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Article Excerpt
Introduction
An increasing number of feminists agree with Susan Moller Okin's claim that multiculturalism is "bad for women," (1) because it locks them up within the confines of their traditional, often patriarchal, communities and hands them over to the power of the men within that community. 0kin was the first in a long line of Western authors who have questioned the feminist credentials of multiculturalism. (2) One of them is a former Dutch politician, Ayaan Hirsi Ali. She has consistently defended the thesis that Islam is inherently mysogynous and wishes to curb all expressions of autonomous female sexuality. Her fierce denunciations of Islam and of relativistic multiculturalism have made her into one of the most controversial public figures in the Netherlands. (3) Dutch feminists (Muslim and non-Muslim) have become severely divided over the issues that she has brought to the fore. Some have praised her as a brave woman who, in the best tradition of feminist activism, has dared to be controversial and speak up against patriarchal traditions. Others have criticized her for wanting to liberate Muslim women without taking account of their own ideas on autonomy and equality. Whereas Hirsi All has suggested that women's emancipation could only be achieved through the adoption of secular liberal values, her critics have pointed out that many Muslim women have successfully managed to reconcile their faith in Islam with the struggle for emancipation. With her belief that women are much better off with Western liberal views on gender relationships and sexuality, Hirsi Ali has firmly inscribed herself in the tradition of liberal feminism.
Some decades ago, feminists fought a different ideological battle over female sexuality. The battleground then was located in the domains of pornography and prostitution. Liberal feminists took issue with the radical feminist standpoint that denounced pornography and prostitution as forms of sexual slavery that were degrading for women. The liberals argued that feminists, rather than supporting the conservative rejection of such practices, should conceive of them as legitimate forms of work, on the condition that women engaged in them voluntarily. To present porn stars and prostitutes as victims only reaffirmed the madonna-whore complex, which had a detrimental effect on the sexual liberty of all women. Prostitutes therefore deserved to be recognized as strong women who, by capitalizing their bodies, proved their sexual autonomy. In the Netherlands, this liberal standpoint gained significant influence. Policymakers and politicians became convinced that the legalization of prostitution would improve the position of voluntary "sex workers." As a consequence, since 2000, the ban on brothels in the Netherlands has been lifted, pimping is no longer outlawed, and prostitution has become an officially recognized profession.
To what extent are women indeed better off with a liberal view of gender relationships and sexual autonomy? Should public policies always be guided by the unconditional respect for the autonomy of (adult) citizens, or might it be wiser concerning some practices to adopt a more cautious, perhaps even paternalistic, approach? I will address these questions by comparing the debates on the position of Muslim women and the moral status of prostitution. My focus will be on the recent Dutch discourse, but the issues are of current interest in all Western societies. (4) The position of Muslim women and that of prostitutes are usually considered to be entirely different issues: the first addresses the relationship between feminism and multiculturalism, the second touches upon the relationship between feminism and conceptions of sexuality--where in both cases feminism is understood as an intrinsic part of the Western legacy of liberalism. However, divergent topics such as (female) virginity, forced or arranged marriage, female genital mutilation, the hijab, double sexual standards, the madonna-whore complex, and concerns about the rise of raunch culture all revolve around the same issue, that of female sexual autonomy. The paper will start with some conceptual clarification on the distinction between procedural notions of moral and ethical autonomy, and a discussion of the critical assessment of these liberal notions in terms of relational autonomy (section 1). Section 2 focuses on the interpretations of autonomy and liberalism as they have emerged in the Dutch debates initiated by Ayaan Hirsi Ali on women within Islam. Hirsi Ali's view of liberalism as the only reasonable comprehensive doctrine, and of personal autonomy as the only road to human flourishing, has been criticized for its illiberal implications. Nevertheless, regarding practices that one has good reasons to suspect are harmful to the women involved, her attitude of what I will call "sympathetic distrust" deserves to be taken seriously. In section 3, I use this insight to discuss the re-emergence in the Netherlands of the classical controversy over prostitution between liberal and radical feminists. Seven years after its legalization, all parties agree that prostitution has still not become a "normal" branch of industry. But they vehemently disagree about the reasons for this (section 4). In the conclusion (section 5), I argue that sympathetic distrust may constitute a fruitful criterion for feasible liberal policies on contested practices of sexuality such as arranged marriage and prostitution.
1. Liberalism and Autonomy
The political philosophy of liberalism starts from two basic values: the harm principle and the principle of autonomy. John Stuart Mill aptly captured both in a single formula: "The only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it." (5) In its most literal sense, autonomy means self (auto) rule (nomos), or self-government. According to Gerald Dworkin, by exercising autonomy, "persons define their nature, give meaning and coherence to their lives, and take responsibility for the kind of person they are." (6) In contemporary political and moral philosophy, autonomy is an essentially contested and multi-layered concept. For the purpose of this paper, I will focus on three conceptions or forms of autonomy: moral, ethical, and relational autonomy.
