|
Article Excerpt
I. THE PROBLEM: MINIMAL REQUIREMENTS FOR BEING COMPETENT
TO STAND TRIAL IN CRIMINAL COURT II. THE ISSUE: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JUVENILE DEFENDANTS AND COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL A. THE APPLICATION OF DUSKY TO DEFENDANTS IN JUVENILE COURT B. DUSKY AND COMPETENCY STANDARDS FOR DEFENDANTS IN JUVENILE COURT C. MENTALLY CHALLENGED DEFENDANTS FOUND COMPETENT TO STAND TRIAL IN JUVENILE COURT D. PROVISIONS FOR DEFENDANTS FOUND INCOMPETENT TO STAND TRIAL IN JUVENILE COURT E. DUSKY AND JUVENILE DEFENDANTS IN CRIMINAL COURT III. THE ADVOCACY: MILITATING TO PREVENT THE PROSECUTION OF JUVENILES IN CRIMINAL COURT A. THE CASE FOR JUVENILE ADJUDICATIVE INCOMPETENCY (JAI) B. GENERAL RESEARCH AND CONCLUSIONS ON JUVENILES' LEGAL ABILITIES C. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON JUVENILES' COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL D. THE CASE, SUCH AS IT IS: A SUMMARY OF THE JAI RESEARCH IV. THE OBSTACLE: SEVERAL PROBLEMS SURROUNDING THE CLAIM THAT JUVENILES ARE INCOMPETENT TO STAND TRIAL A. DPS' FAULTY PREMISES ABOUT JUVENILES' COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL 1. That Competency to Stand Trial is Relative or That There Are Degrees of Competence 2. That Juveniles on Average Are Less Competent to Stand Trial Than Adults Means That All Juveniles Are Incompetent to Stand Trial 3. That Some or Most Juveniles of a Certain Age Are Actually Incompetent to Stand Trial Means All Juveniles of That Age Are Incompetent to Stand Trial 4. That Competency to Stand Trial is About Maturity of Judgment and Perfect Defendants 5. That Competency to Stand Trial Requires Belief in the Ideals of the Adversary Process 6. That Competency to Stand Trial Requires Defendants Share DPs' Values and Perspectives 7. That Competency to Stand Trial Matters Less in Juvenile Court Than in Criminal Court B. METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS IN THE DPs' STUDY OF JUVENILES' COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL 1. Competency to Stand Trial Research Tests Do Not Actually Measure Competency 2. Examining a Defendant's Miranda Comprehension Does Not Determine Competency to Stand Trial 3. Examining Only Delinquents, Especially Only Those Detained, Does Not Yield a Representative Juvenile Competency to Stand Trial Score 4. The Lack of a Standard Measure of Adults' Competency to Stand Trial Compromises Research V. THE ULTIMATE PROBLEMS IN THE DPS' STUDY OF JUVENILE COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL A. THE LACK OF A JUVENILE COMPETENCY PROBLEM B. THE DPS' PROPOSED SOLUTION IS WORSE THAN THE PROBLEM 1. The DPs' Solution 2. The DPs' Proposal Fails on Its Merits 3. The DPs' Solution Is Inappropriate 4. The DPs' Solution Is Unnecessary VI. THE CONCLUSION: MYTHS DISPELLED AND LESSONS LEARNED CONCERNING JUVENILES' COMPETENCE TO STAND TRIAL A. MYTHS DISPELLED 1. Massive Numbers of Juvenile Defendants Are Incompetent to Stand Trial 2. Competency to Stand Trial Is Relative, Group-Determined, and Associated with Punishment B. Lessons Learned 1. Ideology and Not a Constitutional Right Is Driving Research Regarding Competency to Stand Trial 2. Juveniles Need Classroom Instruction on Their Rights 3. Juvenile Defendants Require Extra Attention from Defense Counsel.
