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Article Excerpt
NOTE CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION I. THE CRIMINAL GANG THREAT A. Gang Members in the United States Military B. Crimes Committed by Gang-Affiliated Service Personnel C. Implications of Gang Activity in the Military II. EXISTING MILITARY POLICIES ADDRESSING GANG AFFILIATION A. Recruitment B. Detection and Prevention 1. Extremist Organization Regulations 2. Structural Shortcomings 3. Rehabilitative Measures C. Removal III. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONFRONTING THE CRIMINAL GANG THREAT A. Recruitment B. Detection and Prevention C. Removal CONCLUSION
INTRODUCTION
In October 2007, a soldier from Baltimore was arrested by Army authorities in Oldahoma for the gang-related shooting of five people. Police believed the soldier was a member of the Bloods street gang. Three of his five alleged victims had ties to a rival gang known as the Young Gorilla Family. The soldier allegedly joined the Bloods prior to joining the Army. He enlisted eight days after being charged with a trespass violation. The Army was never informed that the soldier had been arrested or involved with a criminal street gang. (1)
The above events are unfortunately part of a larger trend: gang activity in the U.S. military is on the rise. In the Army alone, there were seventy-nine suspected gang incidents reported in 2007. (2) These incidents included acts of homicide, aggravated assault, robbery, theft, and narcotics dealing. (3) Junior enlisted men below the rank of sergeant committed most of these offenses, but a growing number of civilians and military dependents have been suspects as well. (4) The spread of gang culture within the ranks disrupts good order and discipline, threatens base security, and undermines the professionalism of the armed services.
Military-trained gang members pose an even greater threat to civilian communities. While on active duty, they may use their security privileges and military equipment to further gang activities. After discharge, they can pass their training on to other gang members and use their service connections to network between civilian and military gangs. (5) The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) fears that access to weapons and combat training "could ultimately result in more organized, sophisticated, and deadly gangs, as well as an increase in deadly assaults on law enforcement officers." (6) Numerous media services and local agencies have echoed these concerns. (7)
Despite the widespread recognition that gang members pose a serious risk to military and civilian communities, the armed forces have had little success in reducing the number of serving gang members or preventing gang-related crime. This failure is partly attributable to difficulties in the recruitment process. Military recruiters are not always properly trained to recognize gang affiliation. Commanders eager to fill the ranks, moreover, often give "moral waivers" to even those recruits whose gang affiliations are detected. (8) A lack of adequate preventative and disciplinary measures available to commanders seeking to protect their units against gang activity further exacerbates the shortcomings of recruitment practices. (9)
Responding to mounting criticism of the military's failure to reduce gang activity in the armed services, Congress recently required the Secretary of Defense to prescribe regulations "to prohibit the active participation by members of the Armed Forces in a criminal street gang." (10) Congress's order provides the military with an opportunity to adopt a new approach to confronting the criminal gang threat.
This Note encourages the military to capitalize on the opportunity provided by Congress. Part I reviews the extent of the criminal gang threat to military and civilian communities. Part II assesses the effectiveness of the armed services' existing anti-gang measures. Part III recommends specific ideas for the military to consider when it drafts the new required regulations.
I. THE CRIMINAL GANG THREAT
Crime rates in the United States have dropped dramatically over the last decade. (11) Violent crime has fallen 22.5% and property crime 22.7% from 1997 levels. (12) During the same period, criminal gang membership has increased and diversified. (13) Gangs today are more sophisticated in their use of illegal tactics, and they are more resistant to crime-fighting methods. (14) They remain the primary distributors of illegal drugs in the United States (15) and often cooperate with traditional organized criminal entities. (16)
A. Gang Members in the United States Military
Although military communities are generally more stable and secure than their civilian counterparts, they are not immune from gang activity. (17) Recent data suggest that the rise in gang activity has been more pronounced in the military than in the nation at large. (18) This data is conveyed most succinctly in separate reports compiled by the National Gang Intelligence Center (NGIC), a division of the FBI, and the Criminal Investigation Command (CID) of the U.S. Army. These reports detail an increasing number of gang-related crimes involving military personnel. (19)
According to CID reports, a total of 183 suspected gang-related incidents and felony investigations were identified by military police between 2003 and 2007. (20) Reflecting the recent rise in military gang activity, more than three-quarters of these incidents and investigations were reported in 2006 and 2007. (21) Among the individuals identified as gang offenders in the 2007 CID report, most were junior enlisted men or civilian dependents stationed in the United States; none was a commissioned officer or senior noncommissioned officer. (22) The CID identified members of eleven known national gangs in 2007 but noted that the true number and variations of gangs in the Army is unclear. (23) Based on this information, the CID concluded that the threat to the Army from gangs will continue to create new challenges for military authorities. (24)