1.1. Moral autonomy
The first form of autonomy is moral autonomy: the capacity to set for oneself and obey universal laws. It is the will and the capacity to obey principles that one accepts as self-imposed obligations that are binding for all. This Kantian interpretation of autonomy requires that one acknowledge the dignity of each human being as an end in itself. A person is morally autonomous in this sense "when he is not guided just by his own conception of happiness, but by a universalized concern for the ends of all rational persons." (7) Moral autonomy overlaps to a considerable extent with what Rawls, in his exposition of political liberalism, has termed "political" or "full" autonomy. (8) Persons are fully autonomous when they perceive themselves and others as free and equal citizens of a well-ordered society (9) Moral autonomy is primarily a procedural capacity that is intrinsically linked with Rawls's principle of the priority of the fight over the good. It presupposes a sense of justice, and addresses the practical question: how should one act in relation to others? Politically, it engenders a thin version of liberalism, according to which a liberal society is radically tolerant vis-a-vis the comprehensive doctrines that citizens adhere to as persons. Even if these doctrines require individuals to submit to a higher (say, religious) authority, they are considered "reasonable" and hence permissible as long as they are coherent with the principles of justice as fairness. Rawls admits that state neutrality regarding personal aims does not amount to neutrality of effect: political liberalism will inevitably be less hospitable to some life forms, however reasonable, than to others. (10)
According to Will Kymlicka, however, the privileging of certain life forms over others is not merely a contingent, empirical effect of political liberalism--it is a conceptual implication of it. By guaranteeing civil rights such as freedom of opinion, speech, and religion, the liberal state makes it clear that, as citizens, individuals are free to critically explore different views and commitments, including their own, and that they may change them if they wish to do so. Through state institutions and regulations such as free public education for both sexes, subsidy for day care centers, or the legalization of gay marriage, this message will inevitably "spill over" and affect the way citizens relate to themselves as private persons. Thus, Kymlicka convincingly shows that Rawls's neat distinction between the public role of citizens and their private life as persons is implausible. (11)
1.2. Ethical autonomy
Despite Rawls's claim that moral autonomy is "political not ethical," (12) it paves the way for the liberal appreciation of a second form of autonomy, that is, ethical autonomy. According to Rawls, politically autonomous citizens regard themselves and their fellow citizens as free persons who have the power and the right "to form, revise and rationally pursue a conception of the good." (13) This capacity of ethical autonomy is conditional upon a sense of the good life, and addresses the practical question: what kind of life is worth living, what kind of person does one aspire to be? Early liberals such as Kant and Mill already emphasized the right of individuals to pursue their own happiness. The emphasis was as much on pursuing one's own good (versus universal principles) as on the good (versus the right). Ethical autonomy is similar to what Isaiah Berlin called positive liberty, the capacity "to be moved by reasons, by conscious purposes, which are my own." (14)
Although Kant still suggested that the aims of morality (doing your duty) and happiness (pursuing your desire) are mutually exclusive, moral and ethical autonomy are in fact closely linked. First, they are both subject to the principle of self-government. The subject listens to his own reason (or conscience) in setting and obeying the universal law, and listens to his own heart (his desires and emotions) when he pursues his happiness in the way he sees fit. (15) Second, ethical autonomy is bound to moral limits. As already indicated, Rawls's political liberalism is based on an overlapping consensus between "reasonable" comprehensive doctrines. The choice to become a committed member of the mafia, however authentic and well-considered, does not qualify as a reasonable option. Ethical autonomy counts as a value insofar as it involves a choice among goods: "a choice between good and evil is not enough." (16)
The crucial difference is that while moral autonomy is a capacity that human beings possess even in the most oppressive circumstances, individuals must have sufficient opportunities in order to exercise ethical autonomy. Society therefore should offer a range of meaningful options for its members to choose from. Hence the extent to which individuals in their personal life can truly exercise ethical autonomy also depends on the amount of civic, political, and social rights and liberties they enjoy as citizens.
Liberalism values toleration and plurality. Neutrality of the state vis-a-vis comprehensive doctrines seems the best strategy to generate a plural society. But to what extent is such neutrality really possible? Does the value of ethical autonomy not discourage certain conceptions of the good life and support others? Does it not, for instance, privilege forms of life in which individual life plans take precedence over the goals of a collectivity? Several scholars take Kymlicka's line of argument to the bolder conclusion that ethical autonomy constitutes the comprehensive or perfectionist core of liberalism....
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