I. THE PROBLEM: MINIMAL REQUIREMENTS FOR BEING COMPETENT TO STAND TRIAL IN CRIMINAL COURT
Historically, the right to be competent to stand trial has required little in a defendant's wherewithal. A finding of competency to stand trial requires little, probably because the more that it demands, the fewer the defendants that will answer for their crimes. Even so, the right to be competent to stand trial is considered fundamental. Only if defendants are competent can a meaningful exercise of their trial-related rights occur. For example, an incompetent defendant is unable to assist counsel, to testify, or to effectively confront and cross-examine accusers, and perhaps unable to receive a fair trial.
The competency standard was announced by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1960 in Dusky v. United States. (1) To be competent to stand trial, defendants must have a rational and factual understanding of the nature of the proceedings against them, and an ability to consult with a lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding. (2) Thus, if defendants are basically aware that they are on trial for committing crimes--and could be headed to probation, jail, or prison--and can communicate with their attorneys about those offenses, they are likely to be found competent. Typically, a serious mental illness or an advanced stage of mental retardation would have to exist for a defendant to be incompetent to stand trial. Appellate courts have upheld the criminal prosecutions of mentally ill and retarded defendants who have been diagnosed as neurotic, psychotic, or paranoid schizophrenic, including those with low IQs. (3) Even those with amnesia have been found competent to stand trial. (4)
II. THE ISSUE: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JUVENILE DEFENDANTS AND COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL
Regardless of its limits, the Dusky standard applies to criminal court. Both juvenile and adult defendants in criminal court certainly have a constitutional right to be competent to stand trial. (5) However, it is not as certain whether Dusky applies equally to juvenile court, and whether Dusky standards should differ for juvenile defendants in criminal court.
A. THE APPLICATION OF DUSKY TO DEFENDANTS IN JUVENILE COURT
All appellate courts in recent times have held that youths have to be competent in order to face an adjudicatory hearing in the juvenile system. (6) In re Gault made a youth's competency relevant by granting juvenile defendants basic trial-related rights. (7) In re Gault has been used to recognize a due process or fundamental right to competency to stand trial in juvenile court. (8) This has occurred even when state statutes have been silent regarding competency to stand trial and juvenile court judges have been opposed to recognizing the right. (9)
Appellate courts have held that the right to counsel has little meaning if the juvenile is incompetent to stand trial, (10) and that counsel cannot be effective if youths are unable to communicate or to cooperate with their attorneys. (11) Moreover, the competency requirement ensures that the juvenile understands the nature of the charges, (12) and can prepare and present a defense, increasing the accuracy of the proceedings. (13) Competency is necessary to be able to confront and cross-examine witnesses, (14) and to be able to testify. (15) Even the right to be present at a hearing demands competency to stand trial. (16) Adjudicating a juvenile who is incompetent to stand trial violates due process requirements even if the court seeks rehabilitation. (17) For rehabilitation to be legitimate, the necessary precedent is a determination that a youth has violated the law. (18)
B. DUSKY AND COMPETENCY STANDARDS FOR DEFENDANTS IN JUVENILE COURT
Recently, several states have adopted formal positions regarding competency to stand trial in juvenile court. Nevertheless, twenty states continue to process defendants in juvenile court without a clearly and broadly applicable competency standard. (19) Thirteen states have mostly or completely transported Dusky or their criminal court provision on competency to stand trial to juvenile court. (20) Finally, eighteen jurisdictions have adopted specific standards on competency to stand trial in juvenile court, via either juvenile court statutes or court rules. (21)
The thirteen states that have relied upon Dusky or a criminal court statute in developing juvenile court standards have not created special criteria; four states have exceptions. For example, Arkansas law requires Dusky-level abilities and also a reliable episodic memory, the ability to think into the future and consider the impact of behavior, and verbal articulation and logical decision-making abilities. (22) Importantly, however, these capabilities are required only of defendants who are under the age of thirteen and who are charged with capital or first degree murder. Although these youths are prosecuted in juvenile court, failure to respond to the state's rehabilitation efforts can result in a life sentence.