The NGIC report is more alarming in its finding that "[m]embers of nearly every major street gang ... are present in most branches and across all ranks of the military." (25) The report notes that the FBI has identified over forty military-affiliated gang members at Fort Bliss since 2004, while the Army has identified nearly forty military-affiliated gang members at Fort Hood since 2003 and nearly 130 at Fort Lewis since 2005. (26) The report concludes that gang-related activity in the military is increasing and diversifying. (27) It refrains from quantifying these trends, because "[a]ccurate data reflecting gang-related incidences occurring on military installations is limited." (28)
The CID and NGIC reports both emphasize the involvement of dependent children of service members in gang activity on or near military installations. (29) Military children are "targets for gang membership because their families' transient nature often makes them feel isolated, vulnerable, and in need of companionship." (30) Dependents of service members have been involved in a number of reported crimes on and off of military bases. (31)
B. Crimes Committed by Gang-Affiliated Service Personnel
Gang incidents involving active-duty personnel encompass nearly the entire scope of criminal activity. As with civilian gangs, the most common felonies associated with gang activity in the military are illegal drug offenses. (32) While these crimes typically involve the retail distribution of drugs, (33) military gang members have been known to use their security clearances and equipment to facilitate sophisticated drug-trafficking schemes. (34) Military gang members also engage in the smuggling of weapons. (35) In one instance, a gang member in the Army smuggled home four AK-47s from Iraq that were used to commit multiple bank robberies. (36) Due to the domestic security implications of such crimes, law enforcement agencies have identified all reported weapons-related incidents as serious threats. (37)
Murder, assault, and robbery complete the list of felonies that gang members in the military reportedly commit. (38) Killings are often linked to inter- or intra-gang conflicts. One soldier stationed in Germany died after receiving numerous punches from fellow gang members during an initiation rite. (39) Three other soldiers in Alaska were charged with murder after they allegedly killed a civilian while exchanging gunfire with rival gang members. (40) Other killings occur at the hands of military gang members during the commission of separate criminal offenses. (41)
Gang members in the military also commit lesser crimes of vandalism, domestic disturbance, and money laundering. (42) Gang-related vandalism has attracted the most media attention, with several national newspapers reporting a proliferation of gang graffiti on military installations. (43)
C. Implications of Gang Activity in the Military
The presence of gang members in the armed forces poses worrisome problems. In the military, gang members threaten unit order and compromise base security. A shocking example of this is found in the facts of United States v. Quintanilla, (44) in which a Marine sergeant and self-proclaimed gang member shot his commanding officer and executive officer--both lieutenant colonels--and threatened to continue killing officers until his fellow gang members were released from confinement. (45) Other examples of destabilizing gang influences involve narcotics crimes, robberies, and aggravated assaults. (46) Often, these incidents trigger other acts of disobedience or retaliation. Over the years in which the Army has recorded gang activity, the five bases initially reporting high rates of gang activity have witnessed an increase in those rates despite efforts to address the situation. (47)
The presence of gangs in the armed services also threatens to undermine the professionalism of the military and bring discredit upon the nation's forces. The potency of this threat to the public perception of the armed services is evidenced by the number of critical news reports published after reported incidents of military gang activity. (48) In each incident, gang members compromised the otherwise proud traditions of our country's armed forces.
Gang activity in the military has a negative impact on civilian communities as well. Law enforcement officials are concerned about gang-affiliated soldiers transferring their acquired training and weapons back to communities to facilitate the commission of crimes. (49) When such transfers of knowledge and supplies have occurred, communities have suffered and law enforcement officials have fared poorly, (50) In particular, civilian gangs with military ties have proven extremely dangerous to confront and track, (51) These issues become even more problematic as gangs active in the military have become more sophisticated and mobile. (52)
Examples of the dangers posed by gang members in the military are not scarce. In Ceres, California, a Marine, who was a Nortefio gang member, fatally shot a police officer during an altercation, (53) The Marine had served in Iraq and chose his weapon because he knew its rounds could pierce body armor, (54) At Fort Hood, Texas, Army troopers affiliated with the Gangster Disciples murdered the friends of a local nightclub owner who expelled their leader for unruly behavior, (55) At Fort Lewis, Washington, an Army specialist and several accomplices stole night-vision goggles to sell to a gang in California. (56) And in Columbia, South Carolina, four Marines were caught recruiting local teenagers into the Crips. (57)
II. EXISTING MILITARY POLICIES ADDRESSING GANG AFFILIATION
The military justice system is well equipped to prosecute service personnel, including gang members, once they commit a crime. The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) authorizes criminal and nonjudicial forms of punishment and empowers commanders to "promote efficiency and effectiveness in the military establishment." (58) Assisting commanders in their disciplinary role, military police officers investigate crimes and members of the Judge Advocate General's (JAG) Corps prosecute offenders. Where criminal provisions do not apply, commanders have broad administrative powers to impose other sanctions. (59)
Notwithstanding the breadth of these criminal and administrative sanctions, the military has been unable to curb the spread of gang activity in its ranks. (60) The military has been unsuccessful because its procedures for screening and removing gang members fall short of the efficiency of its post-offense mechanisms. The Sections below analyze current gang countermeasures, focusing on the limitations and shortcomings that hinder the elimination of gangs in the military.
