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Article Excerpt
Different ideological perspectives about religious doubt spawn controversy and confusion among some Christians. Typically misunderstood as unbelief, doubt is often characterized as dangerous if not outright prohibited by Scripture. As this study demonstrates, comprehending religious doubt through the lens of Marcia's ego identity statuses offers a more nuanced understanding of the cognitive phenomenon. Multiple regression analyses of survey data from 604 religious adolescents revealed identity moratorium, identity achievement, and doctrinal uncertainties are positive predictors of doubt while identity foreclosure, identity diffusion, and religious satisfaction are negative predictors. Implications from the findings relevant to Erikson and Batson's theories are discussed along with practical applications for those in the church community working with youth.
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Over the past thirty years, a broad base of knowledge about religious doubt has accumulated. Yet, this phenomenon in human cognition remains a controversial and confusing topic among many Christians (Guinness, 1976; McLaren, 2003).
Some of the misunderstanding about religious doubt can be eliminated by taking into account the identity status of doubters and their unique experiences with identity formation. More specifically, Marcia's ego-identity statuses can function as an interpretative lens assisting interested persons in comprehending religious doubt and coping with it.
Unfortunately, the relationship between religious doubt and identity statuses has been understudied. The following discussion exposes aspects of the controversy and confusion associated with doubt among Christians and presents a rationale for and outcomes from a multiple regression study with religious adolescents on the doubt-identity relationship.
A Controversial Phenomenon
Beck (1990) contended, "Doubt is an integral part of each person's belief system" (p. 327). Any contact with reality creates contact with doubtable ideas (Newbigin, 1995). However, some Christians perceive doubt as a significant threat functioning as a usurper or enemy of the faith and entailing risky, dangerous, and destructive thinking. Lucado (1989) described doubt as an obnoxious pest, a "nosey neighbor," which must be barred or prohibited from the mind and soul. Buchanan (2000) likened doubt as a cancer burning and mutating healthy beliefs, a carcinoma with an insatiable appetite consuming like quicksand and uncomforted by evidence. Moreover, Darmani (2002) considered doubt as a demonic weapon striking in the vulnerable moments of life and creating a disturbing restlessness within the human heart.
Other religious adherents embrace doubt. They regard it as a universal experience germinated from human finitude and a necessity for faith maturation and its transitional experiences (Fowler, 1996; Halfaer, 1972; Parks, 2000; Tillich, 1957). Instead of an adversarial role, some evangelicals view doubt as a valuable aspect of mental life encouraging authenticity with God. Geering (1997) argued doubt is not the rival of faith, but a foe of false beliefs. Webber (2002) identified a new generation within the church, 'the younger evangelicals,' and noted they expect theological and biblical thought to be "lively [and] controversial," because they are not afraid to "question, push, and challenge" (p. 168). Moreover, Jones (2001) profiled Christian post-moderns as persons who deconstruct the known by questioning everything, assuming nothing, and taking nothing for granted, habits which often lead them to be skeptical and cynical.
A Confusing Phenomenon
Along with being controversial, religious doubt is often confused with other mental processes (Beck, 1990). Unbelief is one of those phenomena. For instance, in John 20, Thomas was confronted with a report from his companions about their encounter with the resurrected Messiah (v. 25a). The common interpretation of his reaction is that he doubted. However, this disciple's declaration (v. 25b) and Christ's rebuke (v. 27c) reveal a different mindset (Schnackenburg, 1990). These verses paint Thomas in a struggle with unbelief prior to his famous confession of belief (vs. 28).
In John 20:25b, Didymus declared, "Unless I shall see in [Jesus'] hands ... I will not believe" (NAS). Two noteworthy facets are in the declaration. He demanded concrete evidence, to sec and touch the nail marks and side wound, and he insisted belief would be contingent on this proof. Commenting on the latter, Kostenberger (2004) described Thomas' insistence as forceful and suggested the comment be translated as "I will certainly not' (ou me) believe" (p. 577).
In John 20:27c, Christ rebuked his disciple with the statement, me ginou apistos alla pistos. This exhortation unveils the Lord's perception of Thomas' state of mind. Some translate the rebuke, as "stop doubting and believe." However, Carson (1991) argued if apistos and pistos are taken adjectively, a literal rendering of the clause would be, "do not be unbelieving but believing, " and if taken substantively, the clause could be, "do not be an unbeliever, but a believer" (p. 657).