Other exceptions include a recent ruling from the Iowa Court of Appeals that immaturity and intellectual capacity can lead to a finding of incompetency to stand trial, (23) and an opinion from the Michigan Court of Appeals that "competency evaluations should be made in light of juvenile, rather than adult, norms." (24) Similarly, Ohio appellate courts refer to the adult statute on competency to stand trial as applying to juvenile court, provided that "juvenile norms" are utilized. (25) These rulings appear to permit a "watering down" of Dusky standards for defendants in juvenile court.
The eighteen jurisdictions that have a statute or court rule for juvenile court tend to hold that competency to stand trial requires only an ability to understand the proceedings and to assist counsel. For example, Virginia's statute provides:
If the juvenile is otherwise able to understand the charges against him and assist in his defense, a finding of incompetency shall not be made based solely on any or all of the following: (i) the juvenile's age or developmental factors; (ii) the juvenile's claim to be unable to remember the time period surrounding the alleged offense, or (iii) the fact that the juvenile is under the influence of medication. (26)
The only special consideration for juveniles among these jurisdictions can be found in four states. Florida's and Maryland's competency laws include a capacity to appreciate the charges, range of penalties, and adversarial nature of the process; to disclose pertinent facts to counsel; to display appropriate courtroom behavior; and to testify relevantly. (27) Louisiana holds that incompetency to stand trial can stem from immaturity. (28) Vermont's juvenile court rule mentions age and developmental maturity, mental illness, developmental disorders, any other disability, and "any other factor" that could affect competency in juvenile court. (29)
Most of the law related to competency to stand trial in juvenile court addresses the mental illness or mental retardation connection to competency (and treatment prognosis and restoration services) (30) and what should be done with defendants who are incompetent to stand trial. (31)
C. MENTALLY CHALLENGED DEFENDANTS FOUND COMPETENT TO STAND TRIAL IN JUVENILE COURT
The profile of defendants deemed competent to stand trial in juvenile court mirrors the case law pertaining to adult defendants. A juvenile in Texas underwent preliminary testing that revealed an IQ of 49. A psychiatrist determined the youth's ability to learn new facts, information, and routines was more like someone with an IQ in the 80-90 range, and the youth was ultimately found competent to stand trial. (32) Another Texas youth suffered from mental illness, suicidal ideations, and hallucinations. Despite these handicaps, the youth was able to understand the delinquent conduct alleged, the consequences of being adjudicated, and the results of waiving trial via a guilty plea; he actively participated in his defense and was declared fit by the juvenile court judge and the Texas appellate court. (33) Another Texas juvenile found competent to stand trial suffered from head trauma, Tourette syndrome, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), and borderline intellectual functioning or mild mental retardation. (34)
A fifteen-year-old boy from Minnesota scored in the low average category in performance, while his verbal IQ actually fell in the intellectually deficient range. (35) He was described as having "very limited verbal memory, poor verbal abstraction abilities, minimal verbal reasoning and a marginal vocabulary." (36) The youth was limited in his communication and slow in responding to questions. (37) Nevertheless, he understood the roles of the court participants, his relationship to defense counsel, the nature of the trial process, and what his attorney had told him regarding his case. (38) His trial went forward.
