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Article Excerpt
INTRODUCTION
I. FOUR KINDS OF LIBERAL NEUTRALITY II. FOUR COMMITMENTS IN CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT A. The Status of Rights in Catholic Social Thought 1. Rights as Less than Absolute 2. Rights and Duties 3. The Good and the Right Reconsidered a. The Untenable Nature of Complete Neutrality b. The Common Good as the Norm of Social Life c. The Nature of the Right and the Priority of the Good 4. The Civilization of Love: The Goal of Social Life a. The Central Importance of the Family b. The Liberal "Goal" of Social Life: Pluralism and the Civilization of Tolerance B. A Realist Anthropology 1. The Human Person: Freedom and Intellect 2. Love: The Fulfillment of Human Freedom C. Neutrality and the Political Process 1. Positive Support for Democratic Government 2. Human Dignity as a Limit to Democratic Legitimacy D. Neutrality in Adjudication 1. The Problem of Enforcing Unjust Laws 2. Legal Neutrality and the Absence of Partisanship CONCLUSION
INTRODUCTION
Liberalism is widely regarded as "[t]he dominant strand of American political philosophy," (1) and neutrality is often identified as one of the defining features and virtues of the liberal state. (2) Not surprisingly, then, talk of neutrality deeply informs our public discourse concerning not only the nature of law and the structure of legal institutions, but also the content of particular judicial opinions, legislative acts, administrative rulings, and executive orders.
Frequently, however, what is meant by "neutrality in the law" is far from clear. (3) What quality in law does "neutrality" describe? What does it mean to say that a legal institution or a particular juridical act is "neutral"? Does it refer only to the identity of the decision maker, the nature of the forum, and the procedures employed? Does it refer also to the kinds of argument that will be entertained and advanced in support of the ultimate decision? Finally, does "neutrality in the law" relate to the actual resolution of the dispute, the content of the decision itself?
To put the matter more concretely, suppose that the state criminally prohibits the consumption of a certain hallucinogenic substance. Suppose further that a group of individuals ingest this drug as part of a ritual that is central to their firmly held religious beliefs. (4) Does neutrality demand that the state refrain from banning the substance? If so, does the state violate the principle of neutrality by forbidding the consumption of any particular substance? Could the state, in a neutral fashion, ban the use of the drug for some purposes but not for others? For example, would the state violate the principle of neutrality if it recognized a religious exemption from the general ban (5) or if it permitted consumption of the drug for medical purposes but not for recreational use? (6)
Likewise, consider a state-created social assistance program that provides subsistence benefits to qualified individuals. (7) Would the very existence of such a program violate the principle of neutrality? That is, would the act of drawing a distinction between individuals who are "qualified" and those who are not, with the attendant provision of resources to the former and not to the latter, mean that the state is acting in a non-neutral fashion? If the state later terminates the benefits it once provided by means of a summary administrative decision, has it then violated the principle of neutrality? What if the state official assigned to determine the merits of an application for benefits knew or was somehow related to the applicant? Would neutrality then demand the use of another decision maker or the use of an entirely different method for making the determination? If, instead, the state were to make the award or denial of benefits based upon a public hearing, what would a neutral proceeding look like? What would constitute a neutral set of adjudicative procedures? For example, would neutrality be satisfied if the rules allowed for the presentation of evidence and the cross-examination of witnesses? Would the rules be neutral if the proceeding permitted but did not require representation by counsel? What would constitute a neutral burden of proof? And how could the state satisfy neutrality in allocating this burden between the parties?
