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Article Excerpt
1. Introduction (1)
Kant argues that "all politics must bend its knee before right" (PP 8:380), and this means that "right must never be accommodated to politics, but politics must always be accommodated to right" (SRL 8:429). (2) Kant's uncompromising stance on the relation of morals to politics has often been branded unrealistic and impractical. Indeed, it has often been argued that putting Kantian morality into political practice would, in the words of Alasdair MacIntyre, amount to "a dereliction of political duty." (3) While justice (and morality) can afford to be blind, politics must keep its eyes wide open. Does this accusation of naive impracticality against Kant stand up to criticism?
There are (at least) three general ways that we can conceive of the relation between morals and politics. On the idealist tradition, of which Kant is an exemplar, morals trumps or underwrites politics. On the realist tradition, of which Machiavelli and later Carl Schmitt are exemplars, politics trumps or overrides morals. (4) On what can be called the negotiator tradition, of which Max Weber and later Jacques Derrida are exemplars, neither morals nor politics are trumps, so a negotiated compromise must be worked out between the two normative regimes when they conflict. (5) The question of lying in politics throws these various positions into a clear light. For the idealist like Kant, lying is, supposedly, always immoral and therefore has no place in politics, no matter what. For the realist, lying is permissible whenever it is a necessary means to secure a political goal. For the negotiator, principles and prudence must be weighed up. If the costs of adhering to one's convictions about lying become too high, then it would be irresponsible to hold on to those convictions in that situation. (6)
The conflict between morals and politics arises when an action seems both politically legitimate and yet also immoral. This conflict has been portrayed as one between church and state, between "other-worldly" principles and worldly responsibility, and between care for the world and care for the self. (7) Of course, this conflict does not arise when political prudence and moral principle are in agreement, as they often are. As Kant notes, even a nation of purely self-interested devils could agree to live by principles of justice (PP 8:366). Nonetheless, as Machiavelli reminds us, it is often politically prudent to depart from morals. (8) Lying, which Hannah Arendt correctly notes has never been counted among the political virtues, (9) is a particularly clear case in point. On this view, given that humans can be such deceptive and malicious creatures, only an idealistic fool (such as Kant, perhaps) imagines that politics can function based solely on principles of complete candour, openness, and truthfulness. Lying may be immoral, but it is the very grease that keeps the political wheels in motion. Given this, a politics completely subservient to morality would seem to be not only unrealistic but also undesirable. In the face of this problem, the challenge for the Kantian is to defend the practicality and the intuitive desirability of the "morals trumps politics" position. Of course, Kantians could simply pride themselves on their impractical moral purity, but such pride is of the type that comes before a fall.
However, in order to investigate the relation of morals to politics in Kant's work, we need to first deal with the competing interpretations of Kant's moral and political theory. Some, such as Allen Wood, read Kant as a moral realist who offers a teleological theory of ethics based on the supreme value of humanity. Others, such as John Rawls, read Kant as a moral constructivist who offers a deontological theory of ethics based on the dictates of practical reason. (10) Still others have read Kant as offering a virtue theory of ethics where it is character dispositions, and not actions, that are primary. (11) Likewise, the nature of Kant's political theory is also contested. While there is general agreement that Kant is a liberal of some sort, there is debate about what sort of liberal he is. Both libertarians on the right, such as Robert Nozick, and liberals on the left, such as Rawls, and even socialists have invoked Kant's name to further their cause. (12)
With these difficulties in mind, this paper addresses the question of the relation of morals to politics in Kant' s work by first offering an interpretation of Kant's moral and political theory. In section 2 I reject those readings of Kant, which are not uncommon, that claim that his moral theory absolutely forbids lying under any circumstances. In section 3 I also reject those readings of Kant, which again are not uncommon, that claim that his political theory absolutely forbids civil disobedience and rebellion under any circumstances. Drawing upon this reconstructive exegesis, I argue in section 4 that Kant's position on the relation of morals to politics is both morally uncompromising and yet politically flexible, both principled and practical. Further, I also examine in depth the claim that political progress is impossible without accompanying moral progress. A fully politicized public realm requires not only a rights-respecting but also a virtuous citizenry.