In another case, a fourteen-year-old mentally retarded youth in Vermont understood the charges against him and the conditions of his release, knew who his attorney was, that the judge would decide guilt, and that he could be incarcerated. (39) He also could communicate his version of the alleged incident and had a rudimentary understanding of the plea bargaining process. (40) He was declared marginally competent with assistance. (41)
A Wisconsin case involved a ten-year-old child who had ADHD and was of average intelligence. (42) A defense psychiatrist testified that the youth lacked the mental capacity to understand the proceedings and to assist in his defense. (43) The expert reported that due to the ADHD and immaturity, the youth "did lack in his depth of understanding concepts" and "lacked the ability to fully consider the charges and the meaning associated with longterm consequences." (44) Thus, there were serious limitations in his ability to assist in his own defense. (45) However, the juvenile was able to define witness and prosecutor and to identify the punishments he was facing. (46) He said he could explain to counsel the conduct that brought him to court and to identify untruthful testimony. (47) He was found competent to stand trial. (48)
Ohio appellate cases include a youth diagnosed with ADHD, bipolar II disorder, expressive language disorder, and cognitive disorder; (49) a fifteen-year-old functioning with mild mental retardation and operating at a mental age of ten years; (50) another with a history of mental illness, various mental health treatment, and a long-standing history of bipolar disorder, schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type; (51) and a twelve-year-old with bipolar disorder and ADHD. (52) This last defendant had an IQ of 63 and had experienced three emergency psychiatric hospitalizations, one of which followed an attempted suicide. (53)
Finally, a fourteen-year-old from Delaware was in ninth grade although his abilities in spelling, reading comprehension, reading decoding, and arithmetic were scored at the second grade level, while his written expression was assessed to be at the kindergarten level. (54) He had a full scale IQ of 67 and was classified as mildly mentally retarded. (55) A psychologist found the youth had "scored extremely low on the ability to communicate effectively, care for himself, direct himself or function academically." (56) This defendant was found competent to stand trial because the defense attorney would coach the youth and offer explanations during numerous recesses in the trial. (57)
D. PROVISIONS FOR DEFENDANTS FOUND INCOMPETENT TO STAND TRIAL IN JUVENILE COURT
The majority of statutory and court rule activity concerning competency to stand trial in juvenile court has involved what happens when a youth is declared incompetent. Some states have time limits for restoring the defendant to competency, ranging from 240 days in Arizona, to one year in New Mexico and Wisconsin, to eighteen months in Iowa, to two years in Florida. (58) Similarly, some states have focused on how long the charges can remain viable while a youth is incompetent to stand trial; this can depend on the severity of the offense. (59)
In order to restore the youth to competency, numerous states provide for and may demand temporary civil commitment. (60) Case law in five states has granted judges permission to impose civil commitment for restoration of competency. (61) Some states have identified a time limit for this commitment, ranging from 60 days in Minnesota and New Mexico to 90 days in Texas and Virginia to 120 days in Kansas to 360 days in the District of Columbia. (62) Florida law prohibits commitment to its state agency for children (the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS)) if the basis for the incompetency is age or immaturity; instead, a referral to a community treatment center is provided. (63) Similarly, an Arizona court recently explained:
The analog to "restoration" in the case of a normal child who is too young to understand the proceedings would be to either allow the juvenile to mature naturally to the point where he becomes competent or subject him to special education in the legal process to try to speed the process of rendering him competent.... (64)
If restoration appears impossible, some states allow the judge to dismiss the petition with or without prejudice; some states have restricted the "with prejudice" to misdemeanors and status offenses. (65) Three states permit the judge to convert some delinquency charges into status offenses, but another four require competency to stand trial in all cases. (66) Some jurisdictions allow the civil commitment of youths who are permanently incompetent to stand trial. (67)
E. DUSKY AND JUVENILE DEFENDANTS IN CRIMINAL COURT
Several appellate court cases have applied Dusky to juvenile defendants in criminal court without creating special interpretations for these youths. (68) For example, a fifteen-year-old was found competent to stand trial in Minnesota despite falling into trance or dissociative states during jury selection. (69) A sixteen-year-old in Alabama had an IQ of 76, and the defense psychologist had testified that the youth had a mental age of twelve years and a third grade reading ability. (70) Nevertheless, the juvenile understood the charges, legal strategies, and possible punishments. (71)