Lastly, with respect to the ongoing dispute concerning the legal status that should be afforded same-sex relationships, some have argued that the laws that define marriage in a traditional sense are not neutral, but are in fact discriminatory against same-sex couples. (8) Indeed, some contend that "just as there was no neutral way for liberal theory to justify prohibiting interracial marriage yesterday, so there is no neutral way to justify prohibiting same-sex marriage today." (9) Claims of this sort demand either that the meaning of "neutrality" be clarified or that the concept be abandoned. Is the state acting in a neutral fashion by limiting marriage to couples composed of one man and one woman? Does it violate neutrality by requiring the marital partners to be of a certain age? Does neutrality demand that the legal status of marriage be extended to include relationships where the partners involved are of the same sex? Does neutrality require the state to recognize the existence of such relationships simply because the parties desire such recognition? Would the law be neutral if marriage were available to groups of three or more individuals? The law recognizes a wide variety of other relationships, such as employer and employee, buyer and seller, doctor and patient, parent and child. Moreover, significant legal consequences often follow from the recognition bestowed upon these relationships. Does neutrality demand that the state ignore these relationships such that they no longer function as categories within our legal system? Must the state treat every relationship exactly alike regardless of its content or the identity of the persons involved? (10)
That the answers to at least some of these questions are not immediately apparent suggests that the concept of neutrality is in need of some elaboration. In the Article that follows, I seek to clarify what "neutrality in law" means in two basic, though sometimes disparate, jurisprudential perspectives.
The first perspective is liberalism, precisely because it is liberal theory that so keenly insists on the importance of neutrality in law. Beyond this, however, the meaning of neutrality in liberal thought warrants especially close attention for a number of reasons. First, as a historical matter, liberalism as a jurisprudential perspective has provided the intellectual foundation for much of the American legal system. Indeed, liberalism has been "the dominant secular approach to matters of government and society in the West for at least the past four centuries." (11) Despite the frequent claim that we now live in a "post-liberal" age, this continues to be the case. Second, as noted above, (12) many of liberalism's most thoughtful proponents contend that the idea of neutrality is central to the liberal project. If neutrality is "the organizing principle of liberal thought," as some insist, (13) then examining liberal theory should prove fruitful in understanding the meaning of "neutrality in law." Third, despite the tendency of many legal scholars to embrace ideas borrowed from one or another jurisprudential school of thought, liberalism remains the dominant point of view among legal academics. Notwithstanding the wide variety of intellectual perspectives available, liberalism remains the philosophy with which all serious reflection on American law must contend.
Of course, there has never been "any single, authoritative version of liberalism." (14) Rather, liberalism is an intellectual tradition, that is, "an argument extended through time in which certain fundamental agreements are defined and redefined" through a process of responding to external critiques and internal interpretive disputes. (15) As such, liberalism has developed through the contributions of many thoughtful commentators (16)-far too many to attempt to address in a detailed and comprehensive fashion within the confines of a single article. In the Article that follows I will, from time to time, make reference to one or another particular author within the liberal tradition. Nonetheless, as a template for the exposition of liberal neutrality generally, I will make use of Andrew Altman's splendid summary of the main currents of liberal legal thought. (17)
The second perspective on legal neutrality that I wish to explore is the one offered by the body of papal encyclicals, conciliar documents, episcopal statements, and other magisterial texts collectively known as modern Catholic social teaching. (18) The documents that make up this teaching have addressed a number of topics, including the plight of the poor and working classes; (19) the problems of economic justice posed by international trade and globalization; (20) the nature of the family and the need to protect its place in society; (21) the morality of abortion, euthanasia, and capital punishment; (22) the treatment of ethnic and racial minorities, immigrants, and refugees; (23) and relations among peoples and nation-states and the need to build authentic peace in a world often savaged by war. (24) Although these documents have long been a fruitful source of reflection and commentary for theologians, (25) over the past several years they have drawn the attention of a growing number of legal scholars. Legal academic interest in the Catholic social tradition has given rise to the creation of a journal dedicated to the subject, (26) to numerous articles in established law reviews, (27) and to books and chapters in volumes exploring the relationship between law and religious discourse. (28) Although it would be an exaggeration to say that the official texts that make up Catholic social teaching offer a systematic treatment of jurisprudence, in addressing various problems of modern social life these texts do set forth a number of foundational principles concerning the purpose of law, the nature of legal obligation, and the relationship between law and morality.
The texts at the heart of the Catholic social tradition often make use of the Hebrew and Christian scriptures. These works, however, are not primarily exercises in biblical interpretation. They are instead an often subtle amalgam of scriptural exegesis, theological reflection, and philosophical reasoning. (29) Accordingly, it would be wrong to see the legal commentary that makes use of Catholic social thought as an effort to infuse the law with a specifically religious content. Indeed, the critiques of existing legal structures, doctrines, and concepts derived from this tradition accord with the demands of public reason, properly understood.
Part I of this Article sets forth the four varieties of liberal neutrality Altman identifies, namely, what he calls "rights neutrality," "epistemological neutrality," "political neutrality," and "legal neutrality." Part II sets forth in detail how Catholic social teaching regards each of these kinds of neutrality. On the practical level--with respect to the existence and enforcement of legal rights, the structures of democratic government, and the need for an independent and unbiased judiciary--Catholic social thought and liberal theory have much in common. They often differ, however, with respect to the reasons that support and justify these well-established features of the modern state. Moreover, as might be expected, the theoretical foundations of Catholic social teaching that challenge the underlying premises of liberal theory also have practical consequences--consequences that this Article will explore in the pages that follow.
This Article is not an exercise in comparative law in the strictest sense. It does not constitute an analysis of how the legal doctrines or statutory schemes of different countries address a common social problem. (30) It is, however, an exercise in comparative jurisprudence. As such, it provides us with the hope and the opportunity of closely examining something so familiar to us that it often goes unnoticed, of seeing what we often take for granted from a new vantage point--in T.S. Eliot's famous phrase, "to arrive where we started and know the place for the first time." (31) Beyond this, the ultimate point of this extended comparison is not simply to obtain a deeper appreciation of what liberalism has to say concerning the meaning of neutrality in law, but to begin to imagine a different conception of neutrality and a different way of envisioning the modern secular state.
I. FOUR KINDS OF LIBERAL NEUTRALITY
A convenient place to begin this discussion is with Professor Andrew Altman's thoughtful and spirited defense of liberal legal theory, a defense he offers against the assault made by Critical Legal Studies. (32) Altman identifies "four forms of neutrality that are defended within the liberal tradition": "rights neutrality," "epistemological neutrality," "political neutrality," and "legal neutrality." (33)
Among these four, the most fundamental is undoubtedly "rights neutrality" because, as Altman bluntly states, "[w]hat counts for liberalism is the commitment to substantial constraints on politics in the name of individual autonomy." (34) Rights neutrality embodies just this sort of commitment. Moreover, in different ways it also embodies the distinction between "the right" and "the good" as well as the distinction between "law" and "politics."
As Altman makes clear, in the liberal tradition "rights" demarcate those "domains of human experience and activity that are beyond the legitimate reach of the state." (35) These areas of life "are not to be subject to the processes of deliberation, compromise, and negotiation that constitute the normal political life of the liberal state." (36) Instead, rights define "the boundaries of permissible politics." (37) If the state were to intrude beyond these boundaries, it would not only cause harm to the individuals affected, but it would also call into question the very reason for the creation and recognition of the state in the first instance. Consequently, the state must remain neutral with respect to the exercise of individual rights precisely because they "involve matters that are not legitimate subjects for the concern and regulation of the political community." (38) They are "beyond the bounds of legitimate politics." (39) As prominent examples of the kinds of rights that liberal theory has traditionally supported, Altman briefly mentions the right to freedom of conscience and the right to private property. (40) In surveying the contemporary liberal landscape, freedom of expression and sexual liberty also readily leap to mind.
The second kind of neutrality that Altman identifies he calls "epistemological neutrality." This variety of neutrality is closely related to the first in that it is concerned with what constitute "acceptable arguments for the principles that are alleged to demarcate the boundaries of permissible politics." (41) As rights neutrality makes clear, these boundaries lie between those areas of life protected by rights, and thus free from interference by the state, and all other areas of life, which are "legitimate subjects for the concern and regulation of the political community." (42) In other words, "epistemological neutrality" is the idea that liberal theory must be neutral not only in the freedoms and political structures it recommends, but also in the thinking that lies behind these recommendations.
The third variety of liberal neutrality Altman identifies, "political neutrality," is concerned with the "institutional arrangements" of government. Political neutrality means that the legislative procedures used to establish public policy must "guarantee that political power ... is sufficiently widespread and equalized" so that no one group may dominate the political scene and impose its vision of the good on society as a whole. (43) These arrangements must "insure that no single group or fixed coalition can gain lasting control of the power of government." (44) Instead, the institutions of government should "embody some fair set of procedures that compel different groups, each having its own controversial moral and political views, to compromise and negotiate with one another." (45) Only by engaging in the "processes of normative compromise and accommodation" may a group hope "to exercise significant influence over the deployment of state power." (46)
The fourth and final type of liberal neutrality that Altman identifies is "legal neutrality." It concerns neutrality in adjudication. (47) Legal neutrality means that, absent some superseding individual right, judges may not revisit what the political process has already settled. That is, if the legislature has enacted "some particular rule, then the rule [must be] interpreted and applied ... in a way that is insulated from the influence of any fresh assessment of the contending normative views." (48) Accordingly, judges and other officials deciding matters in an adjudicative setting must act in a neutral fashion by refraining from the exercise of simple political choice. Altman notes that this kind of neutrality plainly envisions a fairly strict separation between the realm of "law" and the realm of "politics." (49)
Behind the four varieties of liberal neutrality in law (and rights neutrality in particular) lies a further conceptual distinction crucial to liberal thought: the distinction between "the right" and "the good." As Altman explains, arguments concerning the right and the good each involve a distinct set of "normative directives, or values." Whereas the right "concerns the demands of justice and moral obligation," the good "concerns the ends we should strive for, once we have insured that we are living above the moral threshold set by the requirements of justice and moral obligation." (50) Liberalism traditionally has held that judgments regarding the good--identifying the ends in life worthy of pursuit--are subjective, such that "no conception of the good licenses those who embrace it to coerce those who dissent." (51) In other words, because the nature of the good is unsettled, contested, and always open to dispute, liberalism holds that it is never appropriate to use the coercive power of the state to mandate a particular theory of the good. By contrast, "liberalism does not deny the legitimacy of coercion or the applicability of the concept of objective truth when it comes to matters of the right." (52) Thus, the distinction between the right and the good gives rise to liberal neutrality in its most basic sense: "[T]he state must be neutral among all (and only) those normative conceptions that endorse ways of life actually above the threshold of right and justice" (53) where right and justice are themselves defined in a way that is independent of any notion of goodness.
II. FOUR COMMITMENTS IN CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT
Catholic social teaching has a great deal to say in response to each of these four varieties of neutrality, both by way of support and by way of critique. The sections that follow address each of these kinds of neutrality in turn.
A. The Status of Rights in Catholic Social Thought
For at least some commentators, it seems, the Catholic Church does not have a reputation for championing individual rights. Some view it as a backward institution--anti-democratic, patriarchal authoritarian, and dedicated to the suppression of individual freedoms. (54) In the eyes of these critics, the Church surely has a reputation inferior to that of the United Nations, Amnesty International, the American Civil Liberties Union, and other groups that typically enjoy wide praise for their efforts in promoting individual rights.