A. Recruitment
The rise in gang activity in the military has led some to fault the recruitment policies of the various branches. (61) This criticism recently intensified after the Department of Defense relaxed its standards for granting "moral waivers" to recruits with criminal backgrounds. (62) Critics generally complain that the military has lowered its standards to accommodate recruiting needs. (63) Because the Army has the greatest number of personnel and recruitment problems of any military branch, it has received the brunt of this criticism. (64)
The Army has responded to critiques of its recruitment policies by maintaining that the quality of its applicants remains high and noting that its current policies are designed to "weed out" gang members. (65) Under these policies, recruiters interview applicants and ask them to divulge their criminal history, including expunged, sealed, and juvenile records. If an applicant discloses past law violations, he must undergo a suitability review that includes a police record check. The record check requires a recruiter to solicit an applicant's criminal file from state and local authorities. (66) Applicants with a confirmed criminal history containing five or more minor nontraffic violations, two or more misdemeanor charges, a combination of four or more minor nontraffic or misdemeanor charges, or one serious criminal misconduct charge must seek a moral waiver or face discharge. (67) Moral waivers are granted by the Commanding General of the Army Recruiting Command, who applies the "whole person" concept of review. (68) This review concept considers the severity of the offense(s), the applicant's capacity for reform, and the degree to which the applicant meets other Army standards, (69)
The Army's official position on accepting gang members is codified in Army Regulation A.R.) 60l-210, [section] 4-2(e) (1) (a) (9):
When it is reported ... through a tattoo, behavior, verbal or written communication, appearance, or gestures that an individual is or may be involved with an extremist organization, group, or gang, the following procedures will be used to determine eligibility:
a. The commander must ensure from a series of direct and indirect questions that the applicant is in fact given fair assessment and determination without personal bias or predetermined outcome.
b. A person who admits to or is determined to have been associated with or in a gang linked to criminal or extremist activity will be questioned concerning the involvement. The fact that a person has been in a gang may not be grounds for disqualification. The whole person concept must be applied. (70)
This regulation provides recruiters and commanders broad latitude in determining the extent and nature of an applicant's gang membership. Such latitude is not surprising, given force requirements and the historic perception of the Army as a place where individuals may seek a fresh start. (71)
In many ways, the Army's policies are justified. They balance competing interests, encourage information sharing, and give discretion to the individuals most familiar with the applicant. But shortcomings in the execution of the policies undermine the Army's good intentions and lend support to critics' claims of lowered standards for recruitment.
First, the evaluative process depends upon the honesty of the applicant. Those who admit prior criminal behavior are screened and subjected to a police record check, but "[a]pplicants who claim no law violations or claim only minor traffic offenses are not required to have police record checks or court checks." (72) A recruiter may question an applicant's veracity and conduct a police check despite the applicant's claims, but such occurrences are rare-especially during a time of war. (73) Should a recruiter detect that an applicant is lying about his criminal history, the Army may only sanction the applicant with discharge and reenlistment restrictions. (74)
Second, even when recruiters conduct a police record check, they are likely to miss important information and warning signs due to communication failures. These problems are the result of provisions in the regulations that expedite the recruitment process at the expense of efforts to gather information about questionable applicants. The most glaring of these provisions is A.R. 601-210, [section] 2-11, which permits a recruiter to dispense with a police record check if the police or court authorities (1) charge a processing fee, (75) or (2) do not respond to a file request within seven working days, despite military efforts. (76) These clauses result in a disconnect between recruiters and some state and local offices. (77) Also troubling is the absence of a requirement for recruiters to seek federal records during a police check. Given the breadth and accessibility of federal agencies' resources, this is a noticeable omission.
Third, educational shortcomings hinder the efficient operation of recruitment procedures. Such deficiencies are particularly problematic at the recruiter level. Under the regulations, recruiters are expected to identify the potential attributes of a gang member. (78) To do so, they must possess extensive knowledge of common gang tattoos, clothing styles, terminology, and gestures. Even though recruiters receive extensive training, some are not fully familiar with these identifiers. (79) This unfamiliarity results, in part, from the military's tendency to underemphasize the threat from gangs: few commanders encourage recruiters to focus on eliminating the gang threat, so few recruiters seriously seek the information necessary to identify gang members. (80) A more significant reason for recruiter shortcomings, however, is the inadequacy of their educational resources. To detect a gang identifier, a recruiter currently must rely on a handbook that provides examples of suspect symbols, clothing, and gestures. (81) This handbook is substantial in scope, but it does not fully account for local trends or the ever-changing nature of gang identifiers. (82) Obtaining such information requires cooperation with local police and other agencies.
Fourth, the military has hindered the effectiveness of its anti-gang provisions by failing to define key terms like "gang," "involved," and "gestures" in recruitment regulations and training handbooks. (83) The Army avoids specifying these terms because doing so might spark legal action from affected groups and limit recruiter discretion. (84) This justification, however, provides thin cover for the problems that stem from a lack of specificity. Without proper definitions prompting duties to inspect and penalize gang activity,...
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