A lower Alabama court upheld the criminal prosecution of a fifteen-year-old who had an IQ score of 48, but was capable of behaving in an appropriate manner when it was beneficial to him. (72) The psychologist who declared the youth was competent to stand trial testified that the IQ score did not reflect the youth's true potential, and that individuals with little formal education typically achieve scores that underestimate their true abilities. (73) A second psychologist described the defendant as between slow learner and mildly retarded (an IQ between 60 and 70), but as severely academically retarded. (74) Although the youth was also emotionally immature and impulsive, the psychologist concluded the youth could aid in his own defense and was competent to stand trial. (75)
In other cases from around the country, a seventeen-year-old Arizona youth was found by three psychologists to have a schizoid personality, but was able to make competent choices. (76) The three experts agreed the defendant was competent to waive his right to trial. (77)
A fourteen-year-old Illinois youth had below average intelligence and had sniffed glue. (78) He understood the charges and cooperated with defense. (79) At the beginning of the proceedings, he did not comprehend his right to jury trial and the concept of waiving that right, but his attorney and parents educated him to the point that he was found competent to stand trial. (80)
A thirteen-year-old Nebraska youth had been found by a psychologist to have a persistent preoccupation with death, violence, and other morbid content. (81) He was emotionally detached and escaped into fantasy when faced with stressful situations. (82) Nevertheless, he was determined to be competent to stand trial. (83)
A sixteen-year-old in Oklahoma suffering from hallucinations and depression was found competent to stand trial. (84) Another sixteen-year-old, in Pennsylvania, was diagnosed as schizophrenic with a schizoid personality. (85) He was able to understand the proceedings and assist counsel, and was declared competent to stand trial. (86)
In Tennessee, a fifteen-year-old had an adjustment disorder, conduct disorder, and alcohol and cannabis abuse in his past. (87) He was also diagnosed with a brief psychotic disorder with marked stressors. (88) He had had two beers the night of the offense and could not remember parts of the night prior to his arrest, yet he, too, was declared competent to stand trial. (89)
III. THE ADVOCACY: MILITATING TO PREVENT THE PROSECUTION OF JUVENILES IN CRIMINAL COURT
The question of juveniles' competency to stand trial has been raised in response to the fact that many more prosecutions of juvenile offenders occur in criminal court today than they did twenty to thirty years ago. (90) Historically, the competency question would not have been raised in juvenile court because trials were rare there before In re Gault. Youths' incompetency to stand trial would have been considered a valid reason to adjudicate them so as to offer treatment.
Since the very first days of juvenile court's existence, it has been possible to transfer serious and chronic juvenile offenders to criminal court. Historically, the juvenile court judge made this decision. (91) A significant increase in violent juvenile crime twenty years ago led legislatures in nearly all states to expand the potential of excluding offenders from juvenile court. Particularly troublesome to opponents of exclusion is the legislation that allocated greater transfer decision-making power to prosecutors. (92)
For decades there have been challenges to idea of exclusion, but they did not involve juveniles' competency to stand trial in criminal court. It is the recently increased presence of juvenile defendants in criminal court that has spurred the inquiry into their competency to stand trial. Despite competency's limited requirements, the literature is being inundated with claims that adolescents en masse are incompetent to stand trial, especially-and perhaps only--if the trial occurs in criminal court.
These claims have been offered principally by developmental psychologists (DPs) who have employed developmental psychology principles and research methods to support their claims. (93) Although they are not the only observers who oppose prosecuting juveniles in criminal court, the DPs have selected a line of reasoning that lies within their discipline. They claim that adolescents lack the maturity of judgment to be competent to stand trial, arguing that adolescents are less mature than adults due to deficiencies in maturity of judgment which render it impossible for adolescents to competently participate in a criminal court trial. (94)
A. THE CASE FOR JUVENILE ADJUDICATIVE INCOMPETENCY (JAI)
DPs have constructed two maturity-of-judgment models that purport to explain why juveniles are incompetent to stand trial in criminal courts. The two models, both of which emerged in 1995, identify three psychosocial factors that share common elements.
