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Article Excerpt
Abstract. In this paper, we focus attention on the role of computer system complexity in ascribing responsibility. We begin by introducing the notion of technological moral action (TMA). TMA is carried out by the combination of a computer system user, a system designer (developers, programmers, and testers), and a computer system (hardware and software). We discuss three sometimes overlapping types of responsibility: causal responsibility, moral responsibility, and role responsibility. Our analysis is informed by the well-known accounts provided by Hart and Hart and Honore. While these accounts are helpful, they have misled philosophers and others by presupposing that responsibility can be ascribed in all cases of action simply by paying attention to the free and intended actions of human beings. Such accounts neglect the part played by technology in ascriptions of responsibility in cases of moral action with technology. For both moral and role responsibility, we argue that ascriptions of both causal and role responsibility depend on seeing action as complex in the sense described by TMA. We conclude by showing how our analysis enriches moral discourse about responsibility for TMA.
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Of the many ethical issues arising around computer systems, some of the most complicated and vexing concern responsibility. One obvious issue has to do with "responsible computing" and what it might mean to be a responsible user. Another issue arises when software contains bugs that result in harm to moral patients. (1) Here responsibility may be traced back to the programmers, coders, or testers. Other issues arise when computer systems do exactly what the specifications call for, but they have been built on the basis of an inadequate model of their application environments. (2) Here the developers of the computer system are held responsible. In all of these cases, the focus of attention is on human beings. In this paper, we want to focus attention on computer systems and the role of their complexity in ascribing responsibility.
Responsibility issues related to computer systems are ontologically complex because there are 'many hands' involved in their development and use. The many hands include modelers, coders, testers, documentation writers, system administrators, and users. When something goes wrong, or even when there is some preventative action to be taken to avoid untoward events in the future, questions arise as to whether and how responsibility should be distributed among these 'many hands.' Also, responsibility issues related to computer systems are conceptually complex because there is ambiguity in the very concept of responsibility, both in philosophical and legal accounts, and in everyday or "common sense" notions. When we try to untangle meanings of responsibility, we find that there are many different kinds, e.g., causal, moral, and legal, and they each have overlapping and sometimes interdependent meanings.
Though these two kinds of complexity are important, we want to focus on a third kind of complexity. Responsibility issues related to computer systems are also technologically complex. Our analysis begins with a general analysis of moral action with technology. We emphasize that while the role of computer systems (and other technological artifacts) in moral action is different from that of human beings, it is also different from that of natural phenomena. To explore technological complexity in ascriptions of moral responsibility, we introduce the notion of technological moral action (TMA). TMA involves three integrated components--an artifact, a user, and an artifact-maker. (3) All three components are essential to TMA, but traditionally only the human components have been considered important for discussions of responsibility. We want to show that sorting out the kinds and degrees of responsibility in a TMA requires that this third component--the technological artifact--be included in the investigation.
In the first part of the paper we elaborate our notion of TMA. In the case of TMA and computer systems, TMA is carried out by a computer system user, a system designer (developers, programmers, and testers), and a computer system (hardware and software). In sections two and three we discuss three, sometimes overlapping types of responsibility: causal responsibility, moral responsibility, and role responsibility. Our analysis is informed by the well-known accounts provided by Hart and Hart and Honore. (4) While these accounts are helpful, they have misled philosophers and others by presupposing that responsibility can be ascribed in all cases of action simply by paying attention to the free and intended actions of human beings. That is, these accounts neglect the part played by technology in ascriptions of responsibility in cases of moral action with technology. Hence, we offer an account that moves beyond Hart and Hart and Honore. For both moral and role responsibility, we show that something significant is missed when the computer system is left out of the analysis, in trying to understand designer-responsibility and user-responsibility. We conclude in section four by summarizing our argument and showing how it enriches moral discourse about responsibility for TMA.
In all of these discussions, it is important to bear in mind that inquiries into causal, moral, and role responsibility can be forward and backward looking; that is, sometimes ascriptions of responsibility involve giving an account of what happened after the occurrence of an untoward event, and other times they involve assigning tasks and duties that will be fulfilled in the future. In the backward-looking aspect, sometimes the point is simply to identify the causal sequence of events. Finding fault or assigning blame is also backward looking. In the forward-looking aspect, the point is to assign responsibility so as to prevent or diminish the likelihood of untoward events occurring in the future. These two ways of thinking about responsibility generally work together. In looking back at what happened, we pick out the element that could have been otherwise and in so doing, we ascribe responsibility in a way that can affect future behavior. These ascriptions inform others that they will be identified as accountable for future effects. Our analysis of the role of computer systems (and other technological artifacts) in ascriptions of responsibility shares both the forward and backward-looking aspects of ascriptions of responsibility for human action without technology.
Technological moral action
As already indicated, our starting place is in the realm of instrumented action, that is, action with technology. While human action often occurs without technology, a huge proportion of our actions in the 21st century involve the use of technology. And increasingly, our actions involve the use of computer systems, sometimes visible to us and other times not. In the 21st century, it is rare that human beings act (in morally-interesting ways) solely with their bodies. We live in technologically complex dwellings, communicate through human-made devices, travel in machines, and depend on technologically advanced medical...
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