic Action Party (DAP) and Parti Islam SeMalaysia (Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party, PAS)--posted remarkable gains. This was a particularly stunning result for the opposition considering the outcome of the previous general election in 2004 when the BN swept the Dewan Rakyat, Malaysia's lower house, winning 198 seats to the opposition's combined total of 21, plus all but one state legislature. In contrast, 2008 represents a significant reversal for the BN coalition with its share of seats in the Dewan Rakyat plunging to 63 per cent and its overall popular vote to 51 per cent. Four additional state governments also fell to the opposition.
In the aftermath of March 2008 the Malaysian political landscape has gone through a number of upheavals with questions raised over the continuing viability of BN coalition rule and the future sociopolitical direction of the country. Two issues in particular stand out. First, the BN coalition has lost its two-thirds majority in parliament and therefore its ability to amend the constitution unimpeded, a critical indicator of political legitimacy in Malaysia. Secondly, on 1 April, PKR, PAS and the DAP officially joined forces to form the Pakatan Rakyat (People's Alliance, PR). (4) While the PR does not yet officially have the numbers in parliament to gain control of the government, its de facto leader, Anwar Ibrahim, has publicly claimed to have the necessary numbers willing to cross over from the BN and join the PR. Explicitly contained within both issues are questions concerning the evolving nature of national identity and, in particular, the need for all parties to seriously consider the concept of bangsa Malaysia, a Malaysian nation that transcends ethnic identity. Such concerns about the constitution of national identity are clearly reflected in the 2008 results, which point to a pluralisation of the political system and a popular desire for a more inclusive, ethnically-neutral political discourse.
However, is this rosy picture accurate? On the surface, the 1999 elections promised similar possibilities for increased sociopolitical pluralisation only for the ruling BN coalition to recoup its losses in 2004. In other words, is Malaysia now witnessing a truly progressive moment, one that is long-term and structural, or is this instead a short-term, regressive, "restorative" moment? By adopting a Gramsican perspective this article endeavours to offer a more nuanced analysis of the recent elections and, in particular, their meaning vis-a-vis conceptions of national identity. In the process, it seeks to explore the development and complex operation of hegemony in contemporary Malaysia.
This article will proceed in three distinct parts. Part one will outline the rationale for employing a Gramscian perspective, highlighting the relevant key Gramscian concepts useful for raising and answering questions about hegemony and crises. The following section will historicize the 2008 election with reference to the general elections of 1999 and 2004. The final part of the article will examine more closely the 2008 election results and the aftermath of the elections with particular reference to the possibility for transformation in Malaysian politics and society. This article will conclude with thoughts on whether we are witnessing an "organic" (relatively permanent) or "conjunctural" (immediate and ephemeral) crisis in Malaysia today.
A Gramscian Framework
At first glance, it may seem a peculiar choice to invoke Gramsci's conceptual theorizing in order to analyse a general election in contemporary, multi-ethnic Malaysia. However, his concepts offer a distinctive theoretical perspective which can help map out the complex and varying relationships between economy, polity and society in such countries. (5) Each of the "thinking tools" Gramsci offers is of interest precisely because they provide the vocabulary for considering questions surrounding the complex operation of hegemony in a country like Malaysia, as well as its future prospects for long-term socio-political change.
At the centre of Gramsci's thought is his theory of hegemony, which is based on a rich conceptualization of power. In particular, Gramsci draws upon Machiavelli's metaphor of the ruler as a centaur who "must know well how to imitate beasts as well as employing properly human means" (6) when exercising power or authority. Gramsci's concept of hegemony critically acknowledges the active role of subordinate people in the operation of power and thus allows for a nuanced conception of political and cultural authority. (7) Coercion alone results in only a "limited" or "dominative" hegemony in which the ruling group seeks to neutralize or decapitate the demands of the subaltern group(s). In order to achieve an "expansive" or "aspirational" hegemony, the hegemonic group must also actively seek the consent of subalterns. Gramsci's notion of "hegemony" is sensitive, therefore, to issues of both power and legitimacy.
According to Gramsci, consent is created and recreated by the hegemony of the ruling stratum in society. Far from dominating its junior partners, a successful hegemonic group has to thoroughly recreate itself, it must make large parts of its subalterns' worldview its own and in the course of doing so is itself altered. The moment of hegemony then represents the pinnacle of a dynamic and endless process in which the dominant group succeeds in propagating itself through society, bringing about intellectual and moral as well as economic and political unity. (8) However, this notion of hegemony as a continual process emphasizes the fact that a leading group must be constantly alert to the volatile demands of its subalterns and to the shifting historical terrain upon which it exercises its authority if it is to maintain power. A ruling stratum that asks for consent and yet which cannot give voice to the aspirations of those in whose name it rules will not survive indefinitely.
One of the key elements of any hegemonic strategy designed to acquire consent is the formation of links with existing elements of culture. Stuart Hall notes that "culture" should be interpreted here as, "the actual, grounded terrain of practices, representations, languages and customs of any specific historical society". (9) This includes the whole range of questions that Gramsci lumped together under the title "the national-popular" which he understood as constituting a crucial site for the construction of a popular hegemony. (10) Any cultural project, such as the construction of a "national" identity for example, could not be something imposed upon the people from above. Instead, it had to be rooted in the "humus of popular culture as it is, with its tastes and tendencies and with its moral and intellectual world". (11) This is what he referred to as "common sense"--the often fragmentary and contradictory "stratified deposits" of more lucid philosophical systems which have become "facts of life". Its significance lies in that it is the "taken-for-granted terrain" upon which, "more coherent ideologies and philosophies must contend for mastery ... if they are to shape the conceptions of the world of the masses and in that way become historically effective". (12)
The (re)creation of and contestations surrounding consent, and therefore hegemony, take place through the institutions of civil society. (13) Although Gramsci's use of the term varies, civil society can be appropriately thought of as "the network of institutions and practices in society that enjoy some autonomy from the state, and through which groups and individuals organize, represent, and express themselves to each other and the state." (14) As such, it accounts for individual tastes, behaviours and values as well as regulated cultural institutions. For Gramsci, whoever controls civil society succeeds in manufacturing consent among the masses and, as such, there is a need to pay more attention to ideological rather than coercive domination. As the ruling stratum's hegemony over civil society is never total, a constant re-packaging of ideology is necessary. (15) There are varying degrees of consent but as this consent is...
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