The first model, proposed by Cauffman and Steinberg, contains the factors of "responsibility, temperance, and perspective." (95) Responsibility pertains to the ability to be self-reliant, and to enjoy clarity of identity and healthy autonomy. (96) Temperance involves one's ability to limit impulsivity, to avoid extremes, and to evaluate situations before acting. (97) Perspective relates to one's ability to understand the complexity of a situation and place it in a broader context. (98)
Scott, Reppucci, and Woolard developed the second model, which addresses the factors of "conformity, risk perception, and temporal perspective." (99) Conformity pertains to one's susceptibility to influence or tendency to comply with peers and parents. (100) Risk perception involves just that, in addition to attitudes toward risk and a tendency to focus more on the possibility of gains than losses. (101) Temporal perspective relates to the ability to consider both long and short term implications of behaviors, and to make decisions without being influenced by external pressures. (102)
Adolescents are seen as impulsive and sensation seeking, inclined to use information less effectively than adults, less experienced, apt to discount future fear, likely to misread threats, and subject to stress and mood variations. (103) Youths are also seen as being vulnerable to peer influence, to looking at the short-term rather than to the long-term, and to reacting to risk by seeing potential gains more than losses. (104) Adolescents are also thought to be less capable than adults when it comes to understanding others' perspectives and differing points of view. (105) These traits mean that adolescents cannot be as competent as adults due to possibly making "different choices when faced with decisions in legal contexts." (106)
Adolescents' lack of maturity vis-a-vis adults can lead to thinking, understanding, and behaving much differently than mature individuals in a criminal prosecution. These differences, in turn, are theorized to render adolescents generally incompetent defendants. DPs have theorized that, compared to adult defendants, juvenile defendants may:
(1) perceive and calculate the probability of risk differently in that they are more likely to underestimate the likelihood of risks or to undervalue their negative implications; (107)
(2) be less aware of--and less alert to--information, or to use what information they have less effectively in making choices; (108)
(3) fixate on an initial possibility in the decision-making process and fail to adjust as new information becomes available; (109)
(4) experience difficulty in contemplating the meaning of a consequence, particularly a long-term one, and have less capacity to anticipate harm as an unintended result of their actions; (110)
(5) have less experience to draw on; (111)
(6) make choices that they would not make when their values and sense of personal identity have matured; (112) and
(7) make different legal decisions than adults and not be as able to resist the influence of others to change their mind. (113)
DPs tell us that, as defendants, adolescents may be expected to:
(1) misinterpret the role of counsel and think that they must be truthful with their attorney so the latter will decide whether to advocate for the defendant's interests; (114)
(2) distrust defense counsel and not be forthcoming with that person due to a belief that adult defense attorneys would not work for a juvenile the way they would for adults; (115)
(3) overestimate the probability of desired events that may result in a greater likelihood of rejecting plea bargains; (116) and
(4) have difficulty comprehending the significance of the length of sentences, which can interfere with an ability to appreciate the consequences of various dispositions and to make informed legally-relevant decisions. (117)
B. GENERAL RESEARCH AND CONCLUSIONS ON JUVENILES' LEGAL ABILITIES
A good deal of research has explored juveniles' capabilities, frequently in legally-oriented contexts, without examining trial competency per se. In 1980, Melton found that most children had some idea of the nature of rights by the third grade, while most understood a right as a guaranteed entitlement by age fourteen. (118) Grisso reported the next year that as many thirteen-year-olds (80-90%) understood that a defense attorney serves as an advocate or helper as did older teens and adults. (119) Later, two other studies documented the legal abilities of youths. Warren-Leubecker, Tate, Hinton, and Ozbek discovered that by the age of eight, 92% knew that a judge is in charge of the courtroom, and 90% of thirteen-year-olds understood that jurors decide whether a person is guilty or not guilty based on what they hear in court. (120) Saywitz determined that youths had accurate concepts of a court and the roles of judges, witnesses, and attorneys by the age of eight to nine years. (121) For eight- to eleven-year-olds, 93% gave accurate responses for the roles of the judge and lawyer, while 86% understood witnesses; for twelve- to fourteen-year-olds, 91% gave accurate responses concerning the judge, and 100% were on mark with both witnesses and lawyers. (122)