Unbelief is a rejecting response, a resolute state of mind involving a definite "conviction of falsity regarding an issue" (Beck, 1990, p. 327). Doubt is a hesitant reaction, a temporary and divided state of mind created "by the collision of evidence with prior belief or one belief with another" (Allport, 1957, p. 100). For instance, in Matthew 28:17(TNIV), the apostle noted prior to Jesus heralding the Great Commission that those gathered on a Galilean mountainside who "saw him" and "worshipped him" also "doubted" (Reeves, 1998). The Greek term translated doubt in this passage is distazo, to be uncertain or indecisive. The disciples were "in a state of uncertainty about what recent events meant and what might happen next" (Hagner, 1995, p. 885). So, even though unbelief and doubt are cognitive processes sprung "from the same psychological sources" (Allport, 1957, p. 100), they are distinctively different and separated by opposite levels of certainty.
Doubt is also not equivalent to ambivalence, which is the simultaneous presence of two or more contradictory emotions (ambivalence, 2008; Beck, 1990). Ambivalence may associate with doubt, but it is an affective experience. Moreover, doubt is not skepticism, which refers to the tendency to dispute the truthfulness of certain knowledge claims (skepticism, 2008). Thomas would be better described as a skeptic who grappled with unbelief about God's redemptive plan as many believers have over the past two centuries (Buchanan, 2000; Kostenberger, 2004).
Psychological Research on Religious Doubt
Thirty years of psychological research on religious doubt has produced a vast and diverse knowledge base. Researchers have examined how doubt relates to various dimensions of the human experience such as cognitive functioning, family life, intrapersonal traits and habits (e.g., stress and mood levels), religious life, and interpersonal attitudes and habits. And, several instruments have been employed over the three decades to measure the dynamics of religious doubt such as the Quest Scale (Batson, 1976; Batson & Schoenrade, 1991), the Religious Doubt Scale (Altemeyer, 1988), the Uncertainty and Wondering Scales (Kooistra & Pargament, 1999), and the Multidimensional Quest Orientation Scale (Beck &Jessup, 2004).
Interestingly, patterns in the research findings and their effects can be generalized as appearing dichotomic. Both positive and unpleasant human experiences relate to doubt. Clarity of the dynamics of religious doubt has expanded, yet confusion still abounds; certain research outcomes conflict and at times contradict. As a result, this large body of research has helped to ameliorate many fears which Christians have about doubt while it has also corroborated some of their negative views. For instance, aspects of cognitive functioning positively associated with religious doubt include principled moral reasoning (Ji, 2004), non-rigid thinking (Leak et al., 1990), integrative complexity (ability to juggle different perspectives and note their similarities) (Hunsberger, McKenzie, Pratt, & Pancer, 1993), and non-dogmatic thinking (Hunsberger, Alisat, Pancer, & Pratt, 1996). But, Watson, Morris, Hood, Miller, & Waddell (1999) reported doubt positively linked to pollyannaish thinking along with esoteric thinking, which includes belief in scientifically dubious occurrences (e.g., ghosts, flying saucers) and superstitions (e.g., lucky charms).
Family life experiences positively associated with doubt include problematic parenting habits such as harsh discipline, insincere religiosity, and low commitment to religion (among Protestants) (Kooistra & Pargament, 1999) along with minimal warmth and leniency (Hunsberger, Pratt, & Pancer, 2002). In regards to family functioning, doubt positively associates with disengagement or low cohesion (Hunsberger et al., 2002). Furthermore, a poor relationship with parents in general (Hunsberger et al., 1996) and specifically a conflictual relationship with Protestant mothers also positively link with religious doubt (Kooistra & Pargament, 1999).
Concerning intrapersonal traits and habits, religious doubters report experiencing more stress and life hassles (Hunsberger et al., 1996), higher levels of anxiety (Kojetin, McIntosh, Bridges, & Spilka, 1987), higher depression levels (Genia, 1996), less optimism, less social support, and low self-esteem for some Protestants (Hunsberger et al., 2002), disturbed identity functioning (Watson,...
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