2. Kant on Morality and the Duty to Lie
Kant argues not simply that politics ought not to conflict with morals, but that politics properly conceived cannot conflict with morals. This is because politics is primarily (but not only) the instantiation of right in practice via the necessary means of the free and open use of public reason. Morality demands nothing less. (13) While there can be a "subjective" conflict between morals and the likes of self-interest, prudence, passions, or ideology, there cannot be an "objective" conflict between morals and politics, because politics is primarily about right and not about self-interest, prudence, passions, or ideology (PP 8:370, 379). In order to see what this implies in practice, we need to turn to Kant's account of lying. But what exactly we take Kant's account of lying to look like will depend on how we read his moral theory.
Kant's position on lying might seem straightforward enough. The Categorical Imperative seems to unconditionally forbid lying, no matter what the circumstances or consequences. Lying, in deontological terms, is intrinsically wrong; that means we have a perfect duty to never lie to ourselves or others. While this is the way that Kant is commonly understood (see Alasdair MacIntyre for a recent example), (14) I shall argue that it is seriously misleading. In order to see why, we need to examine Kant's distinction between political and ethical duties as set out in the Metaphysics of Morals. The former are contained in the Doctrine of Right (Rechtslehre) and the latter in the Doctrine of Virtue (Tugendlehre).
In the Rechtslehre, Kant aims to establish a set of rules for coercively protecting the maximum amount of external freedom for each that is compatible with a like amount of freedom for all. Kant argues that: "Any action is right if it can coexist with everyone's freedom in accordance with a universal law" (MM 6:230). We each have only one "innate right" that applies to us qua human beings, and that is a right to freedom, where this is understood as "independence from being constrained by another's choice, insofar as it can coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law" (MM 6:237). Such a system of right is not, as it is for Hobbes, based on a self-interested agreement to restrict one's freedom for the sake of protection. For Kant we do not limit or give up in any way our freedom by entering into a rightful condition. Indeed, it is only in such a state that we realize or achieve our freedom by living in accord with the law of freedom (MM 6:231). Freedom is not, for Kant, a complete lack of external hindrance, but the presence of the right sort of hindrance--namely, the legally enforced rule of right. As such, the "hindering of a hindrance to freedom" is "consistent with freedom in accordance with universal laws, that is, it is right" (MM 6:231). It is not the liberal right to pursue one's own private conception of the good, but the public enactment of freedom in accordance with universal law (i.e., public autonomy), that is the founding value of Kantian justice.
The Tugendlehre outlines a system of perfect and imperfect duties to oneself and others. (15) Perfect duties are based on respect, imperfect duties on love. We have a perfect duty to respect the dignity of rational nature in both our own humanity and that of all others. We have an imperfect duty to love rational nature in both ourselves and others. This love gives rise to the two ends that Kant claims it is a duty to have: the ends of self-perfection and the happiness of others (MM 6:385-86). The vices, which express disrespect and hatred for humanity, arise from the misuse, rooted in our radical propensity to evil, of our natural predispositions to animality and humanity (REL 6:27-28). (16)
Is the veto against telling lies one that belongs to right or to ethics, or both? Can I rightfully demand, and not just ethically expect, truthfulness from others? Unfortunately, Kant gives two conflicting answers to this question. In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant argues that the duty to never lie is a matter of ethics and not right, except in legal matters (MM 6:238), whereas in On a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy, Kant argues that the duty to never lie is a matter of right and not just ethics (SRL 8:427). Given these inconsistencies, what is the best way to interpret Kant's position?
In On a Supposed Right, Kant presents his infamous example of whether or not it is permissible to lie to a murderer who asks you whether a friend of yours, whom he is pursuing and intends to kill, has taken refuge in your house. Presumably you know that if you answer truthfully, the murderer will enter your house and kill your friend, but if you lie, then the murderer will leave and your friend will live. Kant argues that there is an unconditional duty of right not to lie, which applies even in this case, and for this reason you can be held "legally accountable for all the consequences that might arise" were you to lie (SRL 8:425-27). This seems like a "clean hands" policy gone mad. Do your duty, tell the truth (and if you don't you will be held legally accountable), and morally wipe your hands of the outcome (even if that outcome is the murder of a friend to whom you have offered refuge). Such a view seems morally repugnant.
However, Kant offers a different position in the Metaphysics of Morals. Because of this difference, R.F. Atkinson is mistaken in claiming that Kant's position in On a Supposed Right in regard to lying is "no aberration but an expression of fundamental commitment." (17) On Kant's theory, rights protect our freedom. But lying, unlike, say, physical violence, does not in general infringe upon another person's basic freedoms. Indeed, in the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant argues that we have a protected right (but not a duty) to lie, covered by our right to free speech, as the other person remains free to believe or disbelieve what we say (MM 6:238). There is only a juridical...
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