These results parallel the findings of numerous studies that have found few differences between adolescents and adults in formal decision-making abilities. (123) The conclusions reached in several studies is that by age fourteen or fifteen, little distinguishes adolescents from adults in the cognitive-capacity aspect of decision-making. (124) This considerable body of literature has led Professor Grisso to declare that "formal reasoning or problem-solving abilities continue to improve through adolescence, but normatively they may not be substantively different from adults' abilities after age fourteen or fifteen...." (125)
Other conclusions drawn by Professor Grisso, prior to the recent onslaught of research on juveniles' competency to stand trial, include the following:
(1) By age thirteen, most juveniles accurately identify trial participants and their roles, as well as the purposes of trial and that as defendants they are charged with offenses and are facing punitive consequences. (126)
(2) By age fourteen, there are few differences vis-a-vis adults in understanding trial-related matters, (127) and some will have the same abilities related to competency to stand trial as adults. (128)
(3) By age fifteen, juveniles are as capable as adults in providing information to attorneys from their experiences, (129) they can track the trial process as it unfolds and can relate one event to another later one (as in contradictory testimony), (130) and they begin to develop the ability to think in terms of hypothetical conditions. (131)
C. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON JUVENILES' COMPENTENCY TO STAND TRIAL
The first study focused specifically on juveniles' competency to stand trial was conducted by Savitsky and Karras in 1984. (132) They used the Competency Screening Test, which gauges knowledge of legal items. There are no instructions provided and no way to ascertain whether the test-taker is ignorant of court-related facts or cannot comprehend what a criminal trial is all about even after an explanation. Savitsky and Karras administered the test to three groups of individuals: twelve nonincarcerated twelve-year-olds; eighty fifteen to seventeen-year-olds, one half of whom were incarcerated; and nineteen adults. (133) The researchers found that the mean scores on the test improved with each age group. (134) However, Savitsky and Karras could form no conclusions on the percentage of the sample's three groups that was competent to stand trial. (135)
Cowden and McKee reviewed 136 South Carolina juveniles between the ages of nine and sixteen who had been referred for a competency evaluation between January 1987 and January 1994. (136) Competency to stand trial was correlated with age, previous severe mental health diagnosis, and remedial education. (137) No correlation was discovered for gender, race, number or severity of charges, mental health services history, or juvenile court history. (138) The majority of thirteen- (55.6%), fourteen- (67.7%), fifteen- (84.4%), and sixteen-year-olds (72%) were found competent to stand trial; only a minority of eleven- (18.2%) and twelve-year-olds (27.3%) were competent to stand trial, however. (139) The fifteen- and sixteen-year-olds found incompetent to stand trial suffered from mental illness or mental retardation. (140)
McKee later examined another sample of 108 juvenile defendants between the ages of seven and sixteen referred for a competency evaluation between January 1994 and June 1996; 85.2% of the juveniles were deemed competent to stand trial. (141) Adults and those between ages thirteen and sixteen displayed a better understanding of the charges, court procedure, and how to assist an attorney than did youths younger than thirteen. Although seventeen-year-olds were not counted among them, juveniles as a group outperformed adults on several dimensions of the evaluation (knowing and defining charges, court officers, and the adversarial nature of the court; appropriate court behavior; testifying and challenging witnesses; and disclosing facts to the attorney), while fifteen- and sixteen-year-olds were considered equal to adults in terms of competency to stand trial, except in their knowledge of plea bargaining. (142)
The same sample (with four more juveniles referred for a competency evaluation between July 1996 and January 1997) was reexamined by McKee and Shea; 85.7% of the juveniles were considered competent to stand trial. (143) Only age, intelligence, and prior juvenile arrest were...
|