Notwithstanding this sentiment, by any reasonable estimation, the Catholic Church must be counted among the institutions on Earth most dedicated to supporting human rights. (55) This support is most evident in the praxis of the Church--the work that Catholics undertake around the world in caring for people who suffer from a loss of rights and basic human dignity. Whether tending to the needs of migrants and refugees, providing medical services and hospice care for those who suffer from HIV/AIDS, or supplying food, shelter, and education to those who have none, the Catholic Church shows her profound dedication to "the least of these" (56) and to the realization of their rights in the concrete circumstances of everyday life. (57)
The tremendous effort of many Catholics, whether lay or ordained, who work on behalf of those who suffer from a denial of rights is at least in part a response to Catholic social teaching. Although the Church once employed the language of rights only reluctantly, (58) the papal and other magisterial documents that set forth Catholic social teaching now contain numerous references to the "universal and inviolable" rights of the human person (59) and of the need for every state to establish "an effective and independent system for the protection of rights." (60) According to the Church, "the State must protect natural rights, not destroy them," (61) such that when a government ventures to deny the exercise of rights that human beings possess by their very nature, "it contradicts the very principle of its own existence." (62) Thus, these rights take the form of immunity from coercion by the state and freedom to act without interference from others. (63) The many rights recognized in the Church's social teaching include: "the right to life, to bodily integrity and to the means which are suitable for the proper development of life," (64) the right of a man and a woman to marry and establish a family (65) and "to have and to rear children through the responsible exercise of [their] sexuality, "(66) the right "to private initiative, to ownership of property and to freedom in the economic sector," (67) the "right to work" (68) in a safe environment and to receive the payment of a just wage (69) so as to have "the means to support oneself and one's dependents," (70) "the right to develop one's intelligence and freedom in seeking and knowing the truth," (71) including "the right to a basic education and to technical and professional training," (72) "the right "of professing a religion both privately and publicly," (73) including the right "to seek the truth" and "to adhere to the truth, once it is known, and to order [one's] whole [life] in accord with the demands of truth," (74) the right to assemble and associate and to express freely one's opinions; (75) and the right "to take an active part in public affairs and to contribute one's part to the common good of the citizens." (76)
This rather lengthy list of rights seems consistent with Altman's account of rights neutrality in liberalism. A closer examination of the treatment of rights in Catholic social thought, however, reveals three features that distinguish it from the treatment of rights found in liberal theory.
1. Rights as Less than Absolute
The first distinguishing feature is that although the Catholic social tradition regards each of these rights as fundamental and inalienable, it does not treat any of them as absolute. For example, the social teaching of the Church has made this point specifically and repeatedly with respect to the right to own private property. As the late Pope John Paul II stated, the "Christian tradition has never upheld this right as absolute and untouchable." (77) Although Catholic social thought acknowledges private property as an "expression of personality" and "an extension of human freedom" that can aid in the exercise of civil liberties, (78) private property "does not constitute for anyone an absolute and unconditioned right." (79) The tradition holds that all goods, and indeed the entire world, are given to humanity in general (80) such that "[t]he right to private property is subordinated to the right to common use, to the fact that goods are meant for everyone." (81) Because "private property has a social quality deriving from the law of the communal purpose of earthly goods," (82) the state may regulate the use of private property (83) and ensure that "the right to property must never be exercised to the detriment of the common good." (84)
According to the Church's social teaching, rights even more basic than the right of ownership--such as the right to life--are not absolute and unqualified. Plainly, "[f]or man, the right to life is the fundamental right." (85) Indeed, the Church acknowledges that the right to life enjoys a kind of logical priority over other rights in that bodily life is a necessary condition for enjoying all other earthly goods. (86) Still, even this most basic right is not absolute. For example, an individual or the state may licitly take the life of another through an act of legitimate self-defense. (87) In the case of public authorities who are responsible for defending public order and ensuring people's safety and well-being, "[l]egitimate defense can be not only a right but a grave duty." (88) Thus, under certain well-defined circumstances, the Church teaches that the state can take the life of someone intent on harming others.
Likewise, even the right to religious liberty, which Pope John Paul II described as "the source and synthesis" (89) of other rights and "the apex of development," (90) is subject to some qualification. As defined by the Second Vatican Council, the right to religious freedom includes both freedom from coercion, such that "no one [may] be forced to act in a manner contrary to his own beliefs," and freedom from restraint, such that one may act "in accordance with his own beliefs, whether privately or publicly, whether alone or in association with others." (91) But even this most solemn right is subject to the qualification that "the just requirements of public order are observed." (92) Although the Council stated that the right to religious freedom must "be respected as far as possible and curtailed only when and insofar as necessary," (93) the Council clearly anticipated that there could be instances in which the right may justly be restricted.
The Catholic social tradition does speak in terms of absolutes with respect to certain forms of conduct. That is, the Church regards certain actions as "intrinsically evil" in that they are incapable of ordering the human person toward his or her authentic good. (94) As such, it is never morally licit to perform these acts, even when done with the best of intentions. (95) Catholic social teaching holds that to fulfill its function as the guarantor of public order and facilitator of the common good (96)--indeed, in order to preserve the integrity of law as such--the law must prohibit some of these acts. (97) In doing so, the Church often describes the freedom not to be victimized by the wrongful acts of others as a "right" that should enjoy juridical status. At the same time, the Church does not teach that every intrinsically wrongful act must be subject to legal penalty. Indeed, prudential concerns strongly suggest that law and morality should not be coextensive in many instances. (98) Thus, although Catholic social teaching understands that the legal recognition and enforcement of moral rights must, in certain instances, give way to the demands of public order and the common good, certain legal duties--and thus their correlative rights (99)--must remain absolute. (100) Indeed, if the state does not recognize and enforce certain rights always and everywhere--such as the right of an innocent person not to be killed by another individual or the state--then "the very foundations of a State based on law are undermined." (101)
As a practical matter, given that not all rights are absolute, the state may, for example, subject the right of religious expression to reasonable restrictions regarding the time, place, and manner in which the expression is to take place. (102) Likewise, the state may restrict the right of free speech where the speech at issue presents an immediate threat to public safety. (103) The state may not, however, permanently prohibit the dissemination of political views or the public expression of religious devotion because the very foundation of the state is to secure the free exercise of these rights. (104)
In light of this qualification, some might object that this alleged difference is illusory. Some proponents of liberalism may argue that the simultaneous recognition of rights and the treatment of those rights as "less than absolute" does not distinguish Catholic social thought from liberal theory. Some liberal theorists, however, such as Ronald Dworkin, describe rights as "political trumps held by individuals," (105) such that the government cannot "defeat such a right by appealing to the right of a democratic majority to work its will." (106) For Dworkin, the state "must not define citizens" rights so that these are cut off for supposed reasons of the general good." (107) Still, notwithstanding this rhetorical bravado, other committed liberals have observed that the state "can infringe even the most fundamental rights if its justifications are sufficiently 'compelling' and the means used are the least restrictive available." (108) Under this approach, one could zealously subscribe to the tenets of liberalism and still hold that a deeply cherished right, such as the right to free speech under the First Amendment, may be overcome under certain circumstances. (109)
As noted above, (110) liberalism has a long and rich history to which many individuals have made significant contributions. Although it is important to recognize the genuine diversity of opinion that exists within liberal thought, the concept of "liberalism" is not so amorphous and protean as to be devoid of meaning. Rather, it identifies a number of ideas, principles, and values that coalesce together and argue for a certain kind of social order. In showing that Catholic social teaching treats rights as norms that are less than absolute, I have not demonstrated that Catholic social thought stands in opposition to all liberal theory, only that it differs from some versions of liberalism with respect to this point. (111)
Beyond this disagreement with specific participants within the liberal tradition, the difference is one of emphasis. The forthright way in which the Church acknowledges the qualified nature of rights reflects a greater concern for the genuine interests of the community than can be readily seen in the liberal conception of individual rights. It reflects an overt wariness toward the dangers of radical individualism.
