Home | Business News | Browse by Publication | D | DISAM Journal

A balanced strategy reprogramming the Pentagon for a new age.

Article Excerpt
[The following article originally appeared in Foreign Affairs, January/February 2009 edition. We would like to thank the Foreign Affairs for allowing us to reprint the following article. The original article is located on the web at the following web site: http://www.www.foreignaffairs. 101 faessay88103/robert-m:gates/a-balanced-strategy.html.

The defining principle of the Pentagon's new National Defense Strategy is balance. The United States (U.S.) cannot expect to eliminate national security risks through higher defense budgets, to do everything and buy everything. The Department of Defense (DoD) must set priorities and consider inescapable tradeoffs and opportunity costs.

The strategy strives for balance in three areas:

* Between trying to prevail in current conflicts and preparing for other contingencies

* Between institutionalizing capabilities such as counterinsurgency and foreign military assistance and maintaining the United States existing conventional and strategic technological edge against other military forces

* Between retaining those cultural traits that have made the U.S. armed forces successful and shedding those that hamper their ability to do what needs to be done.

Unconventional Thinking

The United States' ability to deal with future threats will depend on its performance in current conflicts. To be blunt, to fail--or to be seen to fail--in either Iraq or Afghanistan would be a disastrous blow to U.S. credibility, both among friends and allies and among potential adversaries.

In Iraq, the number of U.S. combat units there will decline over time--as it was going to do no matter who was elected President in November of 2008. Still, there will continue to be some kind of U.S. advisory and counterterrorism effort in Iraq for years to come.

In Afghanistan, as (former) President George W. Bush announced last September (2008), U.S. troop levels are rising, with the likelihood of more increases in the year ahead. Given its terrain, poverty, neighborhood, and tragic history, Afghanistan in many ways poses an even more complex and difficult long-term challenge than Iraq--one that, despite a large international effort, will require a significant U.S. military and economic commitment for some time.

It would be irresponsible not to think about and prepare for the future; and the overwhelming majority of people in the Pentagon, the services, and the defense industry do just that. But we must not be so preoccupied with preparing for future conventional and strategic conflicts that we neglect to provide all the capabilities necessary to fight and win conflicts such as those the U.S. is in today.

Support for conventional modernization programs is deeply embedded in the DoD's budget, in its bureaucracy, in the defense industry, and in Congress. My fundamental concern is that there is not commensurate institutional support--including in the Pentagon--for the capabilities needed to win today's wars and some of their likely successors.

What is dubbed the War on Terror is, in grim reality, a prolonged, worldwide irregular campaign--a struggle between the forces of violent extremism and those of moderation. Direct military force will continue to play a role in the long-term effort against terrorists and other extremists. But over the long term, the U.S. cannot kill or capture its way to victory. Where possible, what the military calls kinetic operations should be subordinated to measures aimed at promoting better governance, economic programs that spur development, and efforts to address the grievances among the discontented, from whom the terrorists recruit. It will take the patient accumulation of quiet successes over a long time to discredit and defeat extremist movements and their ideologies.

The U.S. is unlikely to repeat another Iraq or Afghanistan that is, forced regime change followed by nation building under fire anytime soon. But that does not mean it may not face similar challenges in a variety of locales. Where possible, U.S. strategy is to employ indirect approaches, primarily through building the capacity of partner governments and...

View this article FREE - Now for a Limited Time, try Goliath Business News
Free for 3 Days!