2. Rights and Duties
A second feature that more strongly distinguishes the treatment of rights found in Catholic social thought from liberal theory is that, in Catholic social teaching, rights never stand alone. Rather, they are always accompanied by duties. (112) Indeed, this pairing of rights and duties appears throughout the social tradition, beginning with the opening lines of Pope Leo XIII's Rerum Novarum, the encyclical that ushered in the modern era of Catholic social thought. (113)
The very concept of a right is, in a sense, neutral in that the right holder has the freedom to exercise it in one way or another. As Dean John Garvey has noted, we are taught that a freedom is bilateral, like "a two-way street," where one is free to travel in one direction or the other, and both "are equal in value." (114) A duty, by contrast, is unidirectional. It is decidedly non-neutral inasmuch as it denotes a definite end that one is bound to pursue. Aside from the duty to respect the rights of others, (115) discussion of duties is largely absent from liberal discourse. (116) The individual's freedom to act, the freedom to plan one's own life course which lies at the heart of liberal theory, is thought best preserved by imposing on others the duty not to interfere with the exercise of rights. Liberal duties are always directed outward, toward another rights holder in the exercise of his or her rights. (117)
Catholic social thought clearly recognizes that the human person has "the duty to respect the rights of others." (118) Nevertheless, in teaching that rights and duties are "inseparably connected," (119) the social tradition goes beyond the limited correspondence between rights and duties reflected in liberal theory. Rather, it teaches that the duties which accompany the various rights of the human person are duties which have an inward orientation. These duties address the proper exercise of rights by the rights holder him or herself. Thus, as Pope John XXIII set forth in Pacem in Terris, "the right of every man to life is correlative with the duty to preserve it; his right to a decent standard of living with the duty of living it becomingly; and his right to investigate the truth freely, with the duty of seeking it ever more completely and profoundly." (120) Other examples in the tradition include the duty to work and the corresponding right to decent and safe working conditions and a living wage, (121) and the duty to use material goods both for one's own benefit and "the benefit of others" and the corresponding right to private ownership. (122)
The notion that rights holders have duties, not only toward others but also with respect to themselves, shows that duties enjoy a kind of priority over rights in Catholic social doctrine. On this point the Second Vatican Council's Declaration on Religious Freedom, Dignitatis Humanae, is especially instructive. The Council argued that every human being has a "personal responsibility" and "a moral obligation to seek the truth, especially religious truth." (123) This obligation arises from the very nature of the human person. Still, a person cannot be responsible unless he or she is also free. As the Council states, "men cannot discharge these obligations.., unless they enjoy immunity from external coercion." (124) Because of his nature, "every man has the duty, and therefore the right, to seek the truth in matters religious." (125) Rights need to be protected because where their exercise is rendered ineffective "the fulfillment of duties is compromised." (126) Thus, duties provide the grounds and justification for rights--not the other way around, as some liberal theorists contend. (127) This relationship between duties and rights--the idea that obligations give rise to freedoms--is admirably summarized by John Henry Cardinal Newman: "Conscience has rights because it has duties." (128)
Although duties enjoy a kind of priority over rights, the Church's social doctrine makes plain that the enjoyment of a right is not contingent upon the right holder fulfilling the correlative duty that accompanies it. For example, Dignitatis Humanae expressly states that the right to religious freedom--the right to be free from coercion in the pursuit of truth "continues to exist even in those who do not live up to their obligation of seeking the truth and adhering to it." (129) This view of rights and duties is undoubtedly compatible with the liberalism reflected in the American constitutional scheme. That is, the "right to investigate the truth freely" (130) is protected by the First Amendment. (131) Under this broad constitutional freedom a person may read the Bible, or reflect on the verses of the Qur'an or the Bhagarad Gita, or investigate the works of Plato and Aristotle, Hegel and Marx, Nietzsche and Sartre without interference from the state. At the same time, a person does not forfeit his or her First Amendment freedoms if, instead of fulfilling the duty to seek the truth ever more completely and profoundly, he or she seeks "to spend life in enjoyment as an end in itself" (132)--a life of "self-love which leads to an unbridled affirmation of self-interest," (133) a life that indulges in the excesses of the material consumption and exhibitionist culture that characterize much of Western society. Even if a person spends his or her entire life moving from distraction to distraction, wholly neglecting the duty to explore the fundamental question of human existence--the question of meaning that lingers in every human heart (134)--such a person nevertheless retains the right to religious freedom. The state may not force a person to read Aristotle or Marx or the teachings of Calvin or Buddha as the price, the quid pro quo, for retaining his or her constitutional right to seek the truth freely